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This thesis examines military performance in both urban and traditional non-
urban environments.  Cases used in this study are German operations on the Russian 
front, Israeli operations during the Yom Kippur War, and U.S. Marine operations in 
South Vietnam.  This thesis establishes a framework for analysis consisting of six factors.  
These include environment, time, informational aspects of military operations, 
application of existing technology, intangible human factors, and the decision-making of 
both political and military leaders.  Analysis of the three cases points to a number of 
common trends including, shortcomings when units enter in the urban environment.  We 
note a lack of urban operations training, an increase in time to accomplish tasks, a 
resistance to operate at night, difficulty processing and communicating information, and 
micro-management of city fighting by political and military leaders who typically refrain 
from such management during non-urban combat.  Results of this study suggest a need to 
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I. A DIFFERENT WAY TO THINK ABOUT URBAN WARFARE 
Cities present a most complex and dynamic environment for combat.  The 
growing urbanization of the world’s population, rapidly evolving global interdependence 
of cities, and the asymmetric advantages urban terrain offers technologically inferior 
forces suggest that the probability and significance of urban warfare will greatly increase 
in the future.  During the Cold War, U.S. military doctrine called for operations to avoid 
cities if possible (FM 90-10, 1979).  This school of thought likely developed from the 
excessive costs and violence associated with urban combat that were discovered (or 
rediscovered) during operations in WW II to include: Aachen, Manila, and Berlin, to 
name a few.  Only recently has urban combat been addressed as unavoidable.   
A. THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to improve understanding of the forces at play in a 
city during combat operations and to determine whether there is a way to control and 
manipulate these forces with the goal of making urban operations more effective.  
Combat in the urban environment affects units differently than fighting in other types of 
environment.  Urban combat is not necessarily more difficult; rather, it is more complex.  
Failure to understand how the characteristics and dynamics of the urban setting impact 
operations is manifested in increased costs in lives, resources, and total damage, which 
leads to the perception that urban warfare is harder and to be avoided if possible. 
Recent conflicts in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, the West Bank, 
and Iraq have witnessed a marked rise in the number of battles fought in urban terrain.  
Militaries which choose not to address the nature of urban battle beforehand typically 
find themselves forced to change strategies and tactics during the execution of urban 
operations, thus generating confusion, uncertainty, and ineffectiveness.  Units structured, 
equipped, and trained for linear combat at extended ranges, involving intricate technical 
systems, disciplined formations, and centralized decision-making quickly discover that 
the urban environment nullifies two-dimensional doctrines and causes the battle to 
devolve into a series of small scale primordial melees.  Commanders lose control of their 
units, and individual soldier tenacity, ability, and resolve become more important to the 
result than in other environments.  As General Vladimir Chuikov, commander of the 
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Soviet 62nd Army at Stalingrad, put it, “Fighting in a city is much more involved than 
fighting in the field.  Here the ‘big chiefs’ have practically no influence on the officers 
and squad leaders commanding the units and subunits” (as cited in JP 03-06, 2002).  
For much of history, generals hoped to avoid urban combat due to the terrible 
costs to their armies, civilian populations, and the cities themselves.  Sieges most likely 
emerged as the dominant tactic for capturing cities because storming them was too costly.  
But, no matter how much commanders wished to avoid the costs of urban combat, these 
operations persisted, from the sack of Carthage in 146 B.C. to the fall of Baghdad in 
2003.  Armies trained and organized to think and fight on open terrain have struggled to 
address the nature of urban warfare.  From the Roman legions in Jerusalem in 70 A.D. to 
Russian motorized rifle regiments in Grozny in 1994-1996, armies unfamiliar with how 
the urban environment challenges their organization have seen their effectiveness, 
advantages, and capabilities greatly reduced.  One of the doctrinal legacies of WWII, 
lasting through the end of the Cold War, was that urban combat was to be considered a 
peculiar problem, best handled with greater numbers and superior firepower (McClarin et 
al., 1987).  Wishing to avoid the costs associated with positional warfare in cities, 
militaries called for avoiding cities whenever possible even though many of these 
militaries possessed an urban doctrine.1 
The post-Cold War environment and experiences in Somalia, Northern Ireland, 
and Chechnya led to a renewed interest in urban warfare and a rebuttal of the idea that 
fighting in cities could be avoided.  This renewed interest generated a series of doctrinal 
revisions, technological studies, and policies regarding urban warfare.  The fruits of these 
efforts have been reaped by militaries that subsequently adapted their combat systems, 
training, and tactics to account for the urban environment.  The recent effectiveness of the 
Russians in the Third Battle of Grozny 1999-2000, the Israelis in the West Bank, and the 
U.S./U.K. operations in Iraq, suggest that some units have been properly prepared to 
handle the challenges of urban operations.     
                                                 
1 U.S. Army field manual, FM 90-10 dated 1979 advises commanders to avoid urban battle.  Olga 
Oliker, in, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000 (2001), determined that Russian urban doctrine prior to the 
first battle of Grozny advocated the bypassing of cities unless otherwise absolutely necessary.  Brigadier 
General (retired) Avidor of the Israeli Defense Force, during a guest lecture at the Foreign Military Studies 
Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS on 12 March 2003 said following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, many Israeli 
officers did not want an urban doctrine, because then there would be an excuse to conduct urban operations. 
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But do these cases represent the worst that cities can throw at soldiers?  We think 
not, and because of this there is a continuing need to improve urban combat capabilities 
for long-term stability and influence.  In our review of military theory, history, and 
current literature on urban warfare we have yet to find a comparison between urban and 
non-urban environments that convincingly demonstrates how challenges are magnified as 
units transition from one environment to the other.  Consequently, this study seeks to 
answer the question, “How do cities affect time, information, use of technology, 
human factors, and decision-making differently than do other environments?”  In order 
to address this question, this study will briefly review classic military theory, 
contemporary literature on urban warfare, and current U.S. urban warfare doctrine to 
determine the origin and present state of thought about the subject, and the extent to 
effectiveness with which these factors are already addressed.  Following this review, our 
hypotheses about urban combat are presented and we then examine the cases of 
Stalingrad, Suez City, and Hue.  These cases will show the extent to which each factor is 
or is not magnified as the same or like units move from a non-urban to urban 
environment.  Following presentation of the cases, the factors will be compared and any 
identifiable trends will be explained.  In the conclusion, we will make recommendations 
for the conduct of urban warfare by taking these factors into account.    
B. THE FOUNDATION FOR CURRENT URBAN DOCTRINE AND 
THOUGHT 
Many of the classic military theorists tend to limit their thinking about treatment 
of urban warfare to the decision of whether or not to attack a city.  While some mention 
is made of tactics, the predominant theme in classic theory is rooted in the strategy of 
attacking cities or fortifications.  The problems encountered during urban operations in 
Mogadishu and Grozny revived interest in the subject, and the current literature on urban 
warfare concentrates on the nature of the environment, technical innovations, and 
recommendations for doctrinal adjustments.  Current U.S. military urban doctrine, for 
instance, reveals improvements in addressing the challenges of urban operations. But, in 
our view, this updated doctrine guides commanders based on lessons learned from 
previous urban operations.  Current doctrine falls short in educating officers about why 
and how the urban environment creates a sharp contrast with the non-urban environment, 
and how those who must make this transition might mitigate the effects.   
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1. Classical Military Theory  
The problems and challenges associated with waging urban warfare have been 
around since ancient times.  Sun Tzu wrote about urban warfare as early as 500 B.C., 
during a very violent period in Chinese history when sieges were common and 
technologies for urban attacks were advanced.  In The Art of War, (Griffith, 1963) Sun 
Tzu advised against attacking cities because they degraded freedom of maneuver, 
required inordinate amounts of time and soldiers, and caused loss of initiative.  Sun Tzu 
implied that besieging or storming a city led to positional attrition-type warfare, which to 
Sun Tzu meant an absence of strategy.  Sun Tzu did recognize that there were proper 
occasions for attacking a city, but only when that effort would lead directly to the 
enemy’s defeat.  His most explicit advice on urban warfare is found in his famous quote, 
“The worst policy is to attack cities.  Attack cities only when there is no alternative” 
(Griffith, 1963, p. 78).  It is clear in reading Sun Tzu that he understood the costs 
associated with urban warfare, but he stopped short in his explanation about the 
relationships between urban warfare and costs. 
In Josephus Flavius’ account of Titus’ costly seizure of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., 
Josephus observed that the narrow winding streets of Jerusalem were not conducive to 
moving in massed formations, thereby forcing the Romans to move in small groups that 
had to guard their flanks continuously as well as fight to their front.  Cleary the Romans 
were masters of siege warfare, but once they made it past the walls, Josephus indicates 
that they were not fully prepared or comfortable with fighting in the city streets (Farmer, 
1960, pp. 203-207). 
Niccolò Machiavelli witnessed many sieges in northern Italy during the 16th 
century and saw first hand the terrible costs associated with that form of maneuver.  He 
advocated in his book, The Art of War (Farneworth, 1965), that the best way to attack a 
city is to “fall upon it unaware” (Farneworth, 1965, p. 195).  He believed that the best 
way to engage in urban combat was to attack with speed, surprise, and shock in order to 
gain and keep the initiative.  He advocated that it was better to draw an enemy out of a 
city than to commence siege warfare; this was exemplified, for instance, by Scipio who 
drew Hannibal out of Carthage by moving his army away (Farneworth, 1965, p. 195).   
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Machiavelli was also one of the first theorists to acknowledge the usefulness of 
the civilian population in defending a city.  He mentions that people unaccustomed to 
siege can easily be persuaded to surrender, especially if an army can generate fear or 
panic within the population, but that it is necessary to grant the population quarter or 
allow people an avenue of escape to prevent them from feeling the need to stiffly resist 
(Farneworth, 1965, pp. 190-195).  Additionally, Machiavelli makes a few tactical 
observations, but, in general terms, like Sun Tzu, he advocates avoiding cities whenever 
possible. 
The Napoleonic Era was the great age of maneuver, when commanders sought 
decisive victory in open terrain.  Much of the thought concerning urban warfare during 
this period was limited to the challenges of getting through the fortifications and walls.  
Street fighting, after the breach of outer defenses, was feared, and this trepidation is best 
captured by Napoleonic author Rory Muir’s description about fighting inside a city 
“…produces nothing but shapeless slaughter without purpose, and an army beyond the 
control of its general” (Muir, 1998, p. 20).  Clausewitz, in On War (1976), devotes most 
of his efforts on urban warfare to the tactical problem of overcoming fortifications 
surrounding cities.  He concluded that infantry comprise the necessary arm for urban 
fighting, and that military virtue within soldiers is more important in terrain that tends to 
complicate operations and disperse forces (Paret, 1976, p. 188).  At the strategic and 
operational levels, Clausewitz, implies that urban warfare is to be avoided unless the 
objective is directly linked to the defeat of the enemy.  This relationship is important 
because Clausewitz understood that the costs in terms of time and violence that are 
associated with urban combat have the potential to throw political will and military 
necessity out of sync, which can lead to a host of unintended consequences. 
B. H. Liddell Hart, in Strategy (Liddell Hart, 1968), and Mao, in On Guerrilla 
Warfare (Griffith, 1978), mention little about the tactics of urban operations, but they do, 
devote a lot of effort to the examination of will and morale, human psychology, surprise, 
and the use of maneuver to achieve true concentration.  Liddell Hart emphasizes 
understanding and manipulation of human affairs as opposed to the physical 
manipulation of combat power.  Mao believed that the best way to conduct war was 
through the use of small units acting independently, constantly moving and constantly 
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applying pressure (Griffith, 1978, p. 78).  Mao believed that a mix of regular and 
irregular forces is vital to success and that in some environments it may even be 
beneficial for orthodox armies to function as guerrillas.  He also believed in two criteria 
essential for success in war: “realization of the people’s aspirations” and adaptable 
leadership not bound by formulae and rules (Griffith, 1978, pp. 76-97). 
2. Contemporary Literature and Current U.S. Urban Doctrine 
S.L.A. Marshall was one of the first post-WWII military thinkers to call for 
preparation for urban warfare.  In his Notes on Urban Warfare (1973), Marshall 
challenges the doctrinal wisdom of avoiding cities and examines how fighting in cities 
can best be done.  Marshall demonstrates that little theoretical effort has been devoted to 
the subject of urban warfare, so he offers historical evidence and the principles of war as 
a way to solve the problem (Marshall, 1973, pp. 3-7).  Marshall uses historical evidence 
from WWI and WWII to develop technical and tactical means for addressing the 
environmental complexities of the urban landscape.  Marshall’s primary area of emphasis 
is on how to use technologies to overcome urban obstacles (Marshall, 1973). 
In 1987, a Defense Technical Institute report, analyzing 22 urban battles fought 
between 1942 and 1982, concluded that, “current doctrine is well-founded in advising 
attacking American forces to avoid cities where this is feasible” (McLaurin, Jureidini, 
McDonald, & Sellers, 1987, p. 3).  The report also notes that taking cities consumes large 
amounts of time; the attacker has an advantage only if the ratio of forces is 4:1 or greater; 
intelligence and firepower are key factors; and it is easier for an attacker to win if the 
defender is alienated from the population.  The report also addresses the utility of putting 
technical systems designed to perform other tasks to innovative uses, such as air defense 
artillery in a ground support role or tanks working behind infantry (McLaurin, 1987). 
Dr. Russell Glenn, of RAND, thoroughly analyzes the peculiarities of the urban 
environment and the impact they have on operations.  His work includes examination of 
environmental differences and the effects they have on time, command and control, and 
information systems (Glenn, 2000).  Glenn also calls for development of weapons, 
communications, and support systems to account for the environmental challenges 
presented by urban areas and the need for joint urban operations doctrine.  Glenn 
developed the notion that cities today are bigger and more complex than in WWII, and 
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that the key to urban warfare lies in overcoming the challenges presented by 
environmental densities which impact military forces (Glenn, 2000).  Glenn proposes that 
one way to deal with urban combat is to prepare for it, and that the extent of preparations 
should be an important measure of combat readiness. 
In contrast, Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Ralph Peters focuses on the human 
dimension of the urban environment and the challenges associated with urban combat as 
a consequence of different cultures, social patterns, and customs.  In Peters’ mind, the 
key variable of urban warfare is the population (Peters, 2000); he feels human complexity 
is greater and more important than the physical challenges of city fighting.  Peters also 
argues that fighting in Third World urban areas will present particular problems for 
military forces, such as disease (Peters, 1999).  He adds that the U.S. military is not fully 
prepared to handle the challenges of urban combat even though militaries will naturally 
be drawn into them (Peters, 1999, pp. 71-72).  Peters calls for significant restructuring of 
military units tasked with urban operations to account for the predictable drain on the 
human capacity to endure continuous high stress, violence, and dramatic change (Peters, 
1999, p. 73). 
Dr. Roger Spiller, in Sharp Corners (2001), calls for a revival of interest in urban 
operations.  He challenges the military to demonstrate a willingness to innovate and adapt 
policies and doctrine to acknowledge future threats that will use urban terrain as an 
asymmetric advantage when confronting U.S. military superiority.  Spiller’s analysis of 
the urban environment not only addresses its physical and human characteristics, but also 
succinctly demonstrates how the two are intertwined.  His analysis has led him to 
conclude that cities are linked to supporting systems and have rhythms of activity which, 
in operational terms, can be somewhat vulnerable to manipulation by military forces.  
Spiller also examines the long history of sieges and urban battles, and draws lessons from 
those battles as well as his environmental analysis to propose ideas for updating current 
approaches to solving the complexities of urban warfare (Spiller, 2001).  
Operational experiences throughout the world in the 1990s, as well as the 
influence of contemporary literature, led to vast efforts to embrace urban training, such as  
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exercises, experiments, and an overhaul of U.S. urban doctrine.  The cornerstone 
documents of this doctrinal repair are JP 03-06: Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations 
(2002) and U.S. Army FM 3-06: Urban Operations (2002).   
JP-03-06, written by the U.S. Marine Corps, addresses the need for a joint urban 
operations doctrine.  The premise of this innovative publication is that the urban 
environment is more difficult and presents a series of unique challenges in terms of 
personnel and equipment.  The crux of JP 03-06 is based on defining the urban 
environment, and then proposing ways to operate within the constraints presented by that 
environment.  JP 03-06 acknowledges that cities constrain the ability to command, 
control, and coordinate forces as well as pose challenges to information operations.  The 
main premise for this assertion is that cities can reduce the advantages of a 
technologically superior army.  JP 03-06 does stress the importance of the human 
dimension of combat, as well as offers several other considerations for executing 
effective urban operations, such as synchronization and tempo challenges, environmental 
considerations, and force protection measures.  Finally, the publication also addresses the 
utility for application of several assets rarely discussed in urban warfare, to include: space 
and psychological operations, civil-military relations, special operations, and 
consequence management schemes for man made or natural disasters (JP 03-06, 2002). 
FM 3-06 is the army’s latest revision of tactical-level urban operations doctrine.  
This publication is designed to provide brigade, battalion, and company level 
commanders and staffs insight into how to conduct urban operations.  The manual does 
provide very detailed guidance on analysis of the physical characteristics of the urban 
environment, and it details a host of tactics, techniques, and procedures for executing 
urban operations—from crossing a street to clearing a building to calling in fire support 
(FM 3-06, 2003).    
Our review of the military theory, contemporary literature, and past and present 
U.S. urban doctrine included many more articles, reports, and manuals, but much of this 
other literature simply repeated or amplified points made above, or to include simply 
warning forces to steer clear of urban warfare.  Lessons learned from past urban battles, 
as well as established military principles based on theory, have for the most part provided 
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the foundation of current thinking about urban operations.  From our synthesis of this 
literature and our own insights into military operations (see bibliography) we derived 5 
key factors for urban warfare: time, information, use of technology, human factors, 
and decision-making.  We note that nowhere in our literature review were these factors 
mentioned together and, except for the environmental factor, none were compared across 
non-urban to urban settings in order to illustrate just how different combat in different 
kinds of environments can be.  Essentially, our examination of the urban warfare 
literature led us to conclude that these factors are not explored in the detail required to 
produce a true understanding of what happens to military forces as they leave a more 
open terrain and head into a city.  We discovered that, quite often, the only analysis and 
discussion surrounding urban combat involves: when to choose to go into a city, how to 
understand the urban environment, how to deal with civilians, or a list of technical and 
tactical quick fixes.  Prior unit experiences and how these may affect a unit’s 
performance in a city are not addressed.  By demonstrating that the five factors we have 
identified are instrumental across environments, we hope to provide insights into how to 
better improve capabilities to conduct urban operations.  
C. THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS OF URBAN WARFARE 
It is our belief that urban warfare is considered complex, costly, and dreaded 
because, somehow, the urban environment magnifies the effects of time, information, 
use of technology, human factors, and decision-making on forces engaged in combat 
in urban areas.  This magnification, while difficult to measure empirically, appears to 
impact the effectiveness of units in an urban setting more so than in non-urban 
environments.   
The complexity innate to urban areas is the primary cause for the magnification of 
the factors and the challenges they, in turn, generate.  This magnification of effect creates 
implications and consequences for fighting forces that are unique to urban combat, even 
though the factors themselves are not peculiar to urban combat.  Understanding the nature 
of a conflict, as well as having a keen awareness of the enemy, are two essential 
conditions for waging successful war in any environment.  In urban warfare, the ability to  
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manipulate these key factors relative to the enemy is a third condition for success, 
success that we define as mission accomplishment characterized by a reduction in overall 
suffering, damages, and costs. 
It is necessary to view the factors of urban warfare not as constants or 
fixed variables.  Their effects and relationships evolve and morph based on actions taken 
by both sides.2  For example, the effects of the factors and their interactions in 
Mogadishu were completely different on 3 October 1993 than they were on 3 September, 
and their effects were dissimilar for all the factions involved.  The thing to keep in mind 
is that the effects are relative, and that they will never affect one side in the same manner 
as they affect the other. 
1. Main Hypothesis 
If a military does not take measures to mitigate the factors of time, information, 
use of technology, human factors, and decision-making, and how these interact with the 
urban environment, it will experience increased fiction proportional to the unit’s inability 
to account for them.   
2. The Key Independent Variable:  Environment 
We have broken the environment into two components, the physical terrain and 
the human environment.  Aside from enemy activity, no other dimension of war has a 
greater impact on organizations than the environment.  Perhaps the greatest reason urban 
operations are regarded as difficult is that cities present the most complex and dynamic 
environment imaginable for combat.  Understanding the foundation of this environmental 
complexity is essential to understanding how the other factors are magnified.  
a. Physical 
In terms of military operations, urban environments can be characterized 
as having a high concentration of large three-dimensional obstacles that limit observation 
and control of forces, and also canalize movement.  The density of obstacles compels 
militaries to operate in a non-linear fashion with elements that are frequently dispersed 
                                                 
2 This implies that friction and enemy activity are linked to the overall effects of each factor.  Both 
friction and enemy actions are inherent constructs in war that can vary in degree based on the action and 
reaction to the dynamic nature of the operational battle space.  We intend, in this study, to illustrate and 
isolate the interaction of the 5 factors, as well as their interaction with the environment.  
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and isolated.3  Conversely, a non-urban environment is anything outside of the urban 
realm.  For this study, such environments include deserts, cultivated areas, barren 
steppes, and jungles.   
b. Human 
The human component of the environment refers to its societal and ethnic 
make-up.  In regard to military operations, this factor describes the attitudes, allegiances, 
and behaviors of a population towards forces fighting within the environment where the 
population resides.   
3. The Factors of Analysis 
Hypothesis: In cities, the time required to complete basic tasks will increase, 
synchronizing combat power will become more difficult, and interpretations of 
objective time will change. 
a. Time 
For the purposes of this study, we have divided time into three categories: 
relative, functional, and objective.  This is derived from Brigadier General Gideon 
Avidor (retired) of the Israeli Defense Forces (Avidor, 2003). 
(1) Relative Time.  Some forces may see time as a constraint, 
whereas others consider it an ally, and opponents generally judge the effects of time 
differently because their objectives and planning considerations differ.  
(2) Functional Time.  This is the amount of time it takes to 
accomplish a task.  Functional time for our purposes will be the different amounts of time 
required to perform similar tasks in both the urban and non-urban environments.  Because 
different militaries choose to do things differently, there will be differences in functional 
time.  For example, whereas one military trains to send a radio message in 15 seconds to 
avoid intercept, another may have equipment that prevents intercepts, and thus that 
military does not concern itself with such a limitation.  The importance of functional time 
comes in a force’s ability to synchronize combat power according to timetables.  Units 
that cannot accurately predict the time it takes to perform certain tasks run the risk of 
disrupting their operational synchronization, which carries with it the consequence of 
losing tempo. 
                                                 
3 The concept of density of obstacles is first presented by Dr. Russell Glenn, in Heavy Matter (2000). 
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(3) Objective Time.  This is time that is the same for all parties 
involved.  This includes time of day, date, and sunrise or sunset.  For instance, everyone 
distinguishes between day and night.  One military may only operate during the day and 
shut down at night.  Another military may also only fight during the day, but uses the 
night to position its forces and refit.  These are constants that all sides use and 
understand.  How they are used, however, depends on the military and its objectives, as 
well as who the enemy is and how it chooses to fight.   
b. Information 
Hypothesis: In the urban environment, a military will be severely constrained in 
its ability to collect, process, and disseminate information. 
The information factor is embedded in a unit’s ability to receive 
information from the surrounding environment and maintain the systemic integrity that 
transforms that information into action.  The abilities to sense and communicate are the 
enabling mechanisms for the factor of information, whether by UAV, satellite, or the 
individual infantryman.  This also includes the ability to collect and process intelligence 
for decision-making, and control and coordinate the activities of organizational assets.  
This factor also must be understood in the context of human limitations to take in and 
process information, and how social ties or groupings affect the flow, quality, and use of 
information. 
c. The Use of Technology 
Hypothesis: Technology, which includes technical systems and organization, 
must be tailored to urban settings in order to be effective. 
Proper use of technology implies taking the enemy and the environment 
into account.  Clearly, the use (or misuse) of available technology can impact how a 
military fights and wins.  If technology is designed for use in one environment, yet is 
forced into application in another, can the users of that technology adapt?  What effect 
does the environment have such that it drives those forces to adapt?  True technological 
innovation for the urban environment demands consideration of both the strengths and 





d. Human Factors 
Hypothesis:  Human limits will be reached more quickly in an urban 
environment. 
Human factors are not addressed in detail in doctrine because they are 
difficult to analyze.  For the purposes of this study, we have selected three areas to 
examine:  Limits of the Human System, Will and Morale, and Ethics and Morality. 
(1) Limits to the Human System.  There is a limit to the 
amount of fear, violence, chaos, and uncertainty a person can tolerate.  Additionally, the 
combination of physical fatigue and the human penchant to think in two dimensions 
places soldiers at a significant disadvantage when they attempt to perform complex tasks 
in a dangerous and uncertain environment.  This may affect the physical, emotional, and 
sensory stresses combatants endure.  Manifestations of this include: physical exhaustion, 
sleep deprivation, audio and visual sensory overload, and the inability to process 
information based on these overloads. 
(2) Will and Morale.  We define this component as the unseen 
forces that blend together to serve as the foundation for individual and group courage, 
boldness, resolve, and eagerness to sacrifice and commit acts of violence against other 
humans.  In combat, this is essential to a military force’s combat strength.  Even though it 
is difficult to measure, it is vital to take into account.  
(3) Ethics and Morality.  Violence in warfare is primarily used 
to physically and or psychologically destroy or defeat an opponent.  Without rules to 
govern this violence, it could grow beyond the control of unit commanders managing it.  
Extensive combat operations in continuous close proximity to the enemy could affect the 
discipline of the forces involved wherein acts are committed that violate understood 
standards of warfare in the Geneva and Hague Conventions.  Examples of poor ethics and 
morality in combat include purposely killing prisoners and other noncombatants, looting, 
and the indiscriminate or deliberate destruction of civilian property or infrastructure.  
e. Decision-Making 
Hypothesis:  Decisions to prosecute operations in urban areas will be made at a 
higher level than on a traditional non-urban battlefield where the same size forces 
would operate.  Decisions made at higher levels will convolute the decision-
making process and chain of command. 
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Regardless of the level of war, strategic, operational, or tactical decisions 
are a critical part of planning and execution.  We define decision-making as those 
decisions made at the political and military levels that affect planning, execution, and 
eventually can be linked to the outcome of a military operation. 
(1) Friction As a Constant.  When militaries conduct 
operations in dangerous environments shared by adversaries one of the results of that 
interaction is friction.  In all types of terrain, and across the spectrum of conflict, the 
presence of friction is understood to be inherent, but varies in degree.  The degree of 
friction experienced by units plays a significant role in determining the magnitude of 
challenges and costs associated with a given operation.  We believe friction to be intrinsic 
to our factors, and it is the interaction of our factors with the environment that generates 
friction and degrades operations.  Effective mitigation of the factors has the net result of 
reducing the consequences of friction on friendly units, while increasing the 
consequences for the enemy.   
The interdependencies of human and physical complexity in cities 
carry with them the potential to intensify friction within military organizations.  This 
urban friction affects both sides, but generally degrades an attacker’s effectiveness more 
than the defender’s defense because of the defender’s typically greater familiarization 
with the location.   
Friction plays an important role in war waged in any environment.  
Armies that have difficulty understanding the environment and its effects relative to both 
friendly and enemy capabilities experience the greatest amount of friction.  
Understanding the urban environment in relation to enemy disposition is difficult, and 
thus urban areas typically generate more friction than other environments, although 
theoretically they do not necessarily have to.  Therefore, we feel that in order to reduce 
the challenges (friction) produced by the urban environment, forces must address the 
interaction of time, information, use of technology, human factors, and decision-making 
in ways to account for and exploit the characteristics of the environment relative to the 
enemy’s ability to do the same. 
(2) The Role of Doctrine.  The absence of doctrine from our 
list of principal factors does not imply its lack of significance.  Indeed, we feel that 
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possession of a sound urban doctrine may enhance chances for success.  More important 
than mere possession of urban doctrine, however, is the ability to use the doctrine as a 
means to think about the dynamics involved, and as a means to reduce the equivocality 
experienced by organizations conducting urban operations.  Simply put, the ability to 
understand and manipulate these factors in an urban context is the basis for urban 
doctrine. 
D. METHODOLOGY  
Our study will examine three cases in which the same military operated in both 
non-urban and urban environments.  The environment serves as the key independent 
variable.  The military’s performance in each environment is the dependent variable.  
These factors serve as the framework for analysis and we will see differences in unit 
performance when we compare across the two environments.  As defined earlier, ‘urban’ 
refers to fighting that occurred within the limits of the given city, and non-urban is 
defined as the environment that the military fought in prior to engaging in operations 
within the city.  By keeping the doctrine, unit, offensive posture, and conflict constant, 
the factors analyzed will reveal the physical and conceptual differences between urban 
and non-urban environments and demonstrate how the factors not considered in doctrine 
are magnified.  
1. Case Selection   
Each case was selected based on the following criteria:  First, we only chose 
militaries with a formally established doctrine for conducting operations.  Second, each 
instance of urban combat needed to occur in a conflict in which offensive operations were 
conducted by the same unit or a similar unit in a non-urban setting before urban 
operations were undertaken.  We set the cases up in this manner to measure doctrine and 
unit proficiency in the environment where the unit was more comfortable operating, to 
then compare these results with that of the same unit as it entered a different environment 
and set of circumstances.  Additionally, we wanted to establish a baseline of performance 
in each case.  For this reason, each case had to have non-urban fighting prior to the urban 
fighting. 
We also wanted to choose cases that would cover the spectrum of conflict from 
total war (e.g., the German campaign on the Russian Front in WWII) to low intensity 
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conflict (e.g., the U.S. experience in Vietnam).  This was to add relevance to the factors 
examined regardless of the magnitude of the conflict or campaign.  In addition to the 
spectrum of conflict each case represents, we wanted cases in which the duration of battle 
differed.  Whereas the Russian front case may be measured in months, the Vietnam case 
is measured in weeks and the Yom Kippur War case is measured in days.  Given such 
differences, we will show that the factors we examine do have an impact regardless of the 
duration of the operation.  Lastly, the cases were not selected because we believe it likely 
that U.S. forces will have to engage in urban combat under similar conditions; rather, 
they were selected because they most clearly demonstrate the effects that our chosen 
factors of urban combat have on military organizations. 
2. Cases Selected 
· German campaign in the Ukraine, 1942.  High intensity, long duration  
· Israeli counteroffensive in the Sinai, 1973.  Mid intensity, short duration. 
· 1st USMC Division operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1967-68.  Low 
intensity, mid-duration. 
We analyze each case according to our five factors.  Following the cases, we 
compare each case, by factor, to identify trends and confirm or deny our hypotheses.  We 
use the results of this comparative analysis to identify conclusions and make 
recommendations for improving doctrine, technologies, operational constructs, training, 
and organizational design.  
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II. STALINGRAD 
The name Stalingrad is synonymous with urban warfare.  This battle was one of 
the climactic battles of World War II, fought from September 1942 until the capitulation 
of the German 6th Army in February 1943.  The enormity of the forces involved, the 
mind-boggling scale of violence, the sheer clash of wills, and the profound strategic 
significance of the battle’s outcome make Stalingrad a classic case in the study of urban 
warfare.     
A. BACKGROUND 
The focal units for this case are the 14th and 24th Panzer Divisions (PD) of the 
German 6th Army.  Individual soldier and unit accounts from these units point to the 
marked differences between the drive across the Ukrainian Steppes in the summer of 
1942 and the actual urban combat phase of the campaign later that fall and into the 
winter.  The 14th and 24th PDs were similarly equipped, manned, and experienced 
divisions.  Throughout the non-urban and urban phases of the campaign the divisions 
worked in conjunction repeatedly, and in some operations elements of one division were 
temporarily assigned to the other; in essence these divisions were sister units.  The other 
important characteristic of these two divisions is that neither had any operational 
experience in urban fighting.  Throughout the Russian campaign prior to the urban 
fighting in Stalingrad, these units were used in open terrain to spearhead assaults, exploit 
penetrations, pursue retreating enemy columns, or act as Army reserves dedicated to 
counter-attacking Soviet penetrations of the German lines.  Comparing the 14th and 24th 
PDs and their successful drive from the Donets River to the outskirts of Stalingrad to 
operations inside the city will highlight just how different the urban setting is in the 
challenges it presents to forces accustomed to fighting in non-urban environments.   
Our aim is not to identify or analyze the reasons for the German defeat at 
Stalingrad.  Inability to fight inside cities was only a contributing factor to the outcome.  
German failure to effectively cut off Stalingrad from Russian reinforcements, Russian 
counterattacks and fierce resistance, and Hitler’s unwillingness to concede the city all  
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played a greater role in determining the battle’s outcome.  However, because of the 
contrast in environments and fighting styles, Stalingrad is a good case to show the 
differences the environment generates for our 5 factors. 
B. THE GERMAN DRIVE ACROSS THE STEPPES 
Through incredible leadership, organization, and determination the German Army 
in Russia was somehow able to survive the terrible winter of 1941-42.  Hitler’s orders to 
hold every inch of ground that winter, while initially criticized by his generals, has come 
to be acknowledged as the key decision in saving the German Army which was 
unprepared for the cruel realities of the Russian winter and subjected to a series of major 
Soviet counter-offensives.  The German Army found that it needed the spring of 1942 to 
refit, replace, and retrain an army that had suffered so much during the previous winter 
(Goerlitz, 1963, pp. 50-56; Liddell Hart, 1948, pp. 188-194).   
Hitler was determined to make 1942 the year of decision on the Eastern Front.  
His strategic aim for that year was the capture of the oil rich regions of the Caucasus.  
Hitler hoped that the capture of the oilfields and subsequent control of the Volga River 
would be enough to overwhelm Soviet war production, and thus destroy the Soviets’ 
overall ability to resist.  On 1 June 1942 Hitler met with the commanders of Army Group 
South to discuss the objectives of the summer offensive, “Case Blue”.  During this visit, 
Hitler insisted on the capture of the oilfields as the means for ending the war, and hardly 
mentioned Stalingrad.  The only interest in Stalingrad was the need to eliminate its 
armament factories and secure a position on the Volga River.  The actual capture of the 
city was not considered necessary (Beevor, 1998, p. 70).   
The 6th Army was tasked to cross the Donets and drive along the west bank of the 
Don River, trapping as many of the fleeing Red Army forces as it could.  Once the 6th 
Army reached the Don River, it was to cross it and secure a position along the Volga in 
the vicinity of Stalingrad, securing the northern flank of Army Group South in order to 
allow the First Panzer Army and 17th Army to thrust into the Caucasus.  Hitler was so 
confident of success that he ordered the transfer of Field Marshal Von Manstein’s 11th 
Army, the only principal reserve in southern Russia, to participate in the siege of 
Leningrad (Beevor, 1998, p. 70).   
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Figure 1.   German Advance to Stalingrad  (From:  Stalingrad Battlefield Info). 
 
The initial advance to the Don River was a Panzer commander’s dream.  Large 
Soviet forces were encircled and destroyed, and the routed survivors were forced to 
retreat.  The mood of the German Army that June and July is captured in Antony 
Beevor’s account of the opening stages of Case Blue: 
These seemed glorious days for German front-line regiments.  ‘As far as 
the eye can see’, wrote an observer, ‘armored vehicles and half-tracks are 
rolling forward over the steppe.  Pennants float in the shimmering 
afternoon air.’  Commanders stood fearlessly erect in their tank turrets, 
one arm raised high, waving their companies forward.  Their tracks stirred 
up dust and propelled it outwards like smoke clouds in their wake. 
(Beevor, 1998, p. 75) 
The 14th and 24th PDs’ actions during this period accounted for much of the 
German success.  In late July thru early August, both divisions spearheaded drives 
20 
towards the western bend of the Don River that resulted in the entrapment and destruction 
of Russian forces attempting to move east.  Both divisions’ records indicate the relative 
ease in accomplishing their objectives, and the practical impunity with which they beat 
off Russian counter-attacks (Mark, 2002, p. 1; Stempel, 2002, p. 11).  Clearly the 
Russians were outmatched by the better-trained and equipped Wehrmacht, which was at 
home fighting on open terrain: 
A number of panzer commanders made dismissive remarks about the 
stupidity of the enemy, leaving tanks halted in the open, and thus 
presenting perfect targets for Stukas or the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, 
deadly in the ground role.  They knew the T-34 was overall a much better 
armored fighting vehicle than anything which Germany had yet produced.  
On the other hand, its gunsight was not very good, few Russian 
commanders had decent binoculars, and even fewer had radios.  The Red 
Army’s greatest weakness, however, was its poverty of tactics.  Their tank 
forces failed to use terrain properly and demonstrated little familiarity with 
the principles of fire and movement.  And, as Chuikov readily 
acknowledged, they were incapable of coordinating attacks with Red 
Army aviation. (Beevor, 1998, p. 94) 
One German assault gunner summed up his impression of Russian fighting ability 
on the open steppe,  
The Russians can shoot as much as they want, but we’ll shoot more.  It’s a 
great pleasure when a couple of hundred Russians attack.  One self-
propelled assault gun is enough, and they will make a run at it. (as cited by 
Beevor, 1998, p. 97)     
 
Figure 2.   German Panzers Crossing the Steppes  (From:  Dunnigan, 1978, Plate). 
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The initial drive to the Don, while successful, did take its toll on the Germans’ 
machinery and equipment.  Despite the need to refit, Hitler insisted that the panzers 
continue east, and it was at this point that the Fuhrer made a complete change to the 
initial operational concept, by issuing Directive No. 45: the order which tasked the 6th 
Army to cross the Don and occupy Stalingrad, instead of the initial concept which only 
required the 6th Army to secure positions on the Volga and destroy the factories within 
Stalingrad.  German generals were shocked at the change of plans.  The German Chief of 
Staff wrote in his memoirs, “The constant underestimation of enemy potential is 
gradually taking on a grotesque form and becoming dangerous” (Beevor, 1998, p. 80).  
At this point, the offensive stalled due to severe fuel and ammunition shortages.  The 
pace of the offensive had clearly outstripped the Wehrmacht’s ability to bring up 
supplies, and as the panzers sat awaiting fuel, the Russians took this valuable time to 
begin concentrating in the vicinity of Stalingrad, preparing to make a decisive stand 
there.  German generals lamented their logistical situation because they knew that 
Stalingrad could be captured without a fight if they could only maintain the offensive’s 
momentum.  Field Marshal von Kleist, commander of the army group advancing towards 
the lower Don, voiced this frustration to B. H. Liddell Hart during a postwar interview: 
The supreme irony of the 1942 campaign was that Stalingrad could have 
been taken quite early if it had been considered of prime importance.  The 
4th Panzer Army was advancing on that line, on my left.  It could have 
taken Stalingrad without a fight, at the end of July, but was diverted south 
to help me in crossing the Don.  I did not need its aid, and it merely 
congested the roads I was using.  When it turned north again, a fortnight 
later, the Russians had gathered just sufficient forces at Stalingrad to 
check it. (Liddell Hart, 1948, p. 306) 
C. STALINGRAD UNDER ATTACK 
From 13-20 August, the 14th and 24th PDs crossed the Don and made impressive 
initial gains to expand the bridgehead.  As the two divisions approached Stalingrad, the 
terrain became more rugged as hills and deep gullies, or balkas, became dominant in the 
otherwise featureless steppe.  It was in this terrain that the Soviets committed large forces 
to delay, disrupt, and attrit the German advance in order to buy time for the forces 
preparing the defense of the city.  As the Germans continued to build up their combat 
power on the eastern shores of the Don, the recently designated Stalingrad Command 
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mobilized close to 200,000 civilians, mostly women and children, to turn the city into a 
fortress while the Soviet High Command continued to rush reinforcements into the area 
(Beevor, 1998, p. 97).  As Stalingrad was being transformed into a killing field, German 
troops were beginning to realize that their armored stampede across the steppe was 
coming to an end.  Lieutenant Joachim Stempel’s reconnaissance platoon for the 14th PD 
captured the following document from an abandoned Red Army command post, which 
indicated that the Russians were preparing to stand and fight: 
The infantry is to have no fear of encirclement and should know how to 
take up a defensive ring and break out of it in complete order.  When the 
infantry is encircled, the commanders have to maintain command strictly 
in their hands.  A strong defense in all directions has to be organized, and 
all measures are to be taken to prevent the enemy splitting up the one 
encirclement in to many smaller encirclements.  The break out from an 
encirclement can only take place on orders of the highest command 
authority.  It should be carried out in good order and in no case in small 
groups. (Stempel, 2002, p. 17)4 
In the same journal entry, the young reconnaissance platoon leader wondered 
what was in store for his unit and why the defeated Red Army would choose to fight after 
months of defeat and tremendous casualties, “but our attack draws us closer and closer to 
the city.  What kind of city is this, that is the objective of such fighting and which the 
Russians do not want to give up at any price?” (Stempel, 2002, p. 17) The Germans had 
other causes for concern due to the fact that their General Staff, not anticipating the 
requirement to capture Stalingrad, was woefully behind in planning the operation.  The 
previous year, Hitler had forbidden urban combat in Moscow and Leningrad.  German 
doctrine provided little on the subject of city fighting, and because of this the German 
Army had little if any training or experience in street fighting (Lewis, 2002, p. 3). 
However, an overconfident Hitler was determined to capture the city, and could not be 
persuaded otherwise by his subordinates.  
                                                 
4 Joachim Stempel was a reconnaissance platoon leader, staff officer, and company commander in the 
14th Panzer Division during the Stalingrad campaign.  He surrendered in January 1943 and both he and his 
diary survived the war.  Personal first-hand records of the battle are rare, and Stempel’s multiple job 
experiences show many perspectives of the battle. Stempel’s father was also present at the battle as 
commander of the 371st Infantry Division.  In 2002, Hans J. Wijers, compiled the notes and translated them 
into English. 
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On 21 August, the 14th and 24th PDs encountered their stiffest resistance of the 
summer between Lake Tsatsa and Lake Sarpa.  The 6th Army’s delay for logistics at the 
Don had given the Soviets an opportunity to coordinate and prepare their defenses 
outside of Stalingrad.  The intent of these defenses was to buy time and wear out the 
Germans before they reached the city.  One of the German engineer officers noted the 
Russian resistance: 
The panzer spearhead moved forward against the lake narrows and there 
we ran unexpectedly into mines.  The whole narrows were mined.  Strong 
enemy defense hindered further progress.  We moved out and followed the 
attack.  All of a sudden we were in the middle of a minefield.  My pioneer 
squad cleared 52 mines with 5 men. (Mark, 2002, p. 25) 
During the same engagement the commander of the 14th PD reported the 
following to his corps headquarters: 
Hill 87 taken at 0645 hours.  Difficult situation because of strong fire out 
of Tsatsa and the gullies.  Cannot go north for the time being.  24th Panzer 
Division should stand near Point 12.2 Main fire from the east out of the 
northern and southern edges of Tsatsa.  4 enemy batteries recognized.  We 
must wait until 24 Panzer Division moves up. (Mark, 2002, p. 30) 
From the 21st through the 28th of August, both divisions were continuously engaged by 
staunch Russian defenses, daily counter-attacks, and night raids by the Soviet Air Force.  
The Germans remained victorious throughout the advance, but slowly their combat power 
was being worn away.   
While the panzers ground their way towards Stalingrad, the Luftwaffe’s VIII Air 
Corps under command of General Baron von Richthofen destroyed Stalingrad proper 
with the intent of interdicting Soviet defensive preparations and eroding civilians’ will to 
resist.  On the 23rd of August, over 1,200 Luftwaffe sorties were flown against the city.  
During the aerial blitz, incendiary bombs set fire to the city and the massive petroleum 
stocks in the industrial center.  Stalingrad burned for days, and in the process an 
estimated 40,000 Russians died, most of them civilians.  Antony Beevor’s assessment of 
the initial bombings indicates that the effort may have produced an effect detrimental to  
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German aims, “Richthofen’s massive bombing raids had not only failed to destroy the 
enemy’s will, their very force of destruction had turned the city into a perfect killing 
ground for the Russians to use against them” (Beevor, 2002, p. 119). 
On the 29th, the dual assault by the 14th and 24th PDs achieved a major 
breakthrough in the Soviet defenses and again, both divisions rushed deep into enemy 
territory, maximizing their advantage in mobile warfare and air-ground coordination.  
This breakthrough took the entire 6th Army to the outskirts of the city.  Lieutenant von 
Senger und Etterlin, a panzer commander in the 24th PD, observed the following during 
the breakthrough: 
We again drove stubbornly for 60 kilometers through drifting dust clouds 
thrown up 100 meters by our quick advance.  The Russian anti-tank guns 
were pointing at us from front and behind, and I was hit once with a loud 
crack by an anti-tank rifle.  My squadron drove against the flank covered 
by the smoke screen and only the last vehicle was stopped by a hit.  The 
breakthrough was successful.  In a swift drive the armored group pushed 
through, over hills and gullies deep into the enemy’s hinterland.  Villages 
were being overrun; unsuspecting Russian supply lines were cashiered.  
The armored group irresistibly forced its way through and sometimes 
when we were moving forward and drifted further apart, we attacked in 
force and came together to move forward…Once, through the glassy 
glimmer lying over the steppe, I saw somewhere far to our right the other 
Panzergruppe likewise driving over the hill with us.  That must be the 
spearhead of the 14th PD. (Mark, 2002, p. 88) 
Throughout the Stalingrad sector, German units raced across the steppe towards 
the city under the constant cover of the Luftwaffe.  The 14th and 24th PDs began to 
penetrate the outskirts of the city during the first week of September 1942.  To the typical 
German soldier, it appeared that the hard summer’s offensive would end soon with a 
quick capture of Stalingrad.  
1. The German Assault into Stalingrad 
Stalingrad was a key industrial city located on the western bank of the Volga 
River.  Bordered by barren steppe to the west and water to the east, Stalingrad’s 
elongated nature ran roughly north to south following the banks of the Volga.  The 
narrow city, with a pre-war population of 600,000, was no more than four kilometers 
wide and in some areas was less than 2 kilometers wide.  The city was bisected by the 
deep gully, Tsaritsa Balka.  The other major natural terrain feature in the northern portion 
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of the city was the old Tartar burial mound at Mamayet Kurgan, a hill some 102 meters 
high that overlooked the entire city and the Volga (Spiller, 2000, pp. 61-62).  South of the 
Tsaritsa Balka was the bulk of the residential area.  Following the Luftwaffe incendiary 
attacks, much of that portion of the city was burned out, and all that remained were rows 
of brick chimneys, which reminded the German soldiers of gravestones (Mark, 2002, p. 
176).  The other two significant features of southern Stalingrad were the main train 
station and the ominous and massive grain silo, which dominated that portion of the city.  
Northern Stalingrad was primarily industrial.  The Mamayet Kurgan dominated the 
northern city part of the city and provided a tremendous vantage point for the industrial 
sprawl created by the oil storage facilities and four major factories: the Lazure Chemical 
Plant, Krasny Oktyabr Metal Works, Barrikady Weapons Plant, and the Dhershinskij 
Tractor Works (Spiller, 2000, pp. 61-62).  The combination of Luftwaffe bombing and 
the labor of Russian civilians to transformed Stalingrad into a fortress of twisted steel and 
concrete, interconnected with bunkers, sniper positions, and trench systems.  No longer 
did anyone, soldier or civilian, live above ground.  Stalingrad was a man-made nightmare 
before the battle was even joined.   
The city was defended by the remnants of the Soviet 62nd Army under the 
command of General Vasili Chuikov.  The 62nd Army had spent the summer fleeing from 
the German onslaught, and found itself with only 20,000 troops to defend the city.  Stalin 
made it clear to Chuikov that the retreat was over, and any further withdrawal would be 
tantamount to a crime against the state (Spiller, 2000, p. 61).  Chuikov, realizing his 
desperate situation, made wide use of directly subordinated NKVD police units to control 
all access into and out of the city.5  He terrorized his own officers and, recognizing the 
need to slow the German advance, conveyed his brutally harsh and simple intent to his 
army: “Time is blood” (as cited by Beevor, 1998, p. 128).  All the Russians had to do was 
hold their ground and kill Germans, and Chuikov was clever enough to understand that 
the courage, tenacity, and hardiness of Russian infantry could be fully maximized in the 
close quarters battle of urban combat. 
                                                 
5 The NKVD, one of the predecessors to the KGB, provided communist party-controlled police 
“services” to the Red Army.  Just before Stalingrad, the Soviet High Command convinced Stalin to 
subordinate the NKVD to local Red Army commanders.  
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Figure 3.   Stalingrad, August 1942  (From:  Stalingrad Battlefield Info). 
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On the 6th of September, the 14th and 24th PDs had planned to assault into the 
southern portion of the city. However, the depleted divisions required more time to refit 
and rearm, and consequently the attack was delayed.  These delays, while necessary, gave 
additional time to the Soviets to reposition, prepare, and conduct reconnaissance.  The 
Russians took advantage of the German delays to bombard and disrupt the German 
assembly areas and lines of communication (Mark, 2002, p. 131). 
Using the Tsaritsa Balka as an anchor on the left flank, the 24th PD was tasked to 
move east into the city, clearing through the burned out residential areas with the 
objective of securing the railway which ran north to south.  The 14th PD simultaneously 
was to launch an attack on a parallel axis in support of the 24th PD.  The remainder of the 
6th Army continued to pressure the central and northern parts of the city, and the 389th 
Infantry Division (ID) attacked to seize the Mamayet Kurgan (Hill 102).  All the while, 
the Luftwaffe continued to pound the city, and the Germans quickly realized how 
difficult air-ground coordination in urban environments could be.  On several occasions, 
Stukas bombed the front line advance of both the 14th and 24th PDs (Mark, 2002, p. 119).  
Prior to the attack, General Hoth, commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, issued the 
following guidance to his panzer commanders, which was to have far-reaching 
consequences in the coming weeks: 
Wherever the panzer forces are employed closely compressed with 
concentrated strength, the attack is a success.  The new regrouping of the 
Corps will and must lead to success.  That the enemy – pressed back into a 
narrow area – will offer considerable resistance is certain. (as cited by 
Mark, 2002, p. 128) 
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Figure 4.   German Tank Outside the Factory District  (From:  Stalingrad Battlefield 
Info). 
 
The first push by the panzer divisions commenced at 0330 hours on 8 September without 
the use of a preparatory bombardment.  This move caught the Russians off guard, and 
both divisions were able to gain substantial ground in the suburbs. But, as the sun rose in 
the city, the panzer formations soon proved vulnerable.  Flanking anti-tank fires from 
pockets of Russian infantry and mines knocked out 33 total panzers from the 14th and 24th 
PDs, with the casualties including a large number of experienced leaders (Mark, 2002, p. 
139).  German advances were modest for the remainder of the day and the attack 
continued until the 14th of September, when the German commanders concluded that the 
city was invested minus the Volga, and a satisfactory foothold was established within the 
suburbs.   
From 15 – 22 September, both divisions worked hard to establish control of the 
southern portion of the city.  As anticipated, Russian resistance was fierce throughout, but 
the speed of the initial panzer thrust and the constant pressure placed on the Russians did 
not afford the Soviets an opportunity to regroup.  The 24th PD was the first unit at  
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Stalingrad to achieve its initial objectives, and it was followed closely by the 14th PD.  
Lieutenant Stempel of the 14th PD recounts his impression of the initial drive into the 
southern portion of the city: 
At our brigade command post it is broadcast in the “evening briefing” that 
the Stalingrad railroad station has just been captured, and this time once 
and for all!  In five days it was evacuated and retaken fifteen times by the 
Russians.  But now it is securely in German hands.  And with this the 
majority of the southern edge of the city has been taken!  All except for 
one building, that rises from the southern edge of the city and is towering 
over everything.  It is a giant grain elevator – there a bitter fight still rages. 
(Stempel, 2002, p. 39) 
The battle for the grain silo was the first tough test for the Germans, and clearly 
demonstrated the difficulty in rooting out staunch defenders from dominant urban 
positions.  Fifty-odd men from the Russian 35th ID defended the grain silo, and on 18 
September they beat off ten German assaults.  After three days of fierce fighting, and  
efforts by elements of three German divisions, the remaining defenders broke out under 
the cover of darkness (Beevor, 1998, p. 140).  The pyrrhic nature of the victory is 
captured in Stempel’s memoir: 
The fighting, no the wrestling here, is yard by yard.  It really is a bestial 
battle for every bit of ground, for each undulation in the ground, each 
gully.  The losses it brings are unimaginable – on both sides! Everything 
here is unbelievable, it surpasses everything seen before!  And our artillery 
fire of all calibers and our bombing attacks tear into this – without pause.  
Directly behind us the division artillery is firing overhead, likewise the 
rocket launchers, who with their “screaming and moaning” make even us 
old fighters jump into the nearest hole for cover.  And then – out of the 
blue sky and without any prior warning – Soviet artillery and Stalin organs 
impact among us!  And then the brigade commander gets the report: “The 
grain elevator has been taken!”  First a battalion attacked there and finally 
– after five days – it is parts of three German divisions that today, 
September 22nd, have finally taken this important point, the grain elevator. 
(Stempel, 2002, pp. 42-43) 
On 24 September, Hitler sacked General Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff.  
Increasingly frustrated by the slow progress and high costs of operations in southern 
Russia, Hitler blamed his generals for operational and tactical difficulties.  Hitler replaced 
Halder with the sycophantic Field Marshal Keitel, referred to by professional officers as 
“Lakeitel” or the ‘nodding donkey’ (Beevor, 1998, p. 145).  At this point, Paulus lost his 
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only ally between himself and Hitler and, despite the setbacks, heavy casualties, and 
worsening operational situation, Hitler demanded that Paulus seize Stalingrad 
immediately, and refused to rotate or redirect forces out of the Caucasus to assist in the 
effort at Stalingrad.  On 30 September, in a speech given at the Berliner Sportsplatz, 
Hitler left no doubt about his intention at Stalingrad: “no man will shift us from this spot” 
(Beevor, 1998, p. 164).  Already suffering from the strain of combat coupled with 
continuous fits of dysentery, this pressure from above took its toll on Paulus (Beevor, 
1998, p. 146).  Paulus’ only hope was that Stalingrad would fall quickly, and thus he 
transferred his personal pressure down the chain to his division commanders. 
Having secured the southern portion of the city, the 24th PD was transferred north 
to assist in the capture of the airfield and Hill 102 (the hill changed hands several times 
during the initial penetration).  The 14th PD was also pulled out of the city to reinforce a 
Rumanian army protecting the flank of the 6th Army.  The Russians were keenly aware of 
the weaknesses of the German allies, and made three concerted offensives against these 
lower quality troops to relieve some of the pressure on Stalingrad.  At a key point in the 
battle, the Germans found themselves transferring assets back and forth, in lieu of 
adhering to their doctrine which demanded that they concentrate all their power and 
effort at the schwerpunkt: point of decision.  Strategically, the Germans were also 
violating this principle due to their insistence on simultaneous campaigns in the Caucuses 
and at Stalingrad. 
With the southern sector of Stalingrad fairly secure, the 6th Army decided that the 
time was right to finish off Soviet resistance and seize the northern industrial sector.  On 
the 27th of September, the German offensive against the factory district began.  The 24th 
PD assaulted along the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, seizing an airfield and the key 
high ground, which overlooked the industrial district.  Again in open terrain, the 24th PD 
experienced tremendous success in penetrating and exploiting Soviet defenses.  Once the 
high ground was firmly in German possession, elements of the 24th PD were assigned to 
assist the 100th Jaeger Division capture the Krasny Oktyaber Metal Works.  The 
combined efforts of these two divisions eventually succeeded in capturing the Krasny 
Oktyaber, but the success came at the cost of the division’s infantry strength within the 
panzer grenadier regiments.  These losses forced the German command to commit the 
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276th infantry regiment from the 94th ID to shore up the 24th’s losses (Mark, 2002, pp. 
245-260).  Unfortunately, these two units were unfamiliar with each other and lacked the 
experience necessary to coordinate infantry and tank attacks, and the biggest attacks were 
yet to come.  Meanwhile, instead of lending support for the seizure of the factories, the 
14th PD was called away again to defeat a Soviet attack to the south of Stalingrad, which 
succeeded in penetrating the 11th Rumanian Corps’ defenses (Stempel, 2002, p. 45).  As 
soon as the integrity of the Rumanian defenses was restored, the 14th PD returned to 
northern Stalingrad to begin the final push against the industrial district.6 
 
 
Figure 5.   Germany Infantry Force Their Way Through “Red Barricade”  (From:  
Carell, 1991, Plate 207). 
 
2 The Fight for the Factories 
After a short pause to coordinate the line of defense and replenish losses, the 24th 
and 14th PDs took the lead in the assault of the two significant remaining Soviet pockets 
of resistance at the Barrikady Gun Foundry and the Dshershinskj Tractor Works.  The 
24th PD, the 108th Panzer Grenadier (PG) regiment of the 14th PD, and elements of the 
94th ID assaulted to seize the gun foundry, while the remainder of the 14th PD and the 60th 
Motorized ID attacked the tractor works.  For the next three weeks, both panzer divisions 
were consumed by the most horrific urban combat imaginable.  The struggle for the 
factories ceased to be a battle of maneuver, coordination, and in some respects firepower.  
Instead it simply became a battle of wills.  The close proximity to the Volga River, in 
some cases only fifty meters away, strengthened resolve on both sides, resulting in a 
                                                 
6 Stempel’s records indicate that the diversions made outside the city to assist the Rumanians lasted 
only a couple of days and did not result in many casualties for the Germans.  However, the fact that units 
exhausted by weeks of city fighting were redirected may indicate that the Germans had overcommitted 
their combat power inside the city as well as lacked faith in the capabilities of their allies.   
32 
fixed positional war of attrition, the type of war that favored the Russians, and one in 
which the Germans were neither trained nor equipped.7  During the summer blitz, both 
panzer divisions measured objectives in terms of kilometers, but in the fight for the 
factories, each division measured progress by meters and by individual buildings.  The 
compression and concentration of combat power from kilometers down to meters 
completely mitigated the German technical and doctrinal advantages in tanks, infantry, 
and coordination, and the close proximity of the fighting ensured the inevitability of 
heavy casualties for all participants. 
 
 
Figure 6.   The Factory District  (From:  Stalingrad Battlefield Info). 
 
                                                 
7 S.J. Lewis, in an interview conducted in March 2003, stated that by the end of 1941, nearly 90% of 
German combat engineers had been lost.  During the spring of 1942, many infantry units had to be 
“retrained” as engineers. 
33 
Lieutenant Stempel, since reassigned to command a company of panzer 
grenadiers in the 108th PG regiment, recounted the fighting in the factory district: 
Meter by meter we advance slowly.  We take hours to reach the next 
objective!  Set up covering fire – work our way forward – covered, 
pressed close to the earth and using each and every, even the smallest 
possibility of cover.  And we continuously look around us, where are the 
Russians lurking?  And there we again see them – directly in front of us- 
at only 50 meters – the heads of the Red Army men!  Earth brown as 
everything that has been left here.  Things blast brightly and the stuff flies 
round our ears!  Again losses through dead and wounded!  My God, how 
many will it be today that have to be recovered and dragged back tonight 
in the darkness?  To the right of us the riflemen attack again!  We can hear 
them, their cries and their firing.  And over us all the smoke of the burning 
buildings, of the oil tanks to the left of us and the glowing remains of the 
factory halls.  And then all of a sudden – again our Stukas are coming up! 
We fire off white flares, so they are immediately able to recognize our 
forward lines and are able to drop their bombs on the enemy as close as 
possible to us.  And now – everywhere white and yellowish flares rise to 
the sky.  Everywhere “Here we are!”  How can the planes possibly 
recognize where the German outposts are?  So they curve and circle – and 
then all of a sudden go into a dive.  With a deafening howl of sirens they 
come diving down! Far in front of us, directly in front of us, and my god, 
also behind us!  New giant craters are made, smoke-and dust clouds as 
well as the dirt of fountains of earth darken the terrain and temporarily 
darken everything!  Visibility nil.  Now all of a sudden machine gun fire! 
Independently from the various groups.  Cries, shouts – engine noises.  
Counterattack by the Soviets!  And there I can make them out.  30 or 40 
meters in front of us – bent over, quick- without steel helmet, all just 
wearing caps.  Now we’re covering them with fire from all weapons.  And 
we need an artillery barrage!  Red flares!  Quickly, quickly!  And there it 
comes in howling, our artillery blocks it off.  Mortar projectiles whir and 
whistle, surprisingly, they are there!  Taking cover now has no use! 
Hours flows into hour [sic], day into day of bitter fighting.  And on the 
27th of October we assemble again.  Though tired, fought to exhaustion, 
we still have the will to force a decision.  Immediately after breaking 
cover, dead and wounded in the first few meters!  And down! Cover!  
Where are the guys that fire on us?  From where is the damned fire 
coming? (Stempel, 2002, p. 77) 
Forced into such combat by the nature of the environment, the effectiveness of 
German mobile doctrine was rapidly eroded.  Tank battles in and around the factories  
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ceased to be coordinated in any way, and instead pitted individual tank crews against 
squads or, in some cases, individual defenders.  In his memoirs, Chuikov wrote about the 
nature of tank divisions in urban combat around the factories: 
…. on the 16th of October, masses of enemy infantry, supported by tanks, 
swooped along the road from the Tractor Factory to the Gun Factory.  This 
large-scale, determined attack came up against the 84th Tank Brigade’s 
tanks, which had been dug in.  And to the west of Tramvaynaya Street our 
tank crews met an enemy attack with concentrated fire from a distance of 
100-200 meters.  Ten or more enemy tanks immediately went up in 
flames.  The German attack petered out.  At that moment our artillery on 
the east bank opened up blistering fire on the enemy’s halted tanks and 
infantry. 
Being a long way from the field of battle, and not seeing what was 
happening on the sector of the main attack, the German generals sent up 
more and more fresh units, which rolled up to our lines in waves.  Here 
they were stopped and were pulverized by powerful salvos from our 
‘Katyusha’.  The German tanks coming under fire from our well-
camouflaged T-34’s and anti-tank guns turned back and abandoned the 
infantry. (as cited by Mark, p. 281)8  
Through the end of October, both panzer divisions fought viciously for control of 
the factories.  However, Russian determination was up to the challenge; all that any side 
accomplished was increased attrition and suffering.  At the end of October, the 14th and 
24th PDs, completely exhausted, pulled out of the fight for the factories and occupied 
positions in some of the more “quiet” sectors of the city.  Their objective was simply to 
defend previously seized objectives.  However, even here they were subjected to Russian 
counter-attacks, barrages, and snipers.  Accounts from both divisions at this point in the 
battle indicate that there was little combat power left, and for the first time doubt began to 
formally set in regarding German chances for success before the onset of winter (Mark, 
2002 ; Stempel, 2002).   
The predicament of diminishing German combat power was compounded by the 
fact that Germans were never able to completely isolate Stalingrad.  The Russians were  
                                                 
8 Mark states that Chuikov’s account, notorious for exaggerations, is corroborated by German records 
(Mark, 2002, p. 281). 
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consistently able to get reinforcements across the Volga River.  These Russian efforts 
ensured that Chuikov’s forces had “just enough” combat power to keep the Germans tied 
to the city (Beevor, 1998, pp. 159-160).   
At the strategic level, Hitler refused to see the reality of the battle, or the 
indicators of a Soviet encirclement that became more and more evident with the passing 
of time.  On the 17th of November, Hitler issued another order to the 6th Army demanding 
the attack continue: 
The difficulties of the Battle for Stalingrad and the lowered combat 
strengths are known to me.  The problems of the Russians with the current 
ice forming on the Volga are even greater.  So when we use this span of 
time, we’ll save a great deal of blood later.  Therefore I expect that the 
leadership, with all previously demonstrated energy, and the troops, with 
often proven determination, will once again give their all in action to 
break through to the Volga, at least near the Gun Foundry and the 
Metallurgical Works, and take these parts of the city.  The Luftwaffe and 
artillery are to do everything in their power to prepare and support this 
attack. (Stempel, 2002, p. 94) 
Paulus, obviously full of “previously demonstrated energy” and perhaps some 
cynicism, relayed the Fuhrer’s order with some of his own guidance, “I’m sure, that these 
orders will give a new impulse to our brave troops” (as cited by Stempel, 2002, p. 94).  
But the troops at this point had little or nothing left to give.  Aside from minor attacks or 
an occasional reconnaissance in force, the 6th Army was forced to assume a defensive 




Figure 7.   Soviet Infantry in Stalingrad  (From:  The Urban Operations Journal). 
 
3. Encirclement and Capitulation 
By this point, the battle for the city was strategically and operationally 
insignificant.  Massive Russian formations had been secretly building up combat power 
north and south of Stalingrad, and on the 19th of November, General Zhukov launched 
Operation Uranus, a two-pronged offensive designed to destroy the Rumanian and Italian 
Armies, protect the flanks of Stalingrad, and encircle the 6th Army.  Operation Uranus 
commenced at 0500 with massive bombardments against the Rumanian and Italian 
positions.  Shortly thereafter, the lead elements of the Russian attack were across the 
Volga and, by midday, organized Rumanian and Italian defense ceased.  That afternoon 
Soviet formations made tremendous gains against fleeting resistance.  Clearly, this was a 
major Soviet counter-offensive designed to encircle the 6th Army, and the success of this 
operation had a major effect on the outcome of the city fight. 
The lack of a German response was surprising.  It appears that Paulus’ command 
was not even aware of the scale of the offensive until mid-afternoon on the 19th.  Despite 
the Germans’ lack of situational awareness they were not in a position to do anything to 
stop the Soviets anyway.  Stalingrad had so consumed the 6th Army that Paulus failed to 
organize a mechanized strike force before the attack, and without a ready-made and 
designated force to thwart the Russian penetration, there was nothing to prevent the link 
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up of the two Soviet armies.  Lieutenant Stempel’s company in the 14th PD would have 
been a logical force to move against the Soviet offensive, but it was bogged down in the 
heart of the city, incapable of breaking contact, and completely in the dark.  This report 
came out of Stempel’s diary dated 19 November 1942: 
It is already 0730 hours this morning.  We are standing by tensely, 
concentrated on the attack.  But no orders to prepare for the attack come.  
No support – whether from the air force or by our artillery – is noticeable.  
And the engineers that had been promised to us for this attack do not 
arrive!  On the other hand there is much excitement and hurrying in the 
battalion staff!  But no explanations and information get through to us.  
Only indications of a situation that has changed completely.  What’s the 
meaning of all this, what has happened, that our attack cannot be 
launched?! We continue to stand by in our extended holes in the earth and 
positions, look towards the east – into the unknown.  Even now, when 
darkness falls – we know nothing. (Stempel, 2002, p. 95) 
Even had the 14th or 24th PD been given orders to leave the city and counterattack 
the Soviet offensive, it is unlikely that either division would have been able to do so.  By 
19 November, both divisions had fewer than thirty functional tanks and little fuel to 
support even that small number (Beevor, 1998, pp. 246-250).  By the afternoon of 21 
November, the lead elements of two Soviet armies linked up in the vicinity of the Don 
River crossing at Kalach; the 6th Army had been encircled. 
Hitler refused to authorize a breakout attempt at Stalingrad even at this point.  The 
city had become a symbol to Hitler and the German people, a symbol that was bound up 
with the fate of the Third Reich.  Retreat from this city meant admitting that the Germans 
could be defeated, and despite the lunacy of holding positions in Stalingrad, Hitler gave 
the following order on 27 November: 
The Battle for Stalingrad is reaching its climax.  The enemy has broken 
through into the rear of the German forces and now is desperately trying to 
regain possession of this vitally important bulwark on the Volga. 
With me the thoughts of the German people are with you in these difficult 
hours.  You’ll have to hold the positions in STALINGRAD, which you 
conquered under the command of such capable generals.  It has to be our 
unwavering determination that, like Kharkov in the spring, this Russian 
breakthrough will lead to his destruction through measures already 
undertaken. 
38 
Whatever is in my power is being undertaken to support you in your 
heroic battle. (Beevor, 1998, p. 107) 
For the next two months the 6th Army remained trapped at Stalingrad.  The 
Luftwaffe conducted a massive aerial resupply operation, but its efforts fell far short of 
the army’s requirements.  Unable to provide for itself in the middle of a Russian winter 
and under relentless Soviet attacks, the 6th Army capitulated on 3 February 1943; 91,000 
prisoners were taken. 
All-told approximately 250,000 Axis troops were lost at Stalingrad along with 
1,000 tanks, 1,800 guns, and hundreds of aircraft.  Of the losses, 150,000 were killed or 
wounded by January 1943 (Lewis, 2002, p. 21).  The losses to the Russians, both military 
and civilian, while officially unknown, were estimated to be greater than the losses 
suffered by the Germans, but in the end Stalingrad had not been taken.  A summer of 
mobile warfare that had generated such success and optimism turned into a fall and 
winter house-to-house fighting in the streets and rubble of Stalingrad, leading to the total 
destruction of the largest field army in the Wehrmacht. 
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: GERMAN ADVANCE TO STALINGRAD 
AND THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD 
1. Environment 
a. Physical Terrain 
The distinctions in terrain between the advance to Stalingrad and the urban 
portion of the battle had significant effects on the outcome of each operation.  The 
physical density of objects, events, and obstacles easily accounts for these differences.  
There appears to be a correlation between the number and density of objects in the urban 
and non-urban environments and the amount of friction experienced by the Germans. 
The physical environment during the advance to Stalingrad was 
characterized by vast open steppes, agricultural land, and farming communities.  On two 
occasions the terrain was broken up by major rivers, the Donets and Don.  Closer to 
Stalingrad, hills and deep balkas provided some relief in the terrain.  However, even in 
this more broken terrain, line of sight, engagement distances, maneuver space, and ability 
to coordinate and control forces were barely affected.  Essentially, the Germans found 
themselves in a near-ideal environment to exercise their doctrine of mobile, combined 
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arms warfare.  Aside from terrible dust and sand that presented a maintenance challenge 
for a mechanized army, and the long distances required to be covered by logistical assets, 
the terrain between the Donets Basin and the outskirts of Stalingrad was essentially ideal 
for a panzer commander.  Accounts from both the 14th and 24th PDs echo this sentiment: 
East of the Donets to the Don steppe and the Kalmuck steppe the wide 
agricultural grounds here have already yielded to the steppe.  East of the 
Don, only the steppe awaits us.  The ground is flat, without any higher 
ground.  It is devoid of trees and possesses a depressing boredom.  Heat, 
dust and wide spaces without shadow!  To the horizon nothing is visible 
that draws attention to itself.  A heat of over 50 degrees centigrade – the 
desert must be like this.  All the while we are of course thinking how this 
will look in winter.  Snow, winter storms, icy frost!  Don’t think about it.  
Not now, while we’re sitting on our motorcycles all sweating.  Driving 
does not offer any relief either.  Heat and dust, nothing else. (Stempel, 
2002, p. 6)  
Group Hellerman, a reinforced battalion of the 24th PD, occupying an area 
covering  25-kilometers while protecting the flank of its parent division, described the 
terrain during the advance east: 
In 58-degree heat and continuous dust storms, we advanced further 
through the Kalmuck steppe toward the northeast.  For days on end there 
are no human settlements, the earth is bare, burnt black and heat waves 
rise into the air.  There are no roads.  We drive with the march compass 
over the hills.  The Kalmuck steppe has swallowed us up. (Mark, 2002, p. 
8) 
In this type of terrain the Germans were able to take advantage of their 
superior tactics and weapons technologies.  The Russian T-34, commonly acknowledged 
as superior to any German tank at the time, lacked the sophisticated gun sights and optics 
to be successful against the Germans in this open terrain, and the Germans were generally 
able to mass tank fires or use the long-range capabilities of the 88mm flak cannons to 
defeat the superior Russian armor.  Conversely, the lack of sophisticated fire and 
maneuver tactics and combined arms doctrine within the Soviet structure placed Soviet 
forces at a serious disadvantage when fighting the panzer formations on the steppe.   
The open terrain allowed the Germans to maximize the use of the 
Luftwaffe’s capabilities.  Aerial reconnaissance was able to locate Russian formations far 
to the front of the advancing panzers, and close air support provided by the Stukas was 
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extremely effective and well coordinated.  In fact, the steppes were so dry and hard that 
on numerous occasions, planes would land right behind the panzer formations to deliver 
supplies, drop off key personnel, or evacuate casualties. 
The open terrain also ensured that the Germans could effectively mass 
combat power without masking any assets.  Visibility was so good that German 
commanders often reported being able to see the elements of other divisions off in the 
distance.  Commanders with this sort of situational awareness clearly had an advantage in 
gaining early and accurate intelligence and coordinating fires.  The occasional hill or 
balka did present some challenges to the Germans, but because these features afforded 
the Russians the only protection for miles it became predictable to expect the Russians to 
defend them thereby making it easier for the Germans to deploy into battle formations 
and employ devastating air and artillery fires.  Finally, Russian counterattacks in the open 
terrain were quickly beaten off on nearly every occasion.   
Within the limits of Stalingrad the terrain changed completely; the urban 
environment nullified many advantages that the steppe offered for a panzer division.  As 
previously mentioned, the city was elongated and extended some 56 kilometers pinned 
against the Volga.  The city, comprised of many small dwellings, apartments, shops, and 
stations, was dominated by the heavily constructed northern industrial district and the 
nearly impregnable grain silo to the south.  Luftwaffe raids that preceded the ground 
attack burnt and “rubbled” the city, but this only served to increase the number of 
obstacles.  The broken terrain of a bombed-out city created numerous concealed firing 
positions, masked the movement of troops, and offered tremendous protection against 
direct fire and high explosive weapon systems.  Additionally, the city could never be 
completely isolated because it ran along the Volga, and while the Germans made many 
attempts to interdict the traffic on the river, they were unsuccessful in completely 
isolating the city from outside support.  The failure to isolate the city from outside 
support ensured that the Russians could keep feeding fresh troops into battle whereas the 
Germans were unable to. 
Some of the physical terrain challenges experienced by the 24th PD are 
captured in a compilation of lessons learned and suggested techniques for city fighting: 
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Terrain difficulties such as house ruins, bomb craters, narrow streets, 
minefields, tank barriers and obstacles largely limit the maneuverability 
and observation possibilities of panzers so that in principle, operations of 
panzer units in city combat must be avoided.  The casualties received bear 
no comparison to the success of this most valuable weapon system of the 
army.  The main weapon of the panzers, ‘fire and movement’, cannot be 
used properly.  They present a target and see very little.  The panzer is not 
suited for city fighting when operating in units such as a Panzer Regiment 
or Abteilung.  On the edge of the city and in completely disintegrated 
sectors of the city, panzer operations are often useful. (Mark, 2002, p. 327) 
The challenges of the terrain were not limited to the panzers.  Artillery 
units had difficulty spotting and adjusting rounds, and the low trajectories of heavy 
artillery made them less effective in engaging targets masked by multi-story buildings.  
Infantry units had numerous difficulties as lines of sight became minimal, and the enemy 
became harder to detect.  The man-made and man-altered aspects of the terrain were also 
particularly harsh on infantrymen trying to maneuver or assault through it: 
The corporal in fully torn up and muddied uniform takes me – in bounds – 
in the direction of the “Front” to the battalion command post.  Over 
mountains of rubble, through collapsed buildings and through the remains 
of halls and factories.  And everywhere projectiles strike the walls still 
standing.  Onward, onward!  Over shattered rails, through hollows with 
loose stones and iron beams that have come down, then again through 
factory halls, in which parts of machines, work benches and material of all 
sorts lie around, toppled, destroyed.  From the iron girders that are still 
standing are hanging wavy metal plates and wiring. (Stempel, 2002, p. 69) 
The sheer number of obstacles, firing positions, and areas to observe, 
coupled with a general inability to see more than one hundred meters, forced units to 
compress their formations and operational battle space.  The compression of combat 
power with decreased situational awareness and decentralization of operations increased 
the friction between units, and forced attrition tactics due to lack of any maneuver room.  
This compression of combat power, caused in part by the complex and difficult-to-
control environment, only added to the problems of operational control. 
b. Human Environment 
For the most part, the terrain during the drive to Stalingrad was devoid of 
human settlement and civilian populations.  The lack of civilians eased German 
operations considerably as they did not have to overly concern themselves with refugee 
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or partisan activity.  For the civilians who did occupy the steppe, many were extremely 
friendly to the Germans.  Many of the Cossacks of the Don Basin were vehemently anti-
Communist, and willingly offered support to German forces, despite the German 
propensity to loot along the way.  The remaining civilians also had cause to side with the 
Germans.  Having been ordered to burn their villages and evacuate their families with the 
retreating Red Army, the Cossacks realized their defiance of this order would eventually 
lead to their death if the Germans were unsuccessful.  Front line German troops enjoyed 
these warm relations with the locals.  A German company commander wrote in his diary, 
“To be honest, people give everything they have if you treat them correctly.  I have never 
eaten so much as here.  We eat honey with spoons until we’re sick, and in the evening we 
eat boiled ham” (as cited by Beevor, 1998, p. 88). 
In contrast, the civilians of Stalingrad—some 200,000 of them—were less 
than pleased to see the 6th Army.  Terrorized by the NKVD who forced them to remain 
within the city, and enraged by the Luftwaffe firebomb attacks, the civilian population 
was not about to hand out anything to the Germans except punishment and revenge. 
Civilians dug trenches, anti-tank ditches, and berms, and many of the women and 
children took up arms against their invaders (Beevor, 1998, p. 98).  German operational 
and logistics problems left them with little patience or resources for civilian battlefield 
management, and essentially there were no rules of engagement.  The combination of 
terror tactics by the NKVD, patriotism, and no better option offered by the Germans, 
created a fervent resolve in the civilian population to resist.  This resolve is captured in 
Stempel’s diary: 
The inhabitants of Stalingrad fought in the ranks of the Soviet forces.  The 
workers of Stalingrad labored day and night despite the murderous 
bombing attacks and the incessant artillery bombardment of the city.  Even 
when the enemy was less than a kilometer from the Tractor Works and the 
enemy’s guns were firing at it over open sights, the work in the factory 
halls was not stopped.  In these horrible days the factory reached its 
highest productivity of labor and daily built dozens of tanks, which rolled 
straight to the forward positions from the factory gates.  Their crews were 
the workers that had built the tanks.  Yes, it was like that day-by-day.  The 
resistance grows stronger; the fight is carried out without mercy. (Stempel, 
2002, p. 30) 
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The dynamics of the physical and human aspects of the urban environment 
varied greatly from those of the non-urban setting, and these differences account for the 
tremendous magnification of our other key factors.  German failure to understand the 
effects of this magnification, and apparent inability to reduce it through proactive 
measures, appeared to make their operations less effective and more time consuming—
time in which the Soviets used to prepare for Operation Uranus and the eventually 
entrapment of the German 6th Army. 
2. Time 
The Stalingrad campaign offers a great instance in which to examine the 
relationships between relative, functional, and objective time in both urban and non-
urban environments.  All three components of time created effects of different magnitude 
in each environment, and these effects were linked to the levels of friction, uncertainty, 
and equivocality experienced by the Germans.   
a. Relative Time 
During the summer drive towards Stalingrad, a slight advantage in relative 
time belonged to the Soviets.  The Germans hoped to decisively cut Moscow from its oil 
reserves in the Caucasus before the onset of winter.  The German High Command 
believed that this action would be enough to convince Stalin to capitulate.  The distances 
required to achieve this objective were tremendous and the need to push quickly to the 
Volga was obvious, so obvious, in fact, that German logistical assets had great difficulty 
in keeping pace with the advance.  Consequently, the momentum of the offensive was 
halted numerous times to due to lack of fuel.  The Germans were also very aware that 
they had in fact lost two months of campaign time in April and May due to the necessity 
to rebuild their forces after the disasters of the preceding winter (Beevor, 2002).   
The Russian view of time was much different for this phase of the 
campaign.  Initially, surprised by the German decision to make the main effort in the 
south, STAVKA was forced to quickly reposition assets from around Moscow to 
Stalingrad.  Additionally, given Russian mobilization plans, reinforcements from Asia 
needed time to train, equip, and position to effectively counter the German offensive 
(Beevor, 2002).  The common thread in relative time between the two sides was 
preparation of the defenses at Stalingrad.  After the Germans crossed the Don, the 
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Russians stopped retreating.  They fought tenaciously in the hills and balkas outside of 
Stalingrad, and launched repeated counterattacks to wear down the Germans and buy 
time for the 62nd Army to prepare Stalingrad for the decisive battle.  The delays caused 
by Russian actions in early to mid- August prevented the quick capture of the city. 
During the urban portion of the campaign, the differences in relative time 
were most pronounced.  The Germans were keenly aware that a quick capture of 
Stalingrad was necessary to allow them to cut the Volga and shore up their defensive 
positions along the river before winter.  The Germans were also concerned that any major 
delay in the capture of Stalingrad could threaten the northern flank of units moving into 
the Caucasus.  It appears that the sharp difference in relative time drove the Germans to 
commit more and more forces to Stalingrad while the Soviets simply had to maintain 
enough force in the city to achieve their objectives.  With each attack, it appeared to the 
German commanders that victory was just one more push away, and that all that stood 
between the 6th Army and the last 100 meters to the Volga were a few Russians and the 
requirement for just a couple more regiments of German infantry.  Indeed, German 
perceptions of relative time may have been the principal reason why the Germans 
committed so much combat power to assault and capture Stalingrad and the defeated 
remnants of a broken 62nd Army.  It is interesting to note that no such time constraints 
were placed on the forces besieging Leningrad during the same period.  The Russian 
view of relative time is simply captured in Chuikov’s directive to his men, “Time is 
blood.”  Stalin and his generals were more than willing to exchange lives in an urban 
fight in order to gain time to reorganize, rebuild, and prepare for a counter-attack.  
Because the Russians had more men to sacrifice and could continue to reinforce 
Stalingrad, they knew they had the advantage in a battle of attrition and were more than 
happy to accommodate German attrition-based tactics. 
b. Functional Time 
The differences in functional time between the urban and non-urban 
phases of the campaign were stark.  Advances on the open steppes were measured by 
kilometers and hours, in contrast to the city where progress was measured by meters and 
days.  During the drive across the steppes, German forces fought relatively short battles 
and often went days without any contact.  Clearing a hill or a balka typically took half a 
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day to accomplish, and after a brief and anticipated Soviet counter-attack the German 
forces would have time to rest and refit before another 2-3 days of movement.  Air and 
artillery units responded more quickly to calls for assistance since it was easier to identify 
the foe and adjust fires.  Perhaps the most important aspect of functional time in open 
terrain was the lack of a requirement to strictly coordinate and control activities with 
adjacent units.  Aside from commanders’ intent, the 14th and 24th PDs rarely ever had to 
pause for coordination on the steppe, even though they mutually supported each other 
during the entire advance.  Commanders had relative freedom to move when and where 
they saw fit.  Dispersal and the long-range nature of the engagements made functional 
time hardly an issue at all. 
Functional time took on an altogether different meaning inside Stalingrad.  
As expected, everything in the city took longer.  Fire support from artillery and aircraft 
was less responsive because of coordination difficulty and poor commander situational 
awareness.  Maneuver units bogged down in the broken terrain, and numerous obstacles 
and the close proximity of the fighting slowed the battle immensely as individual soldiers 
naturally felt a reluctance to move under fire emanating from only 50 meters away.  On 
the 30th of September, Lieutenant Stempel’s journal reveals his views about the pace of 
the battle: 
It is unbelievable, how the course of events here is developing into a war 
of positions!  The fight rages for each house, each factory hall, for railroad 
cuts, walls and each cellar.  And what we all fear seems to come true – 
that we’ll be fighting here in winter. (Stempel, 2002, p. 45) 
Miscalculations in functional time combined with the compression of 
operating spaces and frontages created horrendous coordination problems for the 
Germans fighting inside the city; these problems were manifested in delays, fratricide, 
and inability to orchestrate mass fires onto enemy positions, while the Russians were glad 
to take the time generated by these coordination problems to reinforce and shift assets 
around the battlefield to counter German intentions.  German synchronization of 
operational planning appears to have been time-based, and when stiff Russian resistance 
disrupted the timetable, entire attack plans fell apart: 
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It was clear to the commander of Infanterie-Regiment 576 that the 
cleansing of Hall 6 (Manufacturing Hall) and Hall 4 (Assembly Hall) was 
going to be a bloody protracted affair.  There was no possibility that the 
sector could be cleared before the suggested time of 0800 hours.  A liaison 
officer of 24 Panzer Division equipped with a radio team, had been 
attached to Infanterie Regiment 576 since 0630 hours and provided reports 
about the course of the attack.  He informed Oberst von Below that the 
complete capture of the Gun Factory had not succeeded.  As a 
consequence, the assault of the 24 Panzer Division was now also 
postponed. (Mark, 2002, p. 296) 
Functional timelines, and the dense compression of units, generated 
coordination problems, which led to longer duration of operations.  On 21 October, the 
24th PD headquarters published guidance demanding subordinate units pay particular 
attention to coordination issues in the following categories: Infantry, panzer grenadier 
and panzer coordination, artillery coordination, engineer and panzer coordination, 
adjacent unit coordination, coordination with the Luftwaffe, and general overall 
communications improvement (Mark, 2002, p. 305).  These issues indicate a general 
frustration with delays in time and effectiveness compounded by the close proximity of 
so many assets. 
c. Objective Time 
Due to lack of sophisticated night fighting capabilities, the armies 
developed rhythms based on the amount of light available.  In both the open and urban 
environments, the Germans used the hours of darkness predominantly to defend the day’s 
gains, rest, and resupply.  German air superiority and technical and tactical advantages 
were best suited for daytime conditions.  Conversely, the Russians used the day to 
defend, dig in, and disrupt German operations.  At night, the Russian air and artillery 
assets were used to continuously harass and interdict German rhythms, and although 
Russian efforts did not destroy much in the way of personnel or equipment, they did 
prevent the Germans from resting.  Over time, this constant pressure may have led to 
increased fatigue and errors in judgment on the part of individual German soldiers.  The 
Russians also used the night to launch raids and ambushes against German resupply 
efforts, and surrounded Russian elements were able to successfully escape under cover of 
darkness.  Additionally, inability to constantly pressure the Russians allowed them to 
reinforce and resupply at night, and while no sources indicate this, it seems very likely 
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that a majority of the Volga river traffic flowed at night.  Stempel’s memoirs accurately 
describe the disconnect in rhythms, and how the Soviets were able to take advantage of 
German unwillingness to operate at night: 
When it slowly gets dark, and the view is too unclear to make out 
anything, we stop the attack and take up positions, in order to be safe from 
nightly surprises and be able to spot every enemy approach in time.  
Runners to the platoons, platoon commanders to the infantry!  Recovering 
killed, wounded to be prepared for transport.  Make an evening report with 
sketches and off to battalion with it.  Here none has any rest, every-thing is 
wide-awake, and ready for anything!  And over all hangs the question, 
what will tomorrow bring?  Throughout the entire night “the devil is let 
loose” with us!  Just now our food carriers have been taken out by the 
Russians behind us – to our rear!  The Russians rise out of the tunnels, 
which lead behind our front line and then in the dark wait for runners, 
ammunition and food carriers, overwhelm them and kill them. (Stempel, 
2002, p. 75) 
German disadvantages in relative, functional, and objective time greatly 
increased the difficulties they experienced in not only achieving their objectives, but in 
comprehending their environment because they put artificial time constraints on 
themselves, which succeeded in adding pressure but not thoughtful analysis.  The 
difference in respect to the time dimension between urban and non-urban environments 
was profound.    
3. Information 
The ability to gain intelligence and turn that information into physical action 
defines the two processes most impacted by the nature of the urban terrain.  The 
Germans’ ability to sense and communicate served them well on the steppe, but was 
severely degraded by the complex, dynamic, and hostile environment of the city.  
German records and historical accounts of the battle mention little about intelligence or 
coordination problems, so much has to be inferred from their actions. 
On the steppe there were few places to hide and very few hindrances to FM radio 
communications.  German aerial reconnaissance and ground scout assets had little 
difficulty in spotting Russian formations as well as determining their strength and 
disposition.  Similarly, command and control on the steppe was never a major issue.  
Even when radio contact was lost, commanders could physically see most of their units; 
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likewise, air and artillery coordination was much simpler.  Due to the scarcity of 
civilians, there was little ability or need for human intelligence (HUMINT) networks.  
This greatly simplified intelligence matters for the Germans who could focus more on the 
technical means of intelligence collection.  Another significant advantage the steppes 
offered the Germans was a manageable level of information to process.  Commanders 
could get away from their staffs, and staffs could easily pace themselves given the low 
volume and highly accurate reports.  At the same time, the steppes allowed for greater 
relative distances to the enemy, creating a larger time-space factor, which allows units 
greater planning, information processing, and reaction time.  
The environment within Stalingrad created and presented a completely different 
effect on the information dimension.  German ability to sense and communicate greatly 
diminished in the urban setting.  The enemy was seen only in snap shots and would then 
disappear into a building or across a street.  True enemy strengths most likely could not 
be accurately gleaned because of the inability to see the battlefield.  Communications 
were also degraded by the irregularities in the environment.  While we could not find 
anything in German records to confirm EMS interference, we believe, based on present-
day understanding, that German FM radio communications were reduced due to physical 
interferences in the EMS caused by irregularities in the urban terrain.  The Germans did 
complain about the unreliability of radio communications, but it is unclear whether the 
problems were environmental or technical.  Wire communications, while slightly more 
reliable and secure, were also somewhat problematic due to their vulnerabilities to 
explosives, sabotage, and the broken nature of the terrain. 
An army of 250,000 soldiers, fighting compressed in a city the size of Stalingrad, 
must have generated an incredible volume of intelligence and operational reports.  We do 
not have any data to support this, but our own personal experiences in much smaller 
operations give us reason to believe that the volume of information produced at 
Stalingrad was likely very difficult to manage.  A staff’s ability to receive and 
comprehend all the critical information, while intermixed with other standard reports, 
continuously, for months on end, does not seem possible.  This tremendous volume of 
information, while not documented, may have overwhelmed staffs that then became 
forced to prioritize reports.  For instance, the train station in the southern portion of the 
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city changed hands fifteen times.  The number of reports generated by attempts to seize 
this one installation alone were significant, and when you compound other reports 
coming in from adjacent and supporting units it becomes clear that information 
processing was anything but easy.  Some of the 24th PD’s observations on controlling the 
volume of information are indicated by general guidance to reduce radio traffic and 
improve brevity of communications (Mark, 2002, p. 331).  Further complicating the 
Germans’ ability to manage information was the extremely high death rate in 
commanders and staff officers.  From the beginning of September through the end of 
October in the 24th PD, the division commander, all regimental, and most of the battalion 
commanders were either killed or wounded (Mark, 2002, p. 331).  Those commanders 
that managed to survive became prisoners within their own command posts because this 
was the only place from which they could capture the events going on across the 
battlefield.  The paradox of the situation is that commanders sitting in command posts 
tend to demand more and more information about the situation instead of going out to see 
the situation for themselves.  This increased demand for information not only increases 
the volume of information to be managed, but places added reporting burdens on 
subordinate leaders preoccupied with trying to fight in an urban environment.  Prior to 
becoming a company commander, Lieutenant Stempel served as the adjutant in the 108th 
PG regiment of the 14th PD.  On 17 October, during the height of the factory fights, he 
made the following observation, “In these days the brigade commander only rarely leaves 
the command post.  He is in the “situation room” continuously and follows incoming 
messages and the way the situation is developing” (Stempel, 2002, p. 60). 
German accounts do not address the use of HUMINT during any portion of the 
campaign.  However, based on our understanding of combat operations we hypothesize 
the following in regard to HUMINT: Loose rules of engagement and a disregard for 
civilians probably guaranteed poor HUMINT throughout the battle.  HUMINT appears to 
have been most needed for monitoring Russian nighttime activities, but as the battle 
progressed, Russian prisoners became rare and less reliable.  The lack of HUMINT 
probably forced the Germans to rely more on intrinsic technical means.  This imbalance 
in collection assets can often lead to disconnects between what the report indicates and 
actualities on the ground.  Granted, the Germans were probably never going to develop 
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an intricate HUMINT network because of time considerations and the fact that most 
Russians despised the Germans, but if they had tried, they may have been able to 
persuade some of the local populace to collaborate, as they had during their advance to 
the city.  The disconnect between the processing of information and the reality of the 
situation is the biggest indicator of a breakdown of the information system and its 
effectiveness.  Again, Stempel observed: 
Yes, today I witness this “clean-up” “on the map” at the divisional 
command post – about 60 kilometers south of Stalingrad. A Russian 
penetration of the Rumanians must be cleaned up.  By an attack of 
German tanks and panzer grenadiers.  The situation is corrected very 
quickly.  And without any severe losses!  Yes, that all sounds so simple, 
so sober, so according to schedule and routine.  And yet I know exactly 
how it looks “down there” with the squads, platoons and companies.  
When the names of places, units, times and losses get here as “reports.” 
(Stempel, 2002, p. 60) 
The breakdown of the German information system at Stalingrad affected the 
highest levels of the German command.  This breakdown of accurate, intelligible 
information in a hostile dynamic environment likely contributed to a desire in the 
leadership to centralize control and decision-making.  Hitler’s concern about the situation 
and distrust of his commanders led him to interfere with ongoing operations to the point 
where he made several tactical level decisions from over a thousand miles away 
(Mellinthin, 1968, p. 197).  The myopic view of Stalingrad taken by Hitler and his 
commanders may have, in turn, contributed to their inability to detect or acknowledge the 
Russian preparations for Operation Uranus.  The ability to sense and communicate that 
started out as a chief strength of the German army became one of its principal 
weaknesses at Stalingrad. 
4. Use of Technology 
German technical systems and organization in the summer of 1942 were near 
perfect fits with the environment in the move on Stalingrad.  Panzer formations mixed 
with mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery and anti-tank units found the steppe 
to be an ideal environment in which to operate.  On the steppe, the Germans made 
maximum use of every technical and organizational advantage they possessed, from  
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mobility, to communications, to air coordination, to optics.  Historical accounts of the 
advance do not demonstrate any record of innovation or adaptation of equipment or 
organization because there likely was not much of a need to do so. 
In the urban environment, German technological advantages were not merely 
lessened, but in some cases they became detrimental to German efforts.  The experiences 
of tactics and weapons used in city fighting were consolidated by the 24th PD near the 
end of the October fights for the factories.  A verbatim summary of the key problems and 
lessons learned that the division recorded is described below. 
a. General 
· Groupings of tanks, armored infantry, SP anti-tank guns, engineers, and 
artillery have proved excellent in city fighting. 
· Sufficient allocation of engineers is required from the outset. 
· The most dangerous enemy weapons are anti-tank rifles and snipers. 
· The most valuable asset are the men, therefore, mobile assault forces 
should be conserved. 
b. Panzer Grenadiers 
· Infantry squads must be outfitted with sub-machine guns, grenades, 
explosive charges, smoke equipment and multiple radios. 
· Explosives are required for clearing mines and tank obstacles. 
· Each platoon should have a squad of flamethrowers, and companies 
should have mortars with lots of ammunition. 
· Only attack through open areas under cover of artificial fog. 
· Against bunkers smoke is more effective than hand grenades. 
· Direct support of assault groups by artillery is only possible by attachment 
of individual guns. 
c. Panzers 
· Terrain difficulties are so extreme that, in principle, panzer operations 
should be avoided in a city.  The main weapon of the panzer, movement, 
cannot be used properly.9  Panzers present large targets and see little. 
· The panzer is not suited for city fighting in units such as a Panzer 
Regiment. 
· Panzer to infantry coordination is a major issue.                                                  
9 The ability to maneuver and mass fires on specific targets was the true strength of the lighter German 
tanks.  They were not designed to engage in close quarters tank battles against the superior armor of Soviet 
tanks. 
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· Operations by single tanks is refused because of the lack of cover fire. 
· Panzers must not fight in front of the infantry.  They must be kept back to 
provide covering fire.  Infantry must not crouch behind tanks because 
tanks draw lots of fire.  Infantry need to be out front clearing mines and 
spotting targets for the tanks. 
· Operations of panzers without grenadiers is only expected to succeed 
against a very demoralized enemy without any anti-tank assets. 
· Panzers do not have double armor.  They must not be used as assault guns! 
d. Artillery 
· The material and moral effect of massed fires is severe according to 
reports from prisoners. 
· Artillery liaison officers near the infantry have proven themselves. 
· Because radios do not work reliably, liaison officers must also be 
connected by wire. 
· Artillery spotters work best in high buildings behind the front line trace of 
troops. 
· Because of echoing, all sound ranging systems must be removed. 
e. Engineers 
· Engineers must be briefed ahead of time what their mission will be, so that 
they may bring the necessary equipment and nothing more. 
· Engineers must be given proper fire support, and must be employed in 
elements no smaller than platoons.  Squad assignments are refused. 
· Engineers are valuable, difficult to replace specialist troops.  Their 
infantry operations are allowed only in an emergency. 
f. Luftwaffe 
· Employment of bombers in front of attack spearheads has proven 
ineffective because the front line changes so frequently. 
· Russians move in close to our positions when they detect our aircraft.  
Therefore, our assets should be used in the enemy rear areas. (Mark, 2002, 
pp. 325-331) 
None of the German equipment of 1942 was designed specifically for 
urban warfare, so Stalingrad became a test bed for innovation and technical 
improvement.10  The Germans learned that many of their weapons had little effect in 
penetrating buildings made from reinforced concrete.  The need for delayed fuses became 
paramount, as did shape charges for getting at the enemy.  In a similar fashion, the 
                                                 
10 From our research it appears that no military possessed city-specific weapons prior to 1943. 
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Germans learned how to use over-pressure and the limited oxygen inside buildings and 
cellars against the defender.  They developed new rocket systems called Do-Werfers.  
Instead of producing shrapnel, these rockets generated shockwaves that, “tore lungs to 
pieces and caused huge casualties amongst the Russians.  The dead were practically 
untouched on the outside and only a small stream of blood came out of the mouth” 
(Mark, 2002, p. 277).     
The Germans learned quickly from the Russians about the value of snipers 
in a city fight, and quickly organized their own snipers at all levels to first counter Soviet 
snipers, and then to interdict Russian operations.  Mortars also became more important in 
the city, as the high trajectory fires made them the primary close support weapons.  
Additionally, the Germans developed the use of small caliber flak weapons and self-
propelled artillery into direct fire roles.  The volume of fire these weapons provided 
became essential for the type of penetrating covering fire needed to support an assault in 
the city.  The Germans became very creative in using smoke delivered by any number of 
means to obscure movement or deprive oxygen in closed in areas, as well as the use of 
captured Russian trench periscopes to safely view the battlefield out of sight of snipers. 
Finally, German infantry found that flame weapons proved effective in rooting out the 
enemy from enclosed positions and buildings. 
5. Human Factors 
a. Limits of the Human System 
The drive to Stalingrad was by no means physically easy on the German 
soldiers involved.  The heat, dust, and stress of combat clearly took its toll physically.  
The speed and duration of the Germans’ advance alone indicate that there was little time 
allocated for rest.  However, the battles during the advance were characterized by long-
distance engagements that were vehicle-based and broken up by intermittent periods of 
non-combat activity.  Sensory overload on the steppe, if it did happen, was rare, only in 
that German records make no mention of combat fatigue or non-battle injuries (Mark, 
2002; Stempel, 2002).  Additionally, on the steppes there was always room and time to 
escape fighting whenever it threatened to become overwhelming.  Stalingrad offered no 
such luxuries. 
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The physical conditions inside the urban environment were taxing enough.  
Soldiers complained about the endless sprinting and bounding on concrete and iron.  The 
incessant dragging of dead, wounded, and equipment in a “rubbled” city wore troops 
down.  Unlike the steppe, the city offered no respite from this physically grueling 
experience: 
Yes, you surely cannot imagine the last phase of this wrestling!  No!  No 
one can!  From three sides we receive continuous fire from snipers.  Three 
weeks of man-to-man fighting without a break, house-to-house fighting, 
man-to-man fighting!  There is no way one can sleep!  The Russians are 
about 30 meters away.  Washing, shaving, all of this is done away with.  I 
already have a respectable beard.  We have lice and are in tatters!  Today 
the Bolsheviks again laid such a drumfire barrage of 40 minutes on our 
positions and we only could fold our hands and say “Amen”!  If I will ever 
get back to brigade I do not know.  So now I close for today.  I am not 
capable of reporting more.  All the best and Sieg Heil! (Stempel, 2002, p. 
85) 
The amount of over-pressure experienced by soldiers operating in the 
confined and covered spaces of a city also greatly impacts the physical system, adding to 
its overload.  Lieutenant Holl of the 276th Infantry Regiment, fighting alongside the 24th 
PD, reported: 
A shock wave on the left half of my face made me dizzy for a second.  
The ‘stove pipes’ of the salvo were striking everywhere around the edge of 
the room.  The splinters as well as a large part of the air pressure 
developed by the explosions were blown about.  A part of this mighty 
pressure, however, came down upon me.  My head buzzed and I felt as if 
I’d been hammered.  As my comrades looked at me, I saw their lips move 
but I couldn’t understand them.  It felt like a steam valve letting off steam 
without interruption. (Mark, 2002, p. 291)   
Continuous exposure to close proximity, high-level violence, sensory 
overload, and an inability to escape took tremendous tolls on the soldiers involved.  Also, 
the lack of replacements or fresh troops prevented the Germans from rotating their forces 
out of that environment, whereas the Russians were able to bring in fresh forces over 
time, though presumably they lacked a rotation system as well.  After a short time, both 
veterans of two to three years of campaigning and young raw recruits became inept and 
unable to perform any but the simplest of tasks.  The psychological and physiological 
degradation of the German front line troops appear to have been linked.  Records of battle 
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stress and fatigue do not exist, partly because the Germans officially denied the existence 
of such phenomena.  They declared that to invent such a term was to invite the excuse 
(Beevor, 1998, p. 151).  However, after two months of fighting in the city, numerous 
soldiers began to die without detectable symptoms.  Autopsies indicated that these 
soldiers died from shrinkage of the heart and an over-enlargement of the right ventricle.  
It is possible that these symptoms were the result of the cumulative stresses caused by the 
continuous, close proximity nature of urban combat (Lewis, 2000, p. 20). 
b. Will and Morale 
Clausewitz’s notion that the need for military virtue is greater the more the 
environment tends to complicate war and decentralize forces is readily apparent in the 
comparison of the advance to Stalingrad and the urban phase of the campaign.  While 
measuring will and morale from a historical perspective is difficult if not impossible to 
achieve, letters home and reports to headquarters offer some insight into mindsets, and 
lend themselves to qualifying the “unseen forces that cannot be measured but only felt.” 
The following is a compilation of reports and letters, abbreviated to 
highlight the mood and morale of forces involved in the campaign.  In the divisional 
records, very little is mentioned about will and morale during the move to Stalingrad, 
other than the sense that spirits within the ranks and confidence were high.  The 
following comes from entries in Lieutenant Stempel’s diary and the records of the 24th 
PD: 
16 August – It was Sunday and it was decided that we have a dance.  
(Report from a Battalion commander getting ready to describe the day’s 
attack).  (Mark, 2002, p. 12) 
20 August – We leave the giant dust clouds that tower over the entire 
wide-open land and darken the skies behind us.  Now we are coming, now 
it is our turn! (Stempel, 2002, p. 11)-The Kalmuck steppe, this never-
ending, enormous grey-beige-brown expanse, was transformed overnight 
into a light-violet sea.  Millions of meadow saffron converted the 
autumnal beauty of the landscape into a vivid picture. (Mark, 2002, p. 23) 
22 August – And the tanks that now are standing on the high bank at 
Rynok are cutting this vein of traffic, the connection between the Caspian 
Sea and the north, with their fire.  A proud feeling comes over all of us.   
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Now it’s our turn, we’ll take the town from the south and when we stand 
at the Volga, we’ll be standing before the very gates of Asia. (Mark, 2002, 
p. 23) 
26 August – Added to that the wind without interruption that blows away 
everything and covers it in a ghostly white-grey.  No, the days and weeks 
in Stalino are weeks and weeks past.  It is stunning to see, how quickly 
people are capable of adapting.  But it won’t last long here – our advance 
and our attacks are unstoppable. (Stempel, 2002, p. 19) 
Not long after the urban fighting began, there appear marked differences 
in the journal entries and reports: 
5 September:  It is unbelievable to see with which bitterness and desperate 
courage the Soviet soldiers defend this point, which is so important to 
them.  But we do not let up and despite high losses the attack is carried 
forward without pause.  We’re not to give the Bolsheviks a break in the 
fighting; we’re to keep pressure mounted on them.  Of course, more and 
more clearly the question is asked:  “How are we to carry on like this in 
the days and weeks to come?”  The muster rolls of the companies have 
been decimated and there is no mention of replacements.  From where 
should these come, anyway? (Stempel, 2002, p. 21) 
18 October: I was already awake early.  Sleep was restless.  The 
responsibility and uncertainty about success and failure made me 
somewhat nervous.  I had to go through the waiting period.  In such hours 
time seems to stand still… (description of battle)…We worked our way 
forward with mutual fire support and engaged nest after nest.  That also 
added to our casualties…The enemy defended himself to the last, none of 
them giving themselves up. (Mark, 2002, p. 289) 
19 October:  In the early morning as everyone left the bunker, a direct hit 
smashed into it and buried one man under the rubble.  Someone dug him 
out with a smoke-blackened face and his body torn into pieces.  As 
Sunday approached with cold rain showers, the second one was hit:  a 
shell exploded directly behind him and tore away the back of his head.  
When one saw young comrades lying there, then totally different thoughts 
arise that cannot simply be put down in writing. (Mark, 2002, p. 292) 
Fear generated by uncertainty and lack of confidence also degraded 
German discipline.  An anonymous soldier recounts his own experience with fear, “If 
only you could understand what terror is.  At the slightest rustle, I pull the trigger and fire 
off tracer bullets in bursts from the machine gun” (as cited by Beevor, 1998, p. 150). 
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Fatigue, fear, frustration, and defeat, all magnified by the urban setting, 
worked in unison to lower the will and morale of a once proud 6th Army.  At the same 
time, Russian will and morale manifested in ferocious resistance continued to improve.  
Lieutenant Holl reported on the fanatical efforts given forth by individual and isolated 
Russian soldiers: 
Located in front of us was a dug-out, apparently a command position.  We 
worked our way up to it.  Hand grenades were thrown.  Willmann received 
a couple of splinters, nevertheless, he could go to the first aid post by 
himself.  
Juschko called: “Herr Letinant, there’s an officer!”    
“Call to him that he should give himself up!” 
With the shout from Pawellek, the officer took cover and opened fire on us 
with his submachine gun.  We returned fire.  Dittner to the left of us, had 
recognized the situation.  With a leap, he was within 10 meters of the 
Russian.  With this move the Russian recognized his hopelessness and 
took out his Nagan pistol and shot himself.  We continued on. (Mark, 
2002, p. 291) 
The mere fact that anyone could have held up in such horrible conditions 
is testimony to the morale and courage of the men on each side, and when units became 
isolated the only thing they had to fall back on was their will to fight.  However, months 
of frustrating urban combat culminating with encirclement and entrapment eroded the 6th 
Army’s will and morale leading to losses in confidence, and the belief that they would 
not succeed.    
c. Ethics and Morality 
Historian S. J. Lewis has observed that perhaps the closest that war ever 
came to reaching Clausewitz’s absolute during the battle of Stalingrad.  The fighting 
within the city demonstrated the increased lethality of modern weaponry, and a 
diminution of command and control, where young NCOs or even privates found 
themselves in positions to make decisions (Lewis, 2000, p. 2).  The increased lethality 
combined with diminished control, long duration, complexity, and proximity caused 
ethical and moral decisions to have to be made by young, inexperienced men, who were 
tired, terrified, angry, and equipped to do a lot of damage.     
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It was difficult to discover cases of immoral behavior for the obvious 
reason that perpetrators were unlikely to write about their crimes, and victims were 
unlikely to survive.  German records from the drive to Stalingrad indicate that Germans 
had no problems processing Russian POWs.  In fact, the records indicate that the 
Russians surrendered by the tens of thousands, but POW rates dropped off sharply to 
almost nil once the street battle began.  When the battle turned into a ‘kill or be killed 
struggle’, it is easy to imagine that over time leaderless individuals would begin to feel 
that there was nothing wrong with violating established rules of war and accept that 
behavior as normal.  Without doubt, the stress, fatigue, and fear experienced by both the 
Germans and Russians had to make them vulnerable to engaging in immoral behavior. 
Lieutenant Stempel’s diary contains an interesting comparison of ethical 
behavior between the Western and Eastern fronts: 
The Armed Forces Supreme Command feels itself to be forced to order the 
following: 
From October 8th at 12 o’clock in the afternoon all British officers 
and men captured at Dieppe will be bound up.  This measure will 
last until the British War Ministry states that in the future it will 
give truthful accounts of the shackling of German prisoners, or it 
has gotten the authority to enforce its orders with the troops. 
In future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their 
auxiliary troops who do not behave themselves as soldiers, but as 
bandits, wherever they operate, are to be killed mercilessly in 
combat by German troops. 
Well, problems like that we do not have here.  We know exactly 
what the Bolsheviks do with our comrades who have fallen into 
their hands.  We have lived through it when we’ve found them.  
Slaughtered, treated bestially and tortured.  No, reprisals would not 
have any effect here.  Here there are no “laws.” (Stempel, 2002, p. 
48) 
Clearly, the morality and ethics of the Western and Eastern fronts were 
different from the outset of the war, but during 1941 and the summer of 1942, the 14th 
and 24th PDs took tens of thousands of prisoners and took time to safeguard prisoners as  
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directed by higher command.  Many of the atrocities that took place against the prisoners 
occurred as they were passed off to the SS in the rear.  In contrast, at Stalingrad prisoners 
taken by either side were an exception. 
After a month of fighting in the city, German discipline also showed signs 
of breaking.  Non-combatant refugees were killed and looted in a “degrading” manner, 
NCOs began to threaten officers, and still others simply refused to fight or even deserted 
(Mark, 2002, p. 262-263). 
6. Decision Making 
The innovative German doctrine of mobile warfare served the Germans well 
during the early years of the war and especially during the advance to Stalingrad, and 
German commanders seemed to be confident in their abilities to outfight the Russians.  
Additionally, during the advance, the balance between political will and military 
necessity were in harmony.  But all this changed the moment the lead units entered into 
the urban arena.  
The evidence that German mobile warfare worked well on the steppes is 
conclusive.  As previously mentioned, German training, equipment, organization, and 
experience were all geared to fighting fast, well coordinated, and violent battles in open 
terrain.  The German’s combined arms approach to mobile warfare served them well 
against the Russians, whose lack of effective mobile warfare doctrine prior to 1943 put 
them at a noticeable disadvantage on the steppe.   
The city streets of Stalingrad completely offset all German doctrinal advantages.  
In fact, the Germans had no doctrine for urban warfare which contributed to the 
tremendous costs of the battle.  General von Lenski, commander of the 24th PD at 
Stalingrad, made the following observations about urban doctrinal shortcomings in a 
report to his higher headquarters on 21 October: 
While the division had only small total casualties in panzers during the 
past fighting, they climbed in this period up to fifty percent.  These 
developed from the fact that we repeatedly had to supply a few panzers to 
the infantry, employed in stormtroop operations in place of the absent 
assault guns. My objection, that this type of use of panzers contradicted 
the regulations and every experience, and that improper missions by the 
regiment and battalion commanders of the infantry had only seldom led to 
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the desired result, was also acknowledged by LI Armeekorps.  It remained 
with this unintelligible practice, however, leading to completely useless 
casualties.  It is important for the future that experiences in city fighting in 
Stalingrad be interpreted to close an undoubted hole existing in our 
training. (Mark, 2002, p. 304) 
German officers attempted to innovate during the course of the urban fight, but 
major doctrinal changes are nearly impossible to implement during the course of an 
operation, due to lack of time and ability to educate, train, and equip forces for new ways 
of fighting. 
The lack of feel for urban combat most likely carried with it the consequence of 
increased centralization of authority and control.  German commanders unfamiliar with 
urban combat, unable to receive an accurate picture of the situation, and under pressure 
from higher commanders going through a similar experience, probably felt a need to 
exert more authority and control over a situation that called for decentralization of 
authority and ad hoc operations (Mellinthin, 1968, p. 197).  As previously noted, Hitler 
made tactical decisions from over a thousand miles away, and even Paulus’ headquarters 
was far outside the city.  A primary role for those at the top of any organization is to look 
outwards at the environment and understand and manipulate it in order to enable the 
organization to operate more effectively within it.  The pull to look inwards, to how those 
within the organization operated, took the German commanders away from their principal 
function.  Junior officers and NCOs are primarily responsible for small unit affairs.  
When field grade and general officers become involved at the small unit level, they are 
less able to see the bigger picture, and the potential for external dangers becomes greater.   
Harmony between political will and military necessity is paramount to waging a 
war designed to establish peace on one’s own terms.  Throughout the course of a war, 
campaign, or operation the harmony between the two can change.  The inability, 
associated with urban warfare, to accurately predict costs in terms of time, resources, and 
lives tends to disrupt that harmony more so than do other environments.   
Prior to deciding that the main effort on the eastern front be directed towards the 
Caucasus, Hitler and his senior commanders debated what the summer’s objectives 
should be.  Hitler coveted the oil there and wanted to cut the Soviets off from it.  Some 
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commanders wanted to go after Moscow because of its symbolic value, some 
commanders advocated a general withdrawal to more defensible lines, and yet other 
commanders wanted to orient solely on the destruction of the main elements of the Red 
Army, wherever these were (Liddell Hart, 1948, pp. 194-198).  During the advance 
across the Ukraine, both Hitler and his generals appeared somewhat satisfied with the 
political/military accord they had reached.  Hitler was driving towards his goal, and the 
Wehrmacht was succeeding in destroying large formations of Soviet combat power.   
Fuhrer Directive 45 altered this balance, and many generals, to include Paulus, 
feared the danger to the 6th Army’s flanks; they did not understand the need to seize 
Stalingrad (Goerlitz, 1963, pp. 59-61).  As the battle within Stalingrad commenced, 
Hitler became obsessed with its capture even though Paulus, on four occasions, reported 
that fighting for the city was rapidly eroding his combat power (Lewis, 2000, p. 20).  
Hitler’s public response to the pleas of his generals asking for a shift in strategy away 
from Stalingrad was, “You can be certain no one will get us away from there” (Beevor, 
1998, pp. 439-440).  Even more amazing, a few days later Hitler admitted privately that 
Stalingrad was no longer of any decisive operational importance, but rather vital for 
public and world opinion and that somehow the capture of the city would bolster German 
morale (Lewis, 2000, p. 21).  In the end, a city bearing the name of Hitler’s sworn enemy 
and of little immediate military value (Beevor, 1998, p. 70) became a matter of national 
or perhaps personal prestige.  Had Hitler understood before the battle began that he could 
potentially lose 250,000 men taking the city, he most likely would have directed a 
different course of action.  But when the 6th Army became decisively engaged in the 
fighting, political will overruled military necessity and that imbalance led to a host of 
poor decisions.  Hitler’s obsession with the political significance of Stalingrad caused 
him to create symbolic meaning to the battle, and even though he was aware of the 
damage being done to his forces, he could not withdraw; to do so would be equivlent to 
an admission of defeat.  Cities may carry with them symbolism that may weigh into 
decision-maker objectives.  This symbolism, as exemplified at Stalingrad, trumped 
military judgment.  
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Rules of engagement at Stalingrad were very liberal and did not significantly 
constrain the fighting forces, either in terms of weapon systems to be used or 
considerations about collateral damage.  This almost complete disregard for ROE related 
to the enemy probably contributed to bolstering the Soviet’s will to resist.  Proper 
treatment of civilians and POWs aided the Germans in their advance to the city, but when 
those policies were neglected beginning with the Luftwaffe fire bombings, the Germans 
made the struggle a life or death matter for all involved.   
E. CONCLUSION 
In many ways, Stalingrad was the first modern urban fight of its kind and scale, 
and because of this the differences in effects between a unit going from non-urban to 
urban are prominent.  Table 1 highlights the qualitative differences in the 5 factors 
between the two environments.  
 
Table 1. Effects of the Factors on Operational Performance of 14th and 24th PDs.  
Scale:  Bad Effect (---) to Good Effect (+++). 
 
 
One could say that time never was on the German’s side, either during the 
advance to Stalingrad or in the city proper.  In terms of relative time, the Soviets had 
advantages in both environments, but the city increased this advantage in relative time 
because it stalled the German advance causing the Germans to lose the initiative.  
German advantages in functional and objective times on the steppe turned into 
disadvantages in the city.  This drop off accounts for the overall negative effect for time 
in the transition between environments.   
German ability to sense and collect information on the steppe was excellent.  The 
superb situational awareness created by the open terrain played to German doctrinal 
advantages in command and coordination.  However, in the city these advantages were 
quickly lost, and one of the strengths of German operations quickly became a problem.    




Urban  (-) (--) (--) (-) (---) 
Non-urban (+) (+++) (+++) (++) (+++) 
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German technical systems and organizations were designed for mobile fighting on 
relatively open terrain.  The relatively light armor and small caliber weaponry on German 
tanks was conducive to the German penchant to maneuver into positions of advantage.  
German air-ground tactics were also designed for open terrain.  Stalingrad mitigated 
these advantages and turned some of them, like mass panzer formations and air-to-ground 
coordination, into actual liabilities.   
Human factors are impossible to quantify due to a complete lack of data from 
either environment, and are thus inconclusive for this case.  However, the qualitative 
comparison of journal entries, records, and letters home seems to indicate that the 
Germans inside Stalingrad were reaching the limits of their ability to endure the fighting 
therein.  Sensory overload, lack of rest, fear, and uncertainty all seemed to take their toll 
on an army that, just a few months before, experienced victory after victory.   
German decision-making was most degraded by the change to the urban 
environment.  German doctrine encouraged low-level initiative and sought to maintain 
initiative and tempo advantages through the empowerment of junior leaders.  This system 
worked well on the steppes, but in Stalingrad uncertainty was king.  Uncertainty added to 
extremely high losses in experienced junior leadership, pulled the higher echelons of the 
chain of command—to include Hitler himself—to exert more authority over units 
unaccustomed to this type of intervention.  Leaders who make decisions in areas where 
they cannot feel the effects of the environment or see the reality on the ground are prone 
to make uninformed decisions to some degree. 
 
Figure 8.   Russian Infantry at Stalingrad  (From:  Dunnigan, 1978, Plate). 
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The inability to shift capabilities from one environment to the extreme of another 
is indicative of German failure to understand how our five factors of urban combat 
impact forces and leadership at all levels of war.  We acknowledge, again, that failure to 
understand these impacts was not the principal cause of the German calamity; the 
Russian counter-offensives, Russian ability to keep reinforcing Stalingrad from the east 
bank of the Volga, and Hitler’s unwillingness to allow the 6th Army to break free were 
the major contributors to the German defeat.  However, German unpreparedness and 
inexperience for city fighting allowed the Russians the time and opportunity to hang on 
long enough to spring their trap.   
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III. ISRAELI OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE SINAI 
OCTOBER 1973 
A. BACKGROUND 
In June 1967, the Israelis launched a devastating attack against their Arab 
neighbors of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.  In six days, the outnumbered Israelis seized 
limited objectives from all three nations while also humiliating them militarily by 
destroying 80% of their combined military capability.  In seizing the Gaza Strip, Golan 
Heights, the West Bank, and the entire Sinai Peninsula east of the Suez Canal, Israel 
doubled it size (Gawrych, 1996, p. 3).  With Israel now a regional power, the Arab 
nations would rebuild their militaries for over six years before they would be able to 
challenge the dominant Israeli triad of intelligence, airpower, and armored maneuver 
forces (Gawrych, 1996, p. 5).  By October 1973, the Egyptians and Syrians were 
prepared to launch a surprise attack to inflict severe casualties and regain their lost 
territories.  The combined Arab forces launched this long anticipated attack on the Jewish 
Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973.   
The combined Egyptian and Syrian offensives of the Yom Kippur War caught the 
Israelis completely by surprise.  The Israelis took heavy casualties on both the Sinai and 
Golan fronts from the opening of fighting on 6 October 1973 until the combined 
offensive stalled on 10 October 1973.  From this point, the Israelis began to reorganize 
their forces and take the fight to the enemy in an effort to decimate their opponents.  This 
came in the form of the Israeli counteroffensive, the Suez Canal crossing, and the 
subsequent encirclement of the Egyptian 3rd Army.   
For the purposes of this study, comparing Israeli offensive operations during the 
Suez Canal crossing and breakthrough to the later attack on Suez City offers a 
comparison of how this very competent military force operated in successive operations, 
one a maneuver-style operation and the other urban combat operation.  While the fighting 
on the Sinai front did not lead to a clear victor in the conflict, comparing the non-urban 
operations of the canal crossing and breakout to the assaults on Suez City demonstrates 
the challenges a proficient military faces when it shifts operational environments.   
 
66 
B. THE ISRAELIS TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 
Badly battered but not beaten, the Israelis looked to regain lost territory and inflict 
heavy causalities on their enemies.  The Syrian front had collapsed and allowed Defense 
Minister Dayan to begin shifting strategic reserves and attack aircraft to the Sinai front 
where the fighting was fierce, with heavy casualties on both sides.  Israeli doctrine called 
for attacking an opponent in his territory to annihilate his forces and terminate the war on 
Israel’s terms (Adan, 1980, p. 245).  This would require regaining the offensive and 
pushing into enemy sovereign territory to deal the decisive blows.   
Since the 1967 War, Israel understood the possibility of needing to attack into the 
enemy territories of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.  Two significant linear obstacles would 
prevent these potential attacks: the Suez Canal and the Jordan River.  Capabilities for 
bridging both these natural obstacles were needed in order to maintain the offensive.  
Assault bridging equipment was critical to ensure the use of combined arms to support 
the expanse of a bridgehead.  It was understood that elite Israeli infantry could seize the 
bridgehead easily; but without armor support to exploit the bridgehead, the offensive 
would not succeed.  
 During the winter of 1971-72, Major General Adan’s division was charged with 
conducting an exercise trial to prove the operational assault bridge concept could be part 
of the Israeli offensive doctrine (Adan, 1980, p. 247).  Exercise results demonstrated the 
clear need for this capability, but also highlighted the complexity involved.  It was 
understood that the assets required to conduct a successful bridging operation might 
exceed the costs the Israelis were willing to expend, both in equipment and lives (Adan, 
1980, p. 249).   
During the stalemate of 10-13 October, the Israelis decided that a crossing of the 
canal was necessary in order to break the deadlock and attempt to seize the initiative.  
With the Israeli decision to push across the Suez Canal into Egypt, Adan was given the 
mission to lead the bridge assault.  This was not going to be an easy task, as the 
Egyptians still had significant forces on the Israeli east bank of the canal and these forces 
were well prepared for the impending Israeli attack.  Additionally, the fertile strip of land  
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that bordered the canal on the east and west was a deceptive “green belt” that contained 
numerous Arab infantry and armored units waiting to disrupt Israeli attacks on the east 




Figure 9.   Israeli Crossing Campaign  (From: Adan, 1980, p. 309). 
 
Because of these conditions, the Israelis would need to choose a bridgehead site 
carefully, and patiently wait for the right time to launch the operation, construct the 
assault bridge, and exploit the crossing with adequate armor to penetrate into Egypt.  The 
earliest the Israelis expected to be ready to assault the west bank was not before the 13th.  
U.S. reconnaissance photos showed a lack of forces north of the Great Bitter Lake on the 
west bank.  Surprisingly, this very location was projected as a likely crossing by both the 
Egyptians and Israelis in pre-conflict war plans (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 242).   
Regardless of the Israeli plan, the Egyptians still had significant forces on the east 
bank and were mounting an offensive of their own to break the standoff.  At 
approximately 0600 hours on the 14th, the Egyptians attempted to break the stalemate and 
break through the Israeli lines that were now swelling with replacements from the Golan 
front.  The Egyptians attacked nine objectives across the entire front instead of 
concentrating their combat power at one decisive point (Adan, 1980, p. 238).  By noon on 
the 14th, all Egyptian offensive capabilities had been exhausted in one of the largest tank 
battles in history (Rogers, 1979, p. 31).  This battle was the moment the Israelis were 
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looking for.  With their enemy having suffered a significant loss of offensive power, the 
Israelis could then push to the canal and establish a bridgehead.  Based on the actions of 
the 14th and the availability of the bridging equipment, the plan to cross was set for the 
evening of the 15th.  
When the Egyptian attack on 14 October failed, we thought that they 
would not resume their offensive in the next few days.  Therefore, if we 
wanted to end the stalemate and overcome the enemy, the only way was to 
attack.  And that was the decision: to attack and to cross on the following 
day, the fifteenth of October. (Adan, 1980, p. 242) 
C. THE ISRAELI PLAN 
Based on information gathered from U.S. reconnaissance flights, the Israelis 
chose to seize and expand the bridgehead north of the Great Bitter Lake.  This bridgehead 
would allow for rapid movement of forces onto the west bank where they could penetrate 
quickly in the open country.  The staff estimates calculated approximately one night of 
fighting to secure the corridor up to the canal on the east bank.  This would allow the 
bridge to be moved up quickly, free of enemy ambushes.  The plan called for one rather 
than two crossing sites to move two divisions across the canal.  This aim was to create a 
force sufficiently strong to expand the bridgehead and counter any Egyptian threats to the 
bridging efforts (Adan, 1980, p. 255).  The second phase estimated advances north and 
south on the west bank of the canal to encircle as much of the 2nd Egyptian Army 
(defending north) and 3rd Egyptian Army (defending south) as possible.  Within 24 hours 
it was anticipated that Israeli forces would be able to seize Suez City and control the 
southern portion of the canal entirely (Adan, 1980, p. 254).  The Israelis also wanted to 
ensure an avenue of escape for the defending Egyptian 3rd Army in and around Suez City.  
The hope was that this would defuse enemy pockets of resistance as the Israelis moved to 
take the city (Adan, 1980, p. 257).    
1. Israeli Crossing Execution 
On the evening of the 14th, Adan’s Division was assigned the task of clearing a 
corridor to the canal.  Given the heavy fighting that day, the Israelis did not expect stiff 
resistance.  However, the Egyptians had had several days since their initial gains of 6 
October to solidify their positions.  The green belt offered the defending Egyptian 
infantry and armor forces excellent cover and concealment as the terrain was broken with 
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numerous linear obstacles, such as cross-cutting farm roads and irrigation ditches.  
Additionally, the Egyptians were holding two key positions to the east of the green belt:  
Missouri Ridge and the Chinese Farm.  The effort to reduce these strong points to support 
the crossing operation would cause the Israelis to waste valuable time and resources.   
From the evening of the 14th, for approximately 48 hours, the Israelis would make 
several attempts to open the Akavish Road that would lead to the canal’s edge.  The 
Egyptians executed a well-prepared defense in depth that was effective to keep the 
Israelis from moving their bridging equipment forward.  Adan’s division did the majority 
of the fighting to clear the corridor.  He augmented his predominantly armored and 
mechanized forces with Colonel Uzzi’s Paratroop Brigade that was responsible for 
seizing the west bank bridgehead by rubber assault boats and “mopping up” pockets of 
Egyptian resistance that held up the progress to the east bank (Adan, 1980, p. 290).  
These operations can hardly be considered “mopping up,” as the Israelis were often 
surrounded for hours by counterattacking Egyptians who attempted to hold every inch of 
the green belt.  Adan was skillful in his rotation of the infantry to ensure they were well 
rested when not engaged in these combat operations (Adan, 1980, p. 296).  When the 
bridge was finally established on the night of the 17th, Adan began to move his brigades 
to the west bank.  By 0500 hours on the 18th, two of Adan’s three brigades had finished 
crossing and were moving directly into combat to seize the high ground at the Geneifa 
Hills and seek out the Egyptian surface to air missile sites (SAMs) that would impede 
Israeli air cover for the offensive.  The high cost of the green belt combat was about to 
pay dividends as the Israelis launched the “…breakthrough into Africa!” (Adan, 1980, p. 
310).   
 




Figure 11.   Green Belt Terrain and Combat.  Note the Dense Vegetation.  (From:  
Adan, 1980).  
 
2. The Breakout and Encirclement 
From the 18th to the 22nd of October, Adan’s and Magen’s divisions moved 
rapidly across the open plains west of the green belt of the canal. The open expanses of 
terrain on the Aida plains were at first a relief as the armored forces could move quickly, 
with great visibility.  But the plains also lacked identifiable terrain. This became an issue 
as vehicle dust clouds mixed with the featureless terrain to cause the Israelis to again 
move cautiously, this time out of fear of committing fratricide and due to navigational 
difficulties (Adan, 1980, p. 347).   
Key to the Israeli plan to drive deep into Egyptian territory, encircle, and destroy 
the Egyptian 3rd Army was the systematic destruction of the numerous Egyptian SAMs 
defending the strategic reserves and routes to Cairo.  With a slow Egyptian response to 
the Israeli offensive, Adan and Magen met mostly light and disorganized resistance.  
They eliminated this resistance using the same tactics employed in the green belt – armor 
assault followed by objective seizures by infantry.  The pace of the operations was fast 
and confusing, as Israeli elements would jump from objective to objective quickly  
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cleaning out the isolated defenders.  In accordance with this Israeli tactic to seize terrain 
and encircle the enemy, strong points were only reduced by follow-on forces when 
necessary. 
Only after the Israeli breakout on the 20th did President Sadat consider the Israeli 
actions on the west bank to be a threat.  He ordered more forces to the Sinai, but by then 
the fast-paced Israeli offensive could not be stopped militarily (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 
246).  On the 21st, Adan continued to have success with his southwestern sweep to 
encircle Egyptian forces.  The slow Egyptian response was now sealing the fate of the 3rd 
Egyptian Army as Adan moved directly to Suez City and Magen’s division moved to cut 
the Suez-Cairo highway.  On the 22nd Minister Dayan ordered Adan to drive 20 km to the 
south to seize the southern tip of the Little Bitter Lake (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 249).  Speed 
was critical as a ceasefire was planned for 1852 hours that evening.  Even with scattered 
Egyptian strong points, Adan was still unable to get significant forces to the Little Bitter 
Lake by the time of the ceasefire.    
On the 23rd, the Israelis broke the ceasefire and continued to encircle the 3rd 
Army.  Adan had moved to the outskirts of Suez City by 1700 hours and Magen had 
reached the Cairo-Suez road, effectively closing the last line of communication to the 
surrounded 3rd Army.  Additionally, Magen also made the claim for the Israelis of 
reaching the 101 km marker.  This claim placed Israeli forces approximately two hours 
from Cairo without minimal resistance to prevent their advance.  By completing the 
encirclement of the 3rd Army, the Israelis had violated their original plan of ensuring the 
Egyptians a way out (Adan, 1980, p. 257).   
Unbeknownst to the Israelis, the Egyptians in the 3rd Army sector had already 
planned for the possibility of an Israeli siege of Suez City.  Stockpiling of equipment, 
supplies, and organizing the civilian militia and civil emergency services began six 
months prior to the war.  Ever since the 1967 war, the Egyptians were faced with the 
Israelis directly across from Suez City to the east.  The Suez garrison thus took steps to 
better defend the city.  With six months of preparations, the Arab attack on 6 October was 
the early warning the garrison needed to brace for the possibility of an Israeli assault 
(Rogers, 1979, p. 30).   
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Figure 12.   Adan’s Division Seizing Ground on the West Bank in Wide Formation  
(From: Adan, 1980, Plate). 
 
3. Adan Attacks Suez City 
Lead elements of Adan’s division arrived on the outskirts of Suez City at 
approximately 1700 hours on the 23rd.  This lead element made a quick attempt to seize a 
foothold in the city.  Based on their small numbers and lack of preparation, the Israelis 
did not press to gain a foothold once they encountered resistance.  This tactic was in 
keeping with Israeli doctrine.  We saw something similar during the breakout into Egypt 
a few days prior.  The only difference here is that Suez was a major built-up area.  
Essentially, the mission was the same—rapid maneuver and enemy annihilation—it was 
just the terrain that changed.   
Suez City was the port city that controlled and supported the southern end of the 
Suez Canal.  The city was built predominately on the west shore of the northern most part 
of the Gulf of Suez, running north to south.  The city consisted of a city center, residential 
district, oil refinery, and port facilities, with a population of approximately 200,000 
Egyptians.  The city center, residential, and industrial areas were all on the western shore 
while the port facilities and entrance to the canal were on the eastern shore.  With the 
Israeli goal of taking the fight to the enemy’s territory, controlling Suez City would be 

















Figure 13.   Battle for Suez City  (From:  Rogers, 1979, p. 33). 
 
With forces moving into position to attack the city, Adan planned for an attack on 
the morning of the 24th.  The ceasefire had been violated the day prior and the race was 
on again to grab as much territory as possible before the next United Nations (UN) 
imposed ceasefire.  Adan’s plan was to attack the city at two key centers, the industrial 
area with Gabi’s11 brigade and the city center with Aryeh’s brigade (Adan, 1980, p. 411).  
As with all the operations during the Israeli offensive, time was critical and hasty attacks 
were considered worth the risk to seize the city.  Adan considered the operation to seize 
Suez as “…a last-minute, grab-what-you-can action” (Adan, 1980, p. 411).  With a 
second cease-fire scheduled for 0700 hours on the 24th, Adan needed to attack quickly.  
His two-pronged attack would gain control of the key prizes in the city, these being the 
port and the industrial area.  To gain control of the port, he would first have to seize the 
main intersections that controlled traffic to the port access causeway.  With control of all 
the major intersections, the Israelis could then control the movement of forces that could 
influence their hold on the port.  Additionally, General Gonen, the Southern Front 
                                                 
11 In Adan’s book, On the Banks of the Suez, he refers to most of his officers by their first name or 
nickname.  “Gabi” in this case is COL Gavriel Amir.  “Aryeh” is COL Aryeh Karen.  
These three intersections were 
Aryeh’s objectives to cut the 
city and further isolated the 
Egyptians. 
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Commander, advised Adan to attack Suez “if it is to be a Benghazi, yes; but if it is to be a 
Stalingrad, no” (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 258).12  Adan interpreted this as seize the city with 
the division provided that “if the nut proved too hard to crack, we would forego it…” 
(Adan, 1980, p. 427).    
With only four air sorties to soften targets prior to the attack, Adan began his 
assault with limited fire support.  By 0830 hours, Aryeh’s brigade was clearing a path to 
the city by mopping up light resistance north of the city in the military camp.  Gabi was 
also meeting light resistance in the industrial and residential sections of the city to the 
west.  With Gabi’s success, Adan pushed Aryeh forward to seize the advantage in the 
face of light resistance.  In lieu of leading with infantry to seize his objective at the 
Arba’in road junction, Aryeh opted to forego the necessary mission briefs for the late- 
arriving paratroopers and lead with the armor battalions (Adan, 1980, p. 415).  By 0930 
hours, Aryeh was making progress moving through the city center, but was being actively 
engaged by Egyptian anti-tank elements.  Obviously a skilled commander, Aryeh wisely 
attempted to develop the situation during his attack without forcing Adan to commit 
additional support, “The picture is not yet clear.  There are tanks and antitank weapons 
among the buildings; we are engaged in combat.  At this stage I’m holding up in order to 
get some more artillery support” (Adan, 1980, p. 414).  Gabi reported from his sector, 
“They aren’t giving up, they are still fighting” (Adan, 1980, p. 414).   
 
                                                 
12 Benghazi was a key port on the Cyrenaica peninsula of Libya.  The taking of Benghazi in February 
1941 was a rapid strike by British forces crossing 150 miles of desert to cut the retreat of the Italians.  Later 
in the same campaign, Rommel retook Benghazi in May 1941 without firing a shot as the British withdrew 
from the port city in full retreat (Collier, 1977, p. 64).  In either case, General Gonen makes this reference 
because he wants the city taken only if it can be done in one swift blow.   
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Figure 14.   Israeli Tanks Halted on the Sarag Road Inside Suez City  (From:  Zohdy, 
1974, p. 120).     
 
Despite the continued resistance, the two Israeli columns continued to press 
through the city.  As they moved deeper into the center of the city, the buildings became 
higher and the roads became more restrictive for the armor vehicles to maneuver.  When 
Aryeh reached his objective—the Arba’in road junction—his elements came under “a 
withering blast of fire” (Adan, 1980, p. 414) that rendered the lead battalion virtually 
leaderless in seconds.  Only four officers were still able to function in an attempt to move 
out of the fire.  In spite of the confusion and stiff Egyptian resistance, the column 
managed to break through to its next objective, the intersection that controlled the 
causeway access to the port.  Yossi’s paratroopers, one of the attached battalions of 
paratroopers assigned to aid Adan’s division, had fallen behind in the movement on the 
Sarag road and were now cut off from the advancing armor column.  Without support, 
Yossi’s men took cover in a police station where they would fight for the next 14 hours, 
surrounded, and take 25% casualties.   
Aryeh’s lead elements were now stretched along the length of the Sarag road and 
he reported back to Adan that they had reached the objectives, but the resistance was too 
stiff to claim control, casualties were continuing to mount.  In a very short time, what had 
started as a quick operation to seize three key intersections had now become an operation 
to recover the over-extended forces throughout the city.  Adan began to move forces to 
aid the now besieged elements at the expense of his other division responsibilities to clear 
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the green belt east of the city.  These attempts to relieve the pressure on Aryeh’s brigade 
were also uncoordinated, as the main effort turned from seizure to survival.  Throughout 
the afternoon several attempts had failed to break through or even locate two isolated 
elements, Yossi’s and Hisdai’s13 battalions.  By 1600 hours, a daring raid of armored 
personnel carriers had located Hisdai’s force and evacuated his casualties.  With darkness 
approaching, both Yossi’s and Hisdai’s forces were left in the city.  Adan made the 
decision to have both elements attempt to escape through the Egyptian positions on foot 
under the cover of darkness.  Hisdai’s battalion managed to make the two kilometer 
movement. No doubt the short distance his unit had to travel and its low number of 
casualties helped.   
Yossi’s force faced with an altogether different situation.  Lieutenant David Amit 
“Dudu” had taken over when Yossi was wounded and struck unconscious.  The situation 
worsened as the Egyptians made several attempts to storm the Israeli strongpoint.  Over 
the radio, Aryeh attempted to calm Dudu as well as convince him to break through that 
night on his own.  Because of the number of wounded, Dudu insisted his force be 
evacuated.  By 0230 hours on the 25th Yossi had regained consciousness and agreed with 
Aryeh’s assessment to move by foot to friendly lines.  At 0430 hours, the paratroopers 
had managed to reach friendly lines, ending Adan’s first major failure of the war.  His 
attempt at a fast grab of territory had ended in an embarrassing withdrawal.   
The results of the Israeli attack were staggering: 80 killed or missing, 120 
wounded, and 28 armored vehicles destroyed (Adan, 1980, p. 422).  In less than 24 hours, 
Adan had piecemealed elements of all three brigades into the city fight.  By the end, his 
forces were unable to seize or hold any of the key intersections they planned to use to 
control the city.  Casualties were high with almost no tactical or strategic gains to show 
for the cost (Adan, 1980, p. 427).   
Throughout the day on the 25th, Adan’s forces probed the city for a weak point in 
its defenses, with the aim of launching another attack.  As the fighting died down around 
1530 hours, the Israelis had not been able to expand their foothold or dislodge the 
defenders.  At the end of the day, the Egyptians still controlled the city center with the 
                                                 
13 Similar to Yossi, Hisdai was the commander of another attached paratroop infantry battalion. 
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Israelis holding the outskirts, the port installations, and the oil refinery.  The cost for 
Adan was again high; ten more armored vehicles were lost in the probes (Rogers, 1979, 
p. 32).  Nevertheless, despite the heavy Israeli losses and the tactical circus that took 
place on the 24th, Adan had the defending Egyptians in the city besieged.  Additionally, 
with Magen’s move to seize the Cairo-Suez road back on the 23rd, the 3rd Army of “some 
20,000 men and 250 tanks” remained effectively surrounded (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 262).  
At 1700 hours on the 25th, the United Nations peacekeepers moved into the city and 
physically separated the Egyptian and Israeli forces drawn up on the Sarag road.  
Obviously aware of their predicament, the besieged Egyptian defenders flooded the 
streets “shouting and cheering and waving their arms” (Adan, 1980, p. 425).   
The Israelis abided by the ceasefire on the 26th and 27th yet they continued to 
prepare for fighting, not only in the city but along the entire front which was still active 
with continued jockeying and skirmishing.  On the 28th, Adan made one more attempt to 
gain an additional foothold in the city center.  He launched a fourth and final attack at 
about 0600 hours (O’Ballance, p. 264).  This push only lasted an hour and does not 
appear to have been well supported.  It was probably intended as another probe to see if 
the defenders were still in position.  But the Israelis did not find a weakness to exploit 
before the peacekeepers arrived and enforced this final ceasefire.  The total losses for the 
Israeli attacks on the city were 68 officers, 23 pilots, 373 soldiers, and one civilian either 
dead or wounded (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 262).   
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:  ISRAELI BREAKOUT AND THE 
ATTACK ON SUEZ CITY   
Since the 6th of October, Adan and his division had been in the thick of the 
fighting.  They held the Bar Lev Line against the attacking Egyptian armored forces in a 
seesaw battle for control of the Sinai.  As discussed earlier, Adan was masterful in his 
methodical clearing of the corridor to establish a bridgehead across the Suez Canal.  He 
extensively used infantry to support armor pushes for terrain and also used armor to 
support the efforts of often-surrounded and always outnumbered paratroopers.  So, given 
such a performance leading up to the battle of Suez, what then happened when this very 
competent force hit Suez City?  Why were Adan’s forces not only repulsed but badly 
mauled by the Egyptian defenders?   
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According to Glenn Rogers, a US Army officer and author of an article in 
Military Review (1979), Adan failed to use intelligence properly to estimate a defending 
force and did not use infantry in his attack (Rogers, 1979, p. 33).  Rogers, to his credit, 
does address the Israeli doctrine of leading attacks with armor.  This was the tactic used 
throughout the Israeli crossing and offensive and was again used in the disastrous thrusts 
into the city.  Yet, given Adan’s limited objectives of seizing key intersections to force 
the Egyptians out rather than clear them out, and his limited time to seize terrain prior to 
a ceasefire, his aggressive armor advances appear appropriate.  In a Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis, Greg Bendewald (2000) concludes that Adan’s efforts show “failures in 
the critical operational capabilities of C3, ISR, fire support, and the poor tactical 
maneuvering of forces…”14 and later says, “In the heat of battle, General Adan seems to 
have been caught up in the momentum of the Israel’s overall success, which rushed him 
into executing the hasty attack without regard for the need for proper ISR operations” 
(Bendewald, 2000, p. 25).  Both these analyses point to significant shortcomings, but 
were these the only factors in play during the failed Israeli assault?  If one compares 
Adan’s performance just a week prior in the green belt, he did methodically account for 
the factors he has been criticized for not implementing.  Here is where, we believe, the 
differences in environment affected factors that influenced the performance of Adan’s 
division.     
1. Environment 
a. Physical Terrain   
The terrain of the green belt, west bank, and Suez City obviously differed.  
The green belt had varying vegetation, numerous cross-cutting ditches, canals, and 
enough cover to make it impossible to clear an area completely without the enemy 
occupying the ground at a later time.  The west bank of the Sinai was almost featureless, 
causing numerous problems with navigation and making it difficult to identify rapidly 
moving friendly forces at a distance.  Even though these two areas were physically very 
different, the Israelis had a strong grasp on how to fight in each environment.  In both 
these areas, the Israelis conducted operations to support their overall maneuver goals and 
encircle and annihilate enemy forces.  The green belt was the key to securing an avenue 
                                                 
14 C3 refers to Command, Control, and Communication.  ISR refers to Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance.   
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to attack the west bank.  In turn, the west bank was favorable ground on which to exploit 
maneuver abilities.  Also worth noting is that the Israelis approached combat differently 
in each area to further their overall goals of seizing terrain and destroying forces.   
The city was a foreign operating environment for the Israelis.  The 
majority of the structures in the city were two-to-three-story residences made of mud 
brick and stucco.  The larger government and commercial structures were multi-story 
masonry structures.  Additionally, there were several large multi-story apartment 
buildings.  Streets varied in width from alleys to multi-lane boulevards that led to the 
center of the city.  The two main arteries were the Cairo-Suez Highway (leaving the city 
to the northwest) and a road to the northern Sinai town of Ismailia that paralleled the 
canal (Rogers, 1979, p. 29).   
Tactically, the Israelis tried to apply the same concept of using maneuver 
corridors to attack Suez City.  Adan was smart not to try to clear the whole city.  He 
identified the key intersections he wanted to deny to the enemy.  In support of these 
objectives, he also recognized potential high-rise buildings (six to seven stories) that 
would probably need clearing to support control of the intersections.  Adan believed that 
further encirclement of the Egyptian forces in the city, via seizure of key intersections, 
would be enough to drive them from the city.  Yet, Adan had failed to consider any 
preparations the Egyptians had made in the event the Israelis did attempt to seize the city.   
b. Human Environment  
The Egyptians had been planning a defense of the city for six months.  
The city was stockpiled with supplies and weapons.  Civilians had either been evacuated 
or trained for this scenario (Rogers, 1979, p. 30).  Once the Egyptians knew they were 
surrounded and the Israelis controlled the main avenues of approach into and around the 
city, the Egyptians realized they needed to think in alternate terms.  This they did by 
conceding the roads to the superior Israeli maneuver forces.  The Egyptians then used 
numerous dismounted movement corridors to resupply and defend the city.  This may 
seem obvious in hindsight, but Adan attacked the city based on his belief that the 
Egyptians would have to rely on the same routes as his forces and that those routes were  
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as critical to them as to the Israelis.  Here, his logic was flawed: the Egyptians did not 
need the ability to conduct mounted maneuver in the city.  They needed only to defend 
key strong points.   
Had Adan thought in terms of the defender’s situation, he may have 
developed a plan to seize a key portion of the city in the same manner as he brilliantly 
seized the green belt corridor.  Yet, he instead treated the city as though armored 
maneuver corridors would work there.  Beyond the obvious differences in terrain, the 
differences in analyzing the uses of specific terrain are critical.  For instance, had Adan 
been trained in terms of influencing the intersections as opposed to physically controlling 
them, he may have been able to succeed with less force.  The fact that he dominated the 
Egyptians in maneuver forces and airpower should have suggested the likelihood that the 
Egyptians would respond with alternate defensive tactics inside the city. 
2. Time 
Time was an important factor throughout the Israeli offensive.  Because of 
Israel’s precarious situation, wedged in the middle of the Arab world, it needed to beat its 
enemies badly enough to deter them from further encroachment into Israeli territory.  
This meant maneuvering on the enemy and destroying his forces, preferably in his 
territory (Adan, 1980, p. 245).  These maneuvers required time to plan, resource, and 
execute.  In the case of the Yom Kippur War, this was all done in the face of superpower 
sponsors and the UN pressure to quickly end the war.   
a. Relative Time 
Attitudes toward the time available changed for the Israelis at different 
phases of the offensive.  The ability to cross the canal was identified once both the Syrian 
and Egyptian attacks stalled.  The Israelis then estimated they could be ready to cross on 
the 13th at the earliest with a breakthrough and seizure of the west bank by the 15th.  
These estimates, of course, were based on assessments of the Egyptians in the Six Day 
War, and not their current forces.  Once it was realized the Egyptians were still holding 
east bank positions, to include approaches to the canal in the green belt, the Israelis 
moved methodically to open the corridor.  Time was still a factor, but without a secure  
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bridgehead the breakthrough would not be possible.  Here the Israelis took their time and 
ensured the corridor was secure to support the deployment of the vulnerable bridging 
equipment. 
With the assault across the canal, the Israeli offensive became a race 
against the start of the ceasefire.  Now great risks were being taken to exploit openings 
and cause the Egyptians to react to the Israeli moves and not vice versa.  Large amounts 
of ground were seized and pockets of resistance were eliminated on the move.  Strong 
points were bypassed and left for follow-on forces.  Without a ceasefire pending, these 
brash actions may not have been taken.  On the 19th, Dayan relayed a message to his 
commanders that the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger would be traveling to 
Moscow to discuss the ceasefire.  The Israelis translated this to mean that “Israel might 
have just three days of combat left” (Adan, 1980, p. 355).  With this information, the 
General Staff issued orders for “territorial grabs.”  This attitude toward time continued as 
Adan and Magen were being pressed each day with new and more demanding objectives.  
This culminated with the race for terrain on the 22nd, prior to the first ceasefire.  Adan 
carried the trade off of time for terrain into Suez.  As his own harshest critic, he addresses 
his failure to question the benefit of the attack on the city.  Given the time constraints 
inherent in this last-minute, grab-what-you-can venture, he admits his forces were not as 
well prepared as he would have liked.  He cites the lack of planning and attention he paid 
to preparations for the failures of the main attack on the 24th (Adan, 1980, p. 429).  
Additionally, he comments on the strategic worth of the city and the cost in taking it vis-
à-vis the amount of effort the Israelis wanted to throw into it.  While his mission had been 
to take the city, the caveat to that mission was “provided there is no Stalingrad situation” 
(Adan, 1980, p. 429).  Adan should have responded to the order for the attack with a 
negative, citing the lack of time to complete the task.  In other words, “if we can’t do it 
right we should not do it at all.”   
The nature of the diplomatic battle, with the impending ceasefire, caused 
the Israelis to take chances they did not take during the crossing operation.  It would 
seem logical that the Israelis would have approached time the same in Suez City as they 
did in the green belt.  But, the push for diplomatic advantage in the settlement to make up  
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for the heavy Israeli losses early on seems to have been the catalyst to seize as much 
terrain as possible.  If the Israelis had felt they had the luxury of time, Adan would not 
have had to rush to assault the city.     
b. Functional Time 
The actions of the Israelis during the bridgehead and breakout operations 
demonstrated great proficiency in accomplishing individual tasks as part of the larger 
operations.  Even with the delays in clearing the corridor for the bridge, the bridge was 
assembled quickly to push two brigades across under one period of darkness.  As 
mentioned earlier, Adan had tested and trained for such operations and this was evident 
in the execution of this complex operation.  Additionally, the combined arms efforts of 
the Israelis to reduce the numerous Egyptian strong points on the west bank was done 
with precision as the Israelis would advance from one position to another, methodically 
reducing the defensives.  Here again, through solid Israeli training, functional time was 
understood and applied to the continuous familiar operations being conducted.   
In the assaults against Suez City, the Israelis applied the same principles 
they used during the previous fighting.  The Israelis failed to consider the amount of time 
it would actually take to move to the key intersections in the city and how long they 
would need to hold them before the Egyptians would withdraw.  Additionally, planning, 
rehearsal, and coordination were non-existent prior to the first morning attack of the 24th.  
The late arriving paratroopers were simply ordered to follow the armor into the city.  No 
understanding of the time required to complete the assigned tasks was relayed.  This 
could have been corrected through rehearsals or a simple mission brief.  If these 
preparatory tasks were accomplished, upon first contact with the enemy, adjustments to 
the time required to accomplish the mission could have been made.  Regardless of the 
reason, whether it was poor planning and preparation or a complete lack of time to 
conduct the preparation, functional time was not a consideration in the city fight as it was 
in the previous phases of the counter-offensive.    
c. Objective Time 
The Israelis approached the concept of objective time differently in their 
push across the canal (and into the west) and their actions in Suez City.  During the 
bridge crossing and breakout operations, fighting was non-stop.  Much of the Israeli 
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advantage came from using the darkness to seize and hold terrain in the greenbelt.  
Because of the nature of the operation, the bridging was conducted under the cover of 
darkness, as well as was the crossing operations.  The Israeli forces moved directly into 
combat in the early morning hours of the 18th.   
During the breakthrough operations on the west bank, the Israelis fought 
only during the day.  The featureless terrain made it difficult to maneuver during the 
daytime let alone at night with other units moving simultaneously as well.  This 
perspective, however, changed in the brief actions in Suez City.  Adan’s first attack on 
the 24th was planned as an early morning assault not under the cover of darkness.  The 
debacle that followed for the next 14 hours left two paratroop battalions isolated and with 
no sign of relief as the sun fell.  Whereas Hisdai’s battalion was able to use the darkness 
to escape its encirclement, Lieutenant Dudu pleaded with Aryeh to send an armor column 
the next morning to rescue his battalion.  The rescues needed to happen quickly if the 
wounded were to survive.  These movements could only be made in daylight, and with 
the mass confusion of the failed assaults efforts for recovery were slow to coordinate.  
The fact an armor column drove by Dudu’s defensive position in daylight without 
making contact with the isolated troops was reason enough to recommend waiting until 
the next day to attempt the rescue.  The complexity of the urban terrain coupled with the 
uncertainties of darkness was too much for Dudu to recommend an attempt that night.  
Ironically, the nighttime withdrawal of this element was also time-sensitive, as the 
paratroopers needed to move at night to cover their escape.  The lost hours of debate over 
whether the unit should move or stay put probably only confused the situation, as each 
minute passed was one less available to them for moving out.   
3. Information  
In terms of command and control and the use of intelligence, the Israelis had 
some hard fought successes early on in the offensive.  They managed to maintain strong, 
deliberate, and hasty planning during the crossing as well as during the breakthrough.  
Once assaults on them had failed, Missouri Ridge and the Chinese Farm were considered 
to be objectives that could be contained and dealt with at a later date rather than seized 
prior to launching the breakthrough.  Adaptive command and control in the confusing 
green belt saved the lives of many Israelis who found themselves defending against 
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Egyptian counter-attacks rather than mopping up fading resistance.  Adan was brilliant in 
his ability to commit forces on the fly, a must in maneuver warfare.  He displayed the 
same talent on the west bank, as he and Magen, together with two small divisions, 
effectively encircled the 20,000-man 3rd Egyptian Army.  Even though much of the 
reconnaissance was developed from movement-to-contact battlefield reports, the Israelis 
were able to piece together the information they needed to secure the corridor and later 
seize large tracts of the terrain on the west bank.  
In the city, the information aspect of the battle was chaotic.  Rogers (1979) draws 
the following conclusions about the Israeli intelligence preparation prior to the assault on 
Suez: 
Israeli attacks failed because of:  
· Poor Israeli intelligence on defenses. 
· No use of maneuver, no dismounted infantry. (Tanks led the attack.) 
· Poor knowledge of Suez – maps, photos, reconnaissance… (p. 33)   
Additionally, Bendewald (2000) uses Suez City as his first example of a failed 
doctrine in attacking a city.  He cites Adan’s inability to command and control multiple 
tasks for his division as a contributing factor to the poor preparation for the attack 
(Bendewald, p. 24).  He also cites the lack of any type of reconnaissance being exercised 
prior to the attacks (Bendewald, p. 22).  What neither analysis takes into account is the 
success the Israelis had using impromptu planning and analysis as the battle developed 
during the crossing and breakthrough.  With Adan’s limited objectives to seize specific 
intersections in the city if his logic held, the use of impromptu analysis would suffice to 
achieve his goals in the city.  Yet, the physical canalization of the city coupled with hasty 
planning amounted to a recipe for disaster.  It was not that Adan did not plan for the use 
of combined arms; combined arms had been a must for his successful operations in the 
green belt and breakthrough.  The big failure seems to instead lie in the misapplied 
capabilities of a competent and successful force that was not prepared specifically for 
urban combat (Adan, 1980, p. 433).  This, coupled with time constraints, led to the 
Israelis’ poor informational capabilities.   
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4. Use of Technology 
The Yom Kippur War proved to be an excellent testbed for new weapons.  Both 
the Soviets and the American were pushing new weapons and equipment on their 
surrogates.  Sadat said, “They [the Russians] are drowning me in new arms” (O’Ballance, 
1978, p. 33).  For the first time in combat anti-tank guided missiles (the U.S. TOW and 
Soviet Sagger) were used.  The bulk of the maneuvering forces were also supplied with 
newly purchased tanks and APCs.  Van Creveld (1975) points out that 3,000 tanks (75% 
being Arab) were destroyed in the 22-day war.  To put this statistic in perspective, the 
entire tank inventory for all NATO nations combined at the time totaled 9,000 (Van 
Creveld, p. 47).  This statistic not only shows the willingness of the nations involved to 
allow the attrition of their forces, but also their inability to prevent their own attrition.  
Tank and anti-tank systems had become far more lethal than the armored protection could 
withstand.      
If one examines combat losses, it is clear that the IDF was the most skilled army 
involved.  The losses show that the Israeli tank gunnery and maneuver capabilities were 
vastly superior to those of their counterparts.  The Israelis also understood the need for 
proper equipment to support their doctrine and objectives.  This was apparent in their 
training and preparations to support the potential of bridgehead operations.  The Israelis 
were also confident in their abilities to maneuver on and destroy the enemy as a key part 
of their doctrine.  This confidence was relayed to O’Ballance in an interview with an 
Israeli officer, “This officer told me the Israelis did not think much of the capabilities of 
the Egyptian tank crews, who, it was said, had to get too close to their targets before they 
opened fire.  Perhaps it was the Israeli armored superiority complex showing through” 
(O’Ballance, 1978, p. 249).  Two points can be drawn from this quote.  First, the Israelis 
understood the full capabilities of the long-range firepower of the tank in maneuver 
warfare.  Second, poor training, in this case of the Egyptians, led a force to incorrectly 
use equipment.  This same pattern is also seen in the Egyptian use of Sagger anti-tank 
missiles in restrictive short-range terrain, turning these long-range missiles into 
uncontrollable rockets.  This same failure to apply technology can likewise be seen in the 
desperate use of valuable SAMs in a direct fire role against Israeli tanks (Adan, 1980, p. 
351). 
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Yet, in stark contrast, it seems the Israelis did not have the right expertise or 
preparation for the Suez fight.  As stated previously, seizing objectives for limited gain is 
one thing; methodically removing an enemy is another.  To the Israelis’ credit they 
attempted the former.  Yet, even with these limited goals, the combination of tactics and 
equipment available did not match the competence displayed earlier in the offensive.  
Again, Adan offers the most trenchant critique.  As he puts it: 
The capture of a city is always a complicated operation.  A city offers 
many advantages to a defender…So the conquest of a city always involves 
a good deal of fighting, takes time, and results in substantial losses.  
Armored forces are not the most suitable for the conquest and mopping up 
of a built-up area…Nonetheless, in the Armored Corps we had dealt with 
the subject of capturing built-up areas—though this had been mainly in the 
realm of theory—including tactical exercises without troops.  Live fire 
ammunition training and exercises were limited due to the lack of suitable 
sites (built-up areas) for training. (Adan, 1980, p. 428)  
Even with the best equipment and overall training available, if a competent force 
is not prepared to fight in a specific area using its equipment and tactics in a manner that 
are most suitable, operational failures can result.  In the case of Suez City, they did.  
Adan cites as one potential solution training specific urban combat infantry to deal with 
similar scenarios and integrating them with mechanized maneuver forces (Adan, 1980, p. 
430).   
5. Human Factors 
a. Limits on the Human System   
There is insufficient data available in English or releasable to the public 
from the Yom Kippur War to truly examine how far the human body and mind can be 
pushed.  In comparison to other campaigns, and even entire wars, combat in this one was 
relatively short.  It lasted only 22 days, with much of the fighting done during daylight 
hours.  Continuous operations were conducted with only limited combat pushes, with 
resupply and refitting conducted at night.  Even so, out of any of the Arab-Israeli wars, 
the Yom Kippur War appears to have been the toughest test for the Israelis and is replete 
with examples of difficult situations.   
The combat on the southern front was not easy against an enemy well 
entrenched on key terrain.  Up to the attack on Suez City, Adan’s division, like most 
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Israeli forces on the southern front, had been in combat for 17 straight days.  Adan 
describes this as a factor that wore on his men, their morale, and their effectiveness.  
While clearing the corridor for the bridgehead, his division and attachments were fighting 
for 48 continuous hours.  As he comments, “Perhaps, I thought, perhaps the situation of 
the Egyptians at the Chinese Farm is no less difficult than that of Uzzi.  Perhaps they, too, 
have suffered losses and are close to the breaking point” (Adan, 1980, p. 290).  Here he is 
refering to Colonel Uzzi’s paratroop brigade, used to clear a portion of the corridor.  The 
mopping up action turned into a 24-hour fight for survival as the Israelis were attacked 
from all sides.  In the end, Uzzi’s men were relieved by an armor breakthrough and 
pulled back to recover (Adan, 1980, p. 295).   
In terms of duration and intensity, the corridor clearing might be 
considered the hardest fighting of the campaign.  In the end, the Israelis had only carved 
out a narrow corridor to conduct the bridging with enemy strong points still dominating 
the key terrain of Missouri Ridge to the north and the Chinese Farm to the south.  As 
stated above, Adan was concerned about how much longer Uzzi would be able to hold 
out against assaults similar to the Israeli ones against the Chinese Farm and Missouri 
Ridge.  If any unit would have broken, it would have been Uzzi’s because of the close 
and intense violence his unit sustained for 24 hours.  Nothing as intense is described for 
other units in the offensive.  The notorious assaults on the Chinese Farm and Missouri 
Ridge were not as intense as the battles in the green belt.  For the most part, the fast-
paced maneuver style of combat the Israelis prosecuted limited the proximity and 
intensity of the fighting with the enemy.   
In comparison, the fighting on the 24th in Suez was at close proximity and 
was extremely intense.  Yet, its duration was not equivalent to that of the previous 
actions.  This fighting might have been the hardest for those hours in the city, but the fact 
it ended by the next morning does not lend it to fair comparison with the in the green belt 
and how either or both may have tested the limits of the human system.    
b. Will and Morale 
Will and morale of the Israeli soldier was a definite concern for Adan 
prior to his crossing of the canal.  He was worried about how his soldiers would react on 
the offense because of the early setbacks suffered two weeks prior.   
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We had experienced only ‘deluxe wars’ in 1956 and in 1967 – as a result 
of which I had more than once found myself wondering whether youth 
that had been raised on such wars could hold out in difficult campaigns in 
which they might have to retreat at times. (Adan, 1980, p. 259)   
Adan was also concerned about the difficulty he expected during this 
offensive against the Egyptians.  He states that he demanded each man be prepared to 
“…fully exhaust his potential in the offense…” (Adan, 1980, p. 258).  To his pleasure, 
Adan’s division fought well and aggressively throughout the corridor seizure and on the 
west bank offensive.  The Egyptians proved to be a challenge, as they did not retreat; they 
continued to hold against a more competent maneuver force.  In the words of Drew 
Middleton, military editor of the New York Times, “The Egyptian armies did not break.  
They were outmaneuvered, not outfought.  They were still in being” (as cited by 
O’Ballance, 1978, p. 266).  The Israelis, faced with such a resolute enemy, showed that 
they were capable of hard fighting in wars other than a “deluxe war” to borrow the term. 
The fighting in Suez City did not last long enough to cause a visible 
change in will and morale of the Israeli forces.  Even though the actions were brutal, 
Adan halted the commitment of forces on the 24th when the first attacks fell apart.  The 
Israelis actually showed exceptional composure in reorganizing forces and withdrawing 
under vicious fire.  The best example of this was the withdrawal of Nahum’s battalion in 
Aryeh’s brigade.  “Within twenty minutes twenty of the twenty-four Israeli tank vehicle 
commanders of the column, who were exposed in their turrets, were killed or wounded” 
(O’Ballance, 1978, p. 258).  Yet, Nahum was still able to recover his force and press 
through the engagement area.  This is a sign of definite martial professionalism under the 
most confusing of situations.  Another example during the city fighting was the raid Adan 
ordered to recover Hisdai’s casualties.  Once Aryeh had located Hisdai’s besieged 
element, he tasked Ivan to launch a raid with the brigade’s reconnaissance company to 
recover the wounded.  Within minutes, as described by Adan, Ivan’s APCs broke through 
the Egyptian engagement areas with machine guns firing in all directions and recovered 
Hisdai’s wounded (Adan, 1980, p. 419).  Additionally, Avidor cites other acts of bravery 
that were common among Israeli soldiers in Suez City. 
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There were many heroic acts during the battle mainly in the rescue 
operations – like a M113 driver who crossed the city 3 times – one after 
the other collecting wounded people after his commanders were killed – or 
tank commanders running on foot from tank to tank telling the crew that 
lost their commander what to do next…15  
One example of faltering morale involved Yossi’s besieged paratroopers 
at the city center police station.  Having been separated from Aryeh’s brigade on the 
Sarag road, Yossi’s element found itself taking heavy fire and dismounted the APCs and 
buses to take up positions in the surrounding buildings.  In a matter of minutes, casualties 
mounted, to include the battalion commander, Yossi.  Lieutenant David Amit “Dudu” 
took charge and organized a defense of the police station.  For 14 hours, the Israelis held 
off assaults by the surrounding Egyptians.  The Israelis maintained the hope they would 
be rescued, but Adan was not able to mount a rescue to break through to their position 
four kilometers into the city.  Adan cancelled any other attempts as the previous rescue 
operations had resulted in additional losses.  This is one of the greatest paradoxes of 
combat—how many men does a commander risk to save another?   
With no relief coming, Aryeh then needed to persuade Dudu to move on 
his own to friendly lines.  Dudu must have been under immense pressure.  His element 
was disoriented, cut off, and running low on everything.  His commander was 
unconscious, he had more casualties then he could handle, and the Egyptians were 
continuing to press from all sides.  Pleading with Dudu to attempt the movement, 
Lieutenant Colonel Hisdai, who had just led his element out, attempted to provide 
encouragement.  Eventually, Aryeh, Hisdai, and even General Gonen convinced Dudu 
the best chance for him and his men was to move on foot at night.  This decision was 
further solidified for Dudu when Yossi regained consciousness and agreed with the plan 
to evacuate.   
Given, the circumstances, Dudu could have frozen and waited 
unrealistically for relief.  He was obviously torn between exfiltrating in small groups with 
hopes of remaining undetected or moving as a whole group to better defend the wounded.  
In the end, Aryeh ordered Dudu to move as a large group to offer the best resistance.  
                                                 
15 This quote is an excerpt from personal email correspondence between the authors and Brigadier 
General Avidor (retired).  This is not published material.    
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Departing at 0230 hours under an artillery barrage, Yossi’s men moved for the next two 
hours, a distance of four kilometers out of the city (Adan, 1980, pp. 421-422).  This 
example shows how Dudu, even in a brief period of 14 hours, was on the breaking point 
of making a decision that would seal the fate of his command.  Had he given into the 
basic human desire for survival that was being provided by the relative safety of the 
building, his force would have been annihilated the next morning.  He was required to 
make a hard decision and rise above his primal concerns—to move back into the same 
hostile streets that trapped them in the police station in the first place. 
c. Ethics and Morality   
From the sources examined, violations of ethics and morality do not 
appear to have been concerns and if violations had occurred they were not publicly 
recorded.  Additionally, where the actions prior to the fighting in Suez City could have 
provided opportunities to commit such acts, the city fighting did not last long enough to 
see these effects.  The only instances that can be considered potential abuses were the 
three violations of ceasefires.  Between the 21st and 28th of October, three ceasefires were 
violated.  The Israelis deliberately violated all three ceasefires in continued efforts to 
seize terrain during the counteroffensive.  The latter two violations occurred during 
probing operations in the city.  Even though these actions occurred during the attacks on 
Suez City, they cannot be specifically attributed to the urban fighting as skirmishes, 
probing, and shelling were ongoing between the two armies.  Such actions had been 
ongoing since the Six Day War in 1967 until 1970.  This period is commonly referred to 
as the War of Attrition (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 2).  In fact, even after the UN upheld the 
final ceasefire of 28 October, the Egyptians and Israelis continued to exchange fire in the 
second War of Attrition until the Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone in March 
1974 (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 268). 
6. Decision Making  
What are the real effects of all these factors discussed?  They all affect decisions 
made, as well as decisions yet to be made.  In turn, some decisions, whether political or 
military, caused these factors to have more of an effect than they would under other  
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circumstances.  For example, the factor of time available played on the minds of the 
Israelis throughout the offensive.  Had political pressures been taken out of the equation, 
time would have been less critical and Adan would not have said: 
…we faced many concrete problems of which the main one was the lack 
of infantry in the intended zone of combat.  It would take time to move the 
infantry from the Bitter Lake area to Suez City…and time was just what 
we did not have.  The ceasefire was imminent. (Adan, 1980, p. 427)   
Decision-making during the crossing and breakthrough seemed more natural for 
the Israelis with each action leading to the next in a clear sequence.  Even the predictions 
of potential Egyptian counter-moves were all met with confidence by the Israelis.  
Objectives surrounding these decisions also seemed clear and decisive.  Even though 
concerns about casualties were always present, they did not slow the offensive.  The 
Israelis maintained the approved plan to annihilate Egyptian forces.    
The decision to attack Suez City initially presented a continuation of the same 
quick grabs the Israelis had been executing the few days prior to the 24th.  General 
Gonen’s guidance, “… but if it is to be a Stalingrad, no” (O’Ballance, 1978, p. 258) was 
in keeping with the Israeli doctrine of encircling and bypassing strong points.  While the 
decision to attempt the attack was sound in that regard, clear limitations were placed on 
the costs the Israelis were willing to incur.  Unfortunately, high costs came very quickly 
and were unforeseen given the light resistance in the city that was expected (Adan, 1980, 
p. 430).   
Regardless of the weak assumptions about enemy strength, significant tactical 
mistakes were also made.  Even with the light resistance expected, Aryeh should have 
waited for the paratroopers and integrated them into his lead battalion on the 24th.  By 
moving without the paratroopers, Aryeh did not apply the combined arms doctrine the 
Israelis had used previously.  Additionally, Adan points out that, in hindsight, the 
decision to attack lacked any strategic advantage and should not have been undertaken 
(Adan, 1980, p. 427).  While it is unclear why certain decisions were made—no doubt 
many were made in the heat of battle—there is a marked difference between the quality 
of decisions made during the crossing and breakthrough phase and those made about  
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Suez City.  It seems all the calculated assessments to achieve victory ended with Magen’s 
seizure of the Cairo-Suez road, and that the operations to seize the city itself were only a 
bloody after thought. 
E. CONCLUSION  
The Israeli offensive operations in the southern theater illustrate differences in 
how the Israelis undertook combat in two different environments.  It is clear in this 
comparison that the Israelis were more comfortable and competent in fighting using 
maneuver-style tactics than urban fighting.  Additionally, this case demonstrates that 
different types of operations and environments require different approaches to various but 
ever-present factors in warfare.  This is clearly evident in the comparison of physical 
environments, time, informational considerations, use of technology, and decision-
making.  The comparison of human factors in the two environments suggests, but does 
not prove, that urban fighting is more intense than maneuver warfare.  Beyond that, the 
brevity of the conflict makes it difficult to highlight significant differences when it comes 
to the effects of two such different environments on these elusive human factors.   
Table 2 highlights the qualitative comparison of how the two different 
environments affected the performance of Adan’s division in the areas of our 5 factors.  
The Israelis performed the worst in managing information.  Detailed rehearsals, 
established doctrine, and a dispersed and fluid execution in the bridging and breakout 
were successful compared to what occurred in Suez City.  Another significant difference 
was how the Israelis used their available technology so well in the bridging and breakout, 
yet so poorly in the city fighting.  Decision-making reflected the same imbalance. 
Through solid training, the Israelis did mitigate for the different facets of time well.  But 
due to poor preparations and decisions, their use of time was degraded in the city 











Table 2. Effects of the Factors on Operational Performance of Israeli Forces 
Between the Two Environments.  Scale:  Bad Effect (---) to Good Effect (+++). 
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Early in our research on urban warfare, we hypothesized that some factors in 
urban warfare are interrelated and create a magnified effect.  What the analysis of these 
factors has since shown, particularly in the context of the Israeli actions in Suez City, is 
that a number of these factors will converge at key moments in the battle.   
The vignette that illustrates this point most dramatically is the case of Lieutenant 
Dudu at the police station.  Each of the factors analyzed above were involved in Dudu’s 
situation and eventually weighed on the decision he had to make.  He was affected by the 
interaction of the environment with the factors of time, informational capabilities, and 
will and morale simultaneously.  These all played into his ability to make the right 
decision.  Indeed, just the fact of convergence made his situation more difficult.  There is 
no need for an equation or a model to demonstrate this.  Dudu appears to have been 
overwhelmed by the chaotic convergence of all the factors that are always present in 
warfare.  Only if he or his superiors had been able to mitigate the effects of some of these 
factors, perhaps his situation might have seemed less dire or traumatic when it came time 
for him to lead his men back into the street.16   
                                                 
16 In recent history, American elements surrounded in similar circumstances faced the same 
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IV. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS OFFENSIVE 
OPERATIONS IN I CORPS SECTOR, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
1967-68 
A. BACKGROUND 
Vietnam was America’s longest war.  Starting with advisory missions in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, this involvement ballooned to a direct combat role for U.S. 
ground forces in 1965.  The story of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) in Vietnam 
is part of this legacy.  Its role in ground combat operations illustrates the successes and 
challenges of both traditional rural and jungle fighting, as well as the brutal urban 
fighting encountered in Hue during the Tet Offensive of 1968.     
The USMC force build-up began with the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary 
Forces at Da Nang in March, 1965.  One month later, President Johnson authorized the 
use of U.S. forces to conduct ground combat operations.  From this point, U.S. forces 
would build up to 184,300 personnel by the end of 1965 and continue to over 319,000 
personnel by the end of 1967 (Willbanks, 2003, p. 1).  By the beginning of 1968, the 
Marine totals were approximately 69,650 personnel on duty in Vietnam (Telfer, Rogers, 
& Fleming, 1984, p. 323).  As part of this build up, the III Marine Amphibious Force 
(MAF) was assigned to the Vietnamese Military I Corps Tactical Zone in the 
northernmost provinces of the Republic of Vietnam.  The Third Marine Amphibious 
Force (III MAF) was made up of two Marine divisions, the 1st and the 3rd.  Additionally, 
the III MAF had Support Landing Forces (SLF) that operated from Amphibious Ready 
Groups (ARGs) off the coast of Vietnam.  With this substantial force, the Marines were 
in a good position to counter the increasing number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
regular units that were moving south from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the 17th 
Parallel.  1967 and 1968 marked a departure from insurgency-type warfare and the 
beginning of the clash of conventional forces.  The Americans always wanted the 
communists to fight openly, and during much of the action in I Corps Tactical Zone in 
1967 the NVA gave them what they asked for.    
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B. THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE 
1. General 
For the purposes of this study, an examination of the nature of USMC offensive 
operations in 1967 will serve as the (non-urban) baseline for comparing with Marine 
actions during the battle for Hue in 1968.  Since Marine operations typically involved the 
maneuver of multiple battalion-sized elements, many operations involved battalions from 
different Marine regiments fighting side-by-side.  Because of this, it is not possible to 
analyze the specific units in terms of how they fought in Hue versus previously in other 
battles.  Additionally, high turnover of servicemen during the Vietnam War makes it 
difficult to examine a specific unit with the same personnel.  Instead, we have opted to 
develop a more general understanding of the nature of Marine offensive operations 
against the NVA.  The two examples of USMC ground operations selected are from a 
series of operations conducted by the 1st Marine Division in the highly contested 
agricultural region of the Que Son Basin.  Each example demonstrates how typical, 
multi-battalion Marine operations were conducted in the year prior to the Tet Offensive.   
2. Search and Destroy 
In an effort to remove active communist military action, Marine operations 
typically consisted of “sweeping back and forth across a cordoned area” (Telfer et al., 
1984, p. 52).  In U.S. Marines in Vietnam:  Fighting the North Vietnamese 1967, these 
operations are further described, 
…such actions established a tedious balance in the ‘cat-and-mouse’ game 
subduing local guerrillas, operations of a larger scale, responding to 
confirmed intelligence reports, attempted to smash larger, established 
communist concentrations. (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 52)   
These operations were also known by the popular term “search and destroy”.  
Many of these smaller, company-size operations were conducted as a part of the 
extensive pacification campaign throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone.  In numerous 
provinces, both the communist and South Vietnamese governments were in competition 
to control areas with rich farmland.  One of these areas was the Que Son Basin.  Control 
of this area and its agriculture was considered the key to controlling all five Northern 
provinces because of its large output of rice and other agriculture (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 
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63).  Given the sheer bulk of these continuous operations as described above, major 
operations were focused on larger formations of communist forces which were normally 
NVA regular units attempting to fight toe-to-toe with the better trained and equipped U.S. 
and Republic of Vietnam forces.    
3. Operation Union 
The Union series of operations marked the beginning of the struggle with the 
NVA for control of the Que Son Basin.  Opposing the Marines in the basin was the 2nd 
NVA Division.  In early 1967, elements of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2-1 
Marines) moved into the basin to relieve the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 
outpost at Nui Loc Son.  In a few months, F Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (F/2-1 
Marines), was able to reduce NVA/Viet Cong (VC) control over the rice-producing basin.  
The Marines also initiated badly needed civic action projects to gain popular support and 
gather intelligence.  Their third aim was to force the 2nd NVA Division into open combat 
(Telfer et al., 1984, p. 64).  By mid-April 1967, things were falling into place.  The NVA 
were moving into the basin to counter the American presence.  By 17 April, the NVA had 
infiltrated two regiments, the 3rd and 21st, into the basin to assault the Company F outpost 
at Nui Loc Son Base.    
 
 
Figure 15.   USMC Operations in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ).  Note Locations of 
Union I and II  (From:  Telfer et al., 1984, p. 74). 
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With the Company F outpost as the bait, Colonel Radic, the 1st Marine 
Regimental Commander, planned to initiate contact with the NVA elements by using a 
heliborne insertion of three battalions and artillery fire support.  On 21 April, F/2-1 made 
the initial contact with NVA elements in the neighboring village of Binh Son.  While F/2-
1 conducted the majority of the fighting, rapid airmobile deployment of the other three 
American battalions, the remainder of 1-1, 3-1, 3-5 Marines, and fire support allowed all 
elements to be engaged by early on April 22nd.  As was typical of NVA contacts with 
American ground forces, the NVA broke contact with the Marines after only two days of 
fighting.  Radic’s plan nevertheless worked, as the three maneuver battalions were able to 
push the NVA north, inflicting “severe casualties” (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 65).   
The sweeping of the basin continued until 10 May, when two battalions 
conducted a classic movement-to-contact against an enemy strong point on Hill 110.  
Company C of 1-5 Marines was moving on the slope of Hill 110 when it encountered 
heavy fire.  The company was able to clear the hilltop, but the element was still taking 
heavy fire from another hill to the east.  The company commander called for help and 
two companies of 1-3 Marines’ Battalion Landing Force (BLF) moved in from the north 
side of Hill 110 to aid the isolated company of Marines.  From here, the two companies 
shifted operational control over to the battalion commander of 1-5 Marines, Lieutenant 
Colonel Hilgartner.  Even with the extra companies to aid Company C, friendly and 
enemy forces were too close together to concentrate effective direct fire, artillery, and air 
support.  With the additional BLF companies halted, Hilgartner called on his Company A 
operating two kilometers to the east of the action.  When Company A arrived to aid the 
BLF companies, an air controller mistakenly directed a close air support (CAS) strike 
onto their position, killing five and wounding 24 more Marines and ruining another 
chance to aid Company C.   
By 1500, Hilgartner’s command group and Company D had moved to a 
commanding position south of the battlefield.  At 1530, Company M, 3-5 Marines landed 
near Hilgartner’s support-by-fire position.  With these reinforcements, Hilgartner was 
able to consolidate his forces and coordinate cover fire so the BLF companies could 
maneuver on the enemy entrenchment from the north.  By the evening, Hilgartner’s  
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Marines forced the NVA to withdraw under continual harassing artillery fire and CAS.  
The next morning, the Marines found 116 NVA dead, having suffered 33 killed and 135 
wounded themselves.      
 
 
Figure 16.   Marines Search the Rugged Terrain of the Que Son Basin During 
Operation Union II  (From:  Telfer et al., 1984, p. 73).   
 
On 12 May, the BLF returned to their ships off the coast, while the 1-1 Marines 
and the two battalions from the 5th Marines continued to conduct sweeping operations 
through the basin for five more days.  On the 12th and 13th, the Marines were in constant 
contact with platoon and company size forces.  By the evening of the 13th, 3-5 Marines 
accounted for 122 enemy dead during the continued sweep with the aid of air strikes and 
artillery.  This pattern continued on the 14th and 15th as Company D of 1-5 and Company 
M of 3-5, used extensively artillery and air strikes to soften enemy positions.  The 
Marines in this later stage of Operation Union met enemy resistance light enough to be 
handled by company level efforts.   
After 27 days, Colonel Houghton, the 5th Marine Regiment Commander, closed 
down the operation on 17 May.  The Marines accounted for 865 enemy dead, with 486 
NVA among those losses.  In contrast, the Marines lost 110 killed, 473 wounded, and two 
missing.  Colonel Houghton considered the lengthy operation a success.  
The prolonged operations by the 5th Marines in the agriculturally rich Hiep 
Duc-Que-Son-Thang Binh corridor broke the VC control of the area that 
had spanned almost twenty years…the enemy loss in prestige in the eyes 
of the people is readily apparent.  The psychological impact of Operation 
Union equaled or even exceeded the material damage to the Communist 
effort in this area of operations. (as cited by Telfer et al., 1984, p. 68) 
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4. Operation Union II 
With the success of Union I, III MAF planned a continuation of operations in the 
Que Son Basin.  After the withdrawal of elements of the 2nd NVA Division, the Nui Loc 
Son Base continued to report an increase of activity in the basin.  Union II was the 
response to this continued enemy activity.  As in Operation Union I, III MAF designated 
the 5th Marine Regiment to be the operation’s main effort.  On 26 May, the operation 
commenced with 1st Battalion serving in a blocking position along the western side of the 
basin, while 3-5 Marines conducted a heliborne assault to “sweep” northwest towards the 
1-5 position (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 68).  Additionally, the two battalions of the 5th 
Marines worked in concert with an ARVN Ranger element and the 6th ARVN Infantry 
Regiment.  Both South Vietnamese units attacked along two additional axes of advance 
to further prevent enemy withdrawal.   
By 1143 hours on the 26th, 3-5 Marines completed their heliborne assault and 
were caught in heavy fire on the landing zone.  Companies L and M moved north to 
attempt to remove pressure on the landing zone, while Company I moved to envelop the 
enemy position.  By 1630 hours that day, the Marines were able to overrun the enemy 
position at the cost of 38 killed and 82 wounded Marines.  The Marines accounted for 
118 NVA dead.   
On 30 May, Colonel Houghton shifted his efforts to the hills on the southern rim 
of the basin.  The sweeps met only light resistance and scattered sniper fire on the 30th 
and the 1st of June.  On 2 June, Colonel Houghton moved two battalions abreast to 
continue the sweep.  Each battalion, in turn, used two companies abreast, with one in 
reserve.  By 0930 hours that morning, the lead companies of 3-5 Marines were under 
heavy fire on their sweep.  While 3-5 was unable to advance, 1-5 Marines maneuvered to 
the north in an attempt to envelop the enemy position.  Before they could complete the 
maneuver, 1st Battalion elements needed to cross a one-kilometer rice paddy.  The enemy 
position holding 3rd Battalion in place was anchored with elements over-watching the rice 
paddy.  Immediately, lead elements of 1st Battalion were pinned down in the middle of 
the open rice paddy by entrenched NVA.  
101 
With two battalions now pinned and unable to support one another, Colonel 
Houghton asked the 1st Marine Division commander to commit the division reserve, 2nd 
Battalion, 5th Marines.  Major General Robertson authorized the reinforcements and by 
late afternoon Lieutenant Colonel Jackson with one of his own companies and two 
companies from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines landed north of the NVA position.  By 
nightfall, only two companies had reached the landing zone.  Needing to relieve the 
pressure on the other two battalions, Jackson initiated the attack with the two available 
companies.  His battalion immediately made contact with the rearguard of a withdrawing 
NVA element.  With Jackson’s 2nd Battalion now moving unimpeded to their flank, the 
NVA began a complete withdrawal from their defensive positions.  This allowed the 
Marines to capitalize on the large formations of troops moving in the open by directing 
artillery and close air support onto the exposed enemy.   
By morning, the NVA had withdrawn from their positions and both sides had 
begun to collect the dead from the battlefield.  “For the remainder of the day, there was 
an undeclared truce; the two sides intermingled but ignored each other as they went about 
collecting their dead” (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 74).  With this informal truce, Operation 
Union II concluded, with the Marines having suffered 110 killed and 241 wounded.  The 
NVA is estimated to have incurred substantial losses from the operation, with 701 killed 
and 23 prisoners of war (POW).  Even with a continuation of the heavy losses 
experienced during Union I, the casualties from Union II were considered to have 
produced a “favorable ratio” (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 74).   
Both the Union operations were typical “search and destroy’ operations during 
that phase of the war.  The American forces utilized all the assets available to them at the 
time.  Overwhelming fire support from both artillery and close sir support were vital to 
inflict casualties and force the NVA to withdraw during actions in both operations.  The 
Marines were also able to utilize heliborne capabilities to conduct rapid vertical 
envelopment of the enemy with limited notice.  The numerous open areas scattered 
throughout the basin made it easy to conduct these airmobile movements.  This vastly 
increased their maneuver capability.  During the last engagement of Union II, two fresh 
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companies were engaging enemy forces within only five hours of notification.  Even with 
these technological advantages over the NVA, who were mostly restricted to what they 
could carry on their backs, these operations were long, exhausting, and bloody.   
Despite 220 dead and 714 wounded and two missing over the two operations, the 
Marine leadership still considered these operations successes.  This is perhaps because of 
the number of enemy losses in the heavy fighting, approximately 1,700 killed or 
captured.  Overall, the exchange ratio of casualties inflicted was about 2:1 in favor of the 
Americans.  Additionally, both Union operations were multiple-battalion infantry 
operations well supported by a compliment of air transport, artillery, and CAS all 
engaging multiple NVA regiments.  With large-size elements like this, the casualty 
figures appear a high cost for ground that was not held.  However, it is important to 
recognize these operations represent 28 days of combat conducted by successfully 
synchronized efforts of five Marine battalions attacking an enemy in prepared defenses.  
Given the need to have the traditional ratio of attacker to defender at 3:1, the Union series 
appears not only a success in temporarily driving the NVA out of the Que Son Basin but 
also signifies the mettle of the men of the 1st Marine Division in attacking an enemy of 
superior numbers in defensive positions.  As we will see at Hue, this was to become the 
norm.   
C. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS’ ROLE IN OPERATION “HUE 
CITY”   
1. The Tet Offensive, 1968 
A dramatic increase in U.S. ground forces and aggressive operations such as the 
Union series caused a stalemate by the summer of 1967 (Willbanks, 2003, p. 2).  The 
Hanoi-based communist government planned for a general offensive that would break the 
stalemate and “convince the Americans the war was unwinnable” (Willbanks, 2003, p. 2).  
By the fall of 1967, the communist plan was in motion as large troop concentrations 
began with direct attacks across the DMZ and in Vietnam’s Central Highlands.  One of 
the key attacks to draw American attention away from the real objectives of untouched 
urban infrastructure in the south was the attempt to seize the American base at Khe Sanh 
in northwestern South Vietnam.  With two NVA divisions laying siege to the isolated  
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base, President Johnson believed an NVA victory would replicate that over the French at 
Dien Bien Phu in 1954.  As a consequence, President Johnson vowed Khe Sanh would 
not fall. 
As American attention and military efforts were pulled towards Khe Sanh, the 
communists executed their massive attack in the early morning of 31 January 1968 with 
approximately 100,000 NVA and Viet Cong forces dedicated to target population centers 
including “36 of 43 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district 
capitals” throughout South Vietnam (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 239).  Both Saigon and Hue 
were among these objectives.  This attack took advantage of the Tet17 annual ceasefire 
that had been traditionally honored by both sides.   
2. The Battle for Hue 
While many of the battles in the smaller cities and towns ended quickly, the Battle 
for Hue would be the longest, bloodiest, and most storied battle of the Tet Offensive.  
Located 100 miles south of the DMZ in the province of Thua Thien, Hue was the 
provincial capital and the most historic city in Vietnam.  It was the old imperial capital 
and was a cultural and historical center for all Vietnamese, Northerners and Southerners.  
The city was also home to the 1st ARVN Division and a United States Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam (MACV) compound.  Additionally, Hue was on the main supply 
route for American and South Vietnamese supplies coming from the port city of Da 
Nang.  Even with the South’s military presence in Hue, the city’s venerated status kept it 
an open city; and, until January 1968, it had remained free of war.   
In the early morning hours on 31 January 1968, elements of the 2nd NVA Division 
and local Viet Cong elements began their attack on Hue.  By mid-morning, the 
Communists had seized key intersections and government buildings and were laying 
siege to the American MACV compound and the 1st ARVN Division Headquarters in the 
Citadel.  By noon, Viet Cong political officers were eagerly on the streets with lists of 
South Vietnamese, Americans, and other foreigners to detain.  As relayed in Eric 
Hammel’s Fire in the Streets (1991), the following scene was typical of communist 
actions, 
                                                 
17 Tet is the name of the Vietnamese Lunar New Year. 
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“Listen carefully,” the VC commander said.  “You are allowed to go 
home.”  Everyone instantly stood up, ready to leave but the Communist 
officer yelled, “Sit down again!  I mean only the women and small 
children.  All the men, go over there.”  He pointed in the direction of a 
vacant lot.  Immediately, soldiers began pushing all the men to the lot. 
(Hammel, 1991, p. 55)   
 
Figure 17.   Hue City  (From:  Hammel, 1991, p. xvi). 
 
The fate of these detainees and others like them was not discovered until after the 
ARVN and American forces had cleared the Citadel weeks later.  Approximately 3,000 
civilians were massacred and buried in mass graves (Willbanks, 2003, p. 12).   
With the fog of war looming over Hue on the morning of 31 January, both the 1st 
ARVN Division commander, Brigadier General Truong, and the advisors in the 
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American MACV compound were unaware of the extent of the Communist offensive, yet 
both commands were quick to request reinforcements.  Since Hue was located in the I 
Corps Tactical Zone, III MAF received the request to break the siege on the MACV 
compound.  That day, Lieutenant General Cushman, commander of III MAF, ordered 
Task X-Ray of the 1st Marine Division to relieve the MACV advisors.   
On orders from Brigadier General LaHue, the Task Force X-Ray commander, the 
Phu Bai designated reaction force, Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (A/1-1) was to 
aid the advisors.  With limited information about the length of the operation or the 
strength of Communists in Hue, Captain Batcheller hastily led his company on the eight-
mile movement north from Phu Bai soon after sunrise on the 31st.  Meeting up with four 
M-48 tanks moving north to the DMZ, Batcheller pressed forward, slowly encountering 
sniper fire and clearing buildings along the route.  As A/1-1’s convoy crossed the An Cuu 
Bridge and entered the southern portion of Hue, the Marines were caught in an intense 
crossfire of automatic weapons and B-40 rockets.  Pinned down under the withering fire, 
with casualties mounting, Batcheller called for help from his battalion commander, 
Lieutenant Colonel Gravel.  With Company A in desperate need of help, Gravel hastily 
organized what men he had available from his command group and the only infantry 
company currently at Phu Bai, Company G, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (G/2-5).  Without 
time to properly organize his Marines for the relief mission, Gravel’s element moved 
towards Hue with two missions, to relieve the MACV compound and to rescue his 
Company A.  He managed to accomplish both by 1515 hours on 31 January and the cost 
to the Marines by that time had already been 10 killed and 30 wounded.   
With the MACV compound secured, LaHue ordered Gravel to cross the Song 
Huong (Perfume River) with his makeshift battalion of two companies, four tanks, and 
two 40mm Duster anti-aircraft guns to relieve the besieged ARVN command post within 
the Citadel.  Under protest, Gravel advanced with Company G and three of the four M-48 
tanks and several additional tanks from the 7th ARVN Cavalry Squadron.  With the armor 
covering the south side of the Song Huong, Company G crossed the Nguyen Hoang 




Figure 18.   The Citadel in Hue  (From:  Urban Operations Journal). 
 
Met immediately with intense fire, 10 Marines were hit, while two platoons 
plunged forward over the bridge in an attempt to find a breach in the Citadel walls.  
Badly outnumbered and under heavy fire, Gravel pulled Company G back from the north 
side of the river.  In the two-hour fight, one third of Company G was either killed or 
wounded.  CPT Meadows, the Company G commander, recalled that most of the 
casualties occurred while “going across that one bridge and then getting back across that 
bridge” (as cited by Shulimson, Blasiol, Smith, & Dawson, 1997, p. 174)18.   
With the intelligence situation still not clear as to the enemy’s hold on Hue, plans 
to retake the city were being considered all the way up the chain of command from 
LaHue at Task Force X-Ray to General Westmoreland in Saigon and finally to General 
Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.  At each level, these plans were based on 
faulty and grossly underestimated enemy strengths in the city.  With the Tet Offensive 
still raging throughout South Vietnam, this intelligence failure “resulted in insufficient 
forces being allocated for retaking the city” (Willbanks, 2003, p. 17).  The plan initially 
called for a division of effort within the city, with the ARVN forces to secure and clear 
north of the Song Huong and the Marines clearing the south side.  Since Hue was the 
most beloved city in Vietnam, neither the ARVN nor the American leadership was 
willing to risk the potential political repercussions of seeing the ancient capital in ruins, 
thus rules of engagement were important (Willbanks, 2003, p. 18).  Lieutenant General 
                                                 
18 This source is a volume in the official USMC history series.  Because it is based on unit after action 
reports (AAR) and first hand accounts, this source is considered by the authors of this study to be a 
compilation of primary sources.  Other sources used in this study have cited this work as a reference.   
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Cushman later commented, “I wasn’t about to open up on the old palace and all the 
historical buildings in there.  I told Lam [I Corps Commander] he was going to have to do 
it” (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 176).   
From the 2nd through the 10th of February, the Marines painstakingly cleared the 
southern portion of the city.  Gravel was ordered on the 2nd to move six blocks from the 
MACV compound and seize the Thua Thien Province headquarters.  His two-company 
battalion did not make it a block before they were turned back by the enemy defenses.  
As one Marine of Company G recalled, “We didn’t get a block away [from the MACV 
compound] when we started getting sniper fire.  We got a tank…went a block, turned 
right and received 57mm recoilless which put out our tank” (as cited by Willbanks, 2003, 
p. 20).  With Gravel’s failed efforts, Colonel Hughes, the 1st Marine Regiment 
commander, took control of the battle personally, promised Gravel reinforcements, and 
ordered him to conduct “sweep and clear operations…to destroy enemy forces, protect 
U.S. Nationals and restore that (southern) portion of the city to U.S. control” (as cited by 
Willbanks, 2003, p. 21).  Gravel would continue efforts to reach his objectives on the 
south side of the city with limited success for the rest of the day.  The arrival of 2-5 
Marines and Colonel Hughes with the 1st Marine Regimental staff that evening began to 
change the complexion of the battle.   
From the 3rd to the 10th, 2-5 Marines took over the main effort of clearing the 
southern portion of the city.  Since Gravel’s battalion only consisted of approximately 
one and a half companies of combat effective Marines, his force was unable to complete 
the mission and was placed in a supporting role.  Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham, the 2-5 
Marine commander, was given guidance to secure the key structures on the south side.  
The first objectives were the public health building, the treasury office, and the post 
office.  After their initiation in urban combat on the 3rd, where Cheatham’s battalion “was 
exactly where we [1-1 Marines] left them”, the Marines were able to secure all three 
objectives by the 5th (Shulimson, et al., 1997, p. 180).  Cheatham continued to press the 
attack each day with the prison and provincial headquarters office being taken by the 
evening of the 6th.  Fighting continued through the 10th, when the only remaining 
resistance was sporadic sniper fire in the southern side of the city.   
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Figure 19.   Fighting in the Citadel  (From:  Urban Operations Journal). 
 
The fighting the first 11 days in Hue effectively broke the 4th NVA regiment that 
had defended that part of the city.  For the rest of the battle, the 4th Regiment “ceased to 
be a strategically relevant factor in the battle for Hue” (Hammel, 1991, p. 239).  By this 
stage in the battle, the NVA losses were 1,000 killed, 6 POWs and 89 detained for 
questioning.  The U.S. losses were 38 killed and 320 wounded (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 
191).   
With the 2-5 Marines exhausted and still mopping up on the south side of the 
Song Huong, fresh reinforcements were called in to help clear the Citadel.  The original 
plan, decided between Lieutenant General Cushman (the III MAF commander), and 
Lieutenant General Lam, (the I Corps commander), called for South Vietnamese forces to 
clear the Citadel.  The badly surprised and isolated 1st ARVN Division made little 
progress against enemy positions in the ancient city.  The Marines were called on once 
again to help complete the mission.  1-5, under the command of Major Thompson, was 
airlifted by helicopter and moved by landing craft to the besieged ARVN Mang Ca 
compound on February 11th.  
With orders to aid in the clearing of the Citadel, 1-5 moved out of the Mang Ca 
compound on the 13th.  With two companies abreast and one in reserve, Thompson 
pushed into this assigned sector of the Citadel.  The 1-5 Marines quickly met with 
resistance from an archway tower on the east wall of the Citadel.  The NVA had 
entrenched themselves at the base of the tower, making it difficult to approach or use 
artillery to disrupt the position with the remaining option of small arms.  Just as 1-1 and 
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2-5 were baptized in the urban arena - so was 1-5 Marines.  It took three days of heavy 
fighting with the support of Marine field artillery and naval gunfire to reduce the “tower” 
and push the NVA out of their defensive positions.  What it cost to take the “tower” was 
the same for other Marine objectives in this battle – high casualties.  Six Marines were 
killed, with 30 more wounded.  All in exchange for 20 enemy killed and that section of 
the Citadel wall.   
With the tower taken, Major Thompson renewed the attack southeast along the 
Citadel wall.  For another seven days, 1-5 fought “meter by meter” with intense close 
quarter combat in a “defender’s paradise” against a resolute enemy well trained in urban 
fighting (Willbanks, 2003, p. 32).  By the 17th, 1-5 Marines had suffered 47 killed and 
240 wounded in only five days of fighting.  Major Thompson’s Marines were becoming 
completely exhausted by the non-stop fighting.  Casualties were mounting with medical 
personnel unable to keep up with the need for aid.  After a day to rest and refit on the 
18th, Thompson, with remnants of a Marine infantry battalion, was ready to push forward 
to secure the east wall of the Citadel (Willbanks, 2003, p. 34).   
 
 
Figure 20.   Casualty Evacuation in the Urban Environment  (From:  Urban Operations 
Journal). 
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To aid the Allies in their push on the Citadel, the rules of engagement (ROE) had 
been relaxed, allowing for the extensive use of artillery and CAS.  Vice President Ky of 
the Republic of Vietnam stated the enemy is willing to sacrifice “thousands of men to 
win a slight political gain” (as cited by Shulimson, et al., 1997, p. 205).  He additionally 
declared “U.S. forces should not allow the enemy use of pagodas, churches, and other 
religious symbolic buildings to deter their advance and that he would ‘accept 
responsibility’ for any destruction (Shulimson, et al., 1997, p. 205).  With this, continued 
offensive efforts were made with a rolling barrage of artillery and CAS.  The downside of 
lifting the restrictions was that 40% of Hue was reduced to rubble by the end of the battle 
(Willbanks, 2003, p. 33).   
By the 21st, Major Thompson’s battalion had reached its limit and additional 
forces were required to clear the enemy from the last defensive positions inside the 
Citadel.  Alongside the Marines, ARVN troops and Vietnamese Marines also fought 
through the Citadel.  Yet, almost as this were occurring in an old movie, the last objective 
would prove the most symbolic—the Old Imperial Palace.  On the 21st, Company L, 3-5 
Marines was attached to Thompson’s battalion to augment the Vietnamese in taking this 
final objective.  Once more, on the morning of the 22nd, 1-5 Marines launched another 
attack to seize the south side of the Citadel wall and the gate leading to the southern part 
of the city.  Recalled by Thompson, the attack was a “classic combined arms effort that 
could not have been done better on a blackboard” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 
208).  With CAS and M-48 tank fire supporting their advance, 1-5 achieved its objectives 
by 1800 hours that evening with relatively light causalities, with only three killed and 30 
wounded (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 210).   
For political reasons, the coup d’ grâce was left to the Vietnamese Marines who 
made repeated assaults against the Imperial Palace from the 22nd through the 26th 
eventually eliminating the last pockets of organized enemy resistance.  USMC activities 
after 1-5’s last assault on the 22nd were reduced to continued mopping up operations 
south of the Song Huong and in and around the Citadel.  With the fighting in the city then 
drawing to a close, U.S. Marines joined U.S. Army forces already operating outside the 
city in continued operations to clear the area of potential enemy activity.   
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On 2 March 1968, Operation “Hue City” was officially over.  The 26-day battle 
had been the longest sustained infantry battle to this point in the war.  The losses 
reflected the battle’s duration and intensity.  The U.S. Marines casualties totaled 143 
killed and approximately 1,100 wounded.  U.S. Army losses were 74 dead and 509 
wounded.  South Vietnamese losses were higher, with 384 killed and 1,773 wounded, and 
30 missing (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 213).  The civilians of Hue also suffered dearly 
during the month-long ordeal, with an estimated 5,800 killed and missing and 116,000 
people left homeless (Willbanks, 2003, p. 37).  Communist losses were estimated 
between 2,500 to 5,000 killed, although official Communist reports declared only 1,042 
killed, with no record of wounded, prisoners, or missing (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 213).   
Compared to the exchange ratio in the Union operations, the battle for Hue was a 
much narrower victory in terms of losses when totaling the USMC, U.S. Army, and 
ARVN casualties compared to those of the Communists, yielded a ratio of almost 1:1.  
This estimate does not even account for the civilian losses both from executions or 
combat.  One explanation for this could be that the Communists were either unable to 
withdraw when faced with the superior U.S. firepower or they simply chose not to.  One 
Marine commented that he thought the fighting in the city was easier because, “…you 
can see more of the damage you’re doing to the enemy because they don’t drag off their 
dead” (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 185).  For whatever reason, the casualty exchange ratio 
indicates that the Communists at Hue made the Allies pay for every meter of the city the 
Allies gained more so than during the Union operations.   
Analyses of the battle for Hue often point to three shortcomings on the part of the 
Americans.  First the intelligence failure of anticipating the Tet Offense is considered one 
of the worst American intelligence failures of the war.  Simply put, if the Allies were 
aware of the offensive, Hue would have been better defended and it may not have 
required a month of hard fighting to retake the city.  Secondly, Marine command and 
control has been criticized as having failed during the battle.  Willbanks (2003) states that 
no single commander was in charge of the battle and this confused the Allied ability to 
command and control.  This is a an excellent point in regard to coordinating the 
operations of the ARVN forces in the Citadel, the Marines on the south side of the Song 
Huong, and the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division efforts to isolate the city to the north.  
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Isolation of the city was critical and coordination of all three elements in supporting the 
isolation operation needed to be done.  However, given the large linear obstacles that 
compartmentalized the sections of the city, a single commander coordinating all forces 
may not have had been effective in the city-specific fighting.  Additionally, due to the 
poor intelligence picture, local commanders were reacting rather than anticipating enemy 
actions.  A single commander may have confused this already complex situation.  The 
third shortcoming often mentioned is the failure of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division 
to isolate Hue from the NVA supply centers north of the city until the February 21st.  This 
allowed the NVA to reinforce, refit, and resupply the defenders unhindered for three 
weeks of fighting.   
With these handicaps, the Marine performance at Hue might appear to have been 
a costly slugging match between the highly trained Americans and the resolute and 
poorly equipped NVA.  This is not the case: The NVA outnumbered the Marines by as 
much as 5:1 and they were defending from prepared positions (Martin, 2000).  
Additionally, the Marines were not trained in urban fighting while Hammel states the 
NVA had received special training in urban fighting prior to launching the offensive 
(Hammel, 1991, p. 29).  So, with an enemy trained in urban combat and planning to stand 
and fight, how did the outnumbered and ill-trained Marine force still manage to win?   
The following comparative analysis will demonstrate how different the fighting 
was for the Marines in the Union operations from what they experienced in Hue.  As in 
the previous cases, this analysis will concentrate on our 5 factors.  But here it should be 
noted that there is at least one significant difference between this case and the previous 
two.  The Marines at Hue succeeded.   
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:  UNITED STATES MARINE OFFENSIVE 
OPERATIONS IN I CORPS SECTOR AND OPERATION “HUE CITY”.   
1. Environment 
a. Physical Terrain 
The difference in the physical environment the Marines operated in during 
the Union operations and the battle for Hue is obvious.  The Que Son Basin was a rich 
agricultural region that mainly produced rice.  While the low ground of the basin was 
cultivated for agriculture, with canals, dikes, and paddies necessary for rice production, 
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the surrounding rolling hills were thickly vegetated and typical of that region of Vietnam.  
The cultivated land offered numerous open locations to conduct vertical envelopment 
operations via helicopter.  In contrast, the walls of the basin offered excellent 
concealment and increased elevation to observe air movement within and entering the 
basin.     
The more densely vegetated areas provided excellent concealment for the 
defending Communist forces not only from ground observation, but also from the 
asymmetrical advantages of American air power.  The vegetation was thick enough to 
bog down organized Marine attacks at the company and battalion levels, which allowed 
the Communists to continue to play the “cat and mouse game” and evade the pursuing 
Americans (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 52).  The Communists skillfully combined their 
defenses on key high ground while dominating the numerous open avenues of approach 
in the cultivated rice paddies below.  Terrain in the Que Son Basin favored the 
Communist defenders.  Even though the Union operations were American offensive 
operations, the Communist offensive infiltrations into the basin were designed to draw 
the Americans into direct combat where the Communists could enjoy their established 
defenses.   
In contrast to the rugged terrain of the Que Son Basin, Hue had its own 
unique features that made it a “defender’s paradise” (Willbanks, 2003, p. 32).  Like many 
other cities around the world, Hue is divided by a river.  The historical center, the Citadel, 
was to the north of the Song Huong (Perfume River) while the more modern sections 
with industry and government infrastructure were to the south.  Additionally, the 
tributaries of the Song Huong made Hue a series of islands that were only accessible by 
key bridges or shallow draft watercraft.  This aspect of the city offered a defender an 
additional advantage granted he could dominate these isolated and vulnerable avenues of 
approach (Hammel, 1991, p. 30).   
The southern section of the city, consisting of more modern structures, 
was not as congested as the Citadel.  The buildings resembled those of any contemporary 
western city with various parks and open areas.  The government infrastructure centers 
were generally larger multi-story buildings that covered entire blocks as opposed to the 
114 
smaller, older structures of the Citadel.  Government centers common to all large cities, 
such as the “Treasury”, “Hospital” and “Provincial Headquarters,” would take on new 
meanings for the Marines as areas that offered stiff resistance during the fighting.  The 
southern section of the city became a laboratory for two Marine infantry battalions to 
learn the lessons of urban warfare.  In the southern section of the city, Lieutenant Colonel 
Gravel and his under-strength battalion were able to advance “only 75 yards…the going 
was slow.  We would go maybe a block.  We fought for two days over one building” (as 
cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 189).   
The Citadel itself was a city within a city, with 30-foot high and 40-foot 
thick walls that surrounded the historic center in the shape of a square, approximately 
2700 yards long on each side (Willbanks, 2003, p. 4).  Major Thompson described the 
Citadel as “row after row of single story, thick walled masonry house jammed close 
together and occasionally separated by alley ways or narrow streets” (as cited by 
Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 201).  Additionally,  
…nearly all the buildings inside the Citadel and in the modern city were of 
stout concrete or masonry construction.  Each building was a potential 
pillbox or bunker that could be fortified to withstand a direct assault by 
even the most heavily equipped modern infantry. (Hammel, 1991, p. 30)   
In addition to the tight irregular streets common to an 18th century city, the 
Imperial Palace in the Citadel in itself comprised a smaller walled Citadel that dominated 
all approaches through the old city.   
b. Human Environment 
Beyond the obvious differences in the physical terrain where operations 
were conducted, the people that lived in the Que Son Basin and Hue represented another 
distinct part of the landscape that affected Marine operations.  First, the Que Son Basin 
had been under Viet Cong control for over 20 years.  With increased Marine activity and 
establishment of the Nui Loc Son base, Viet Cong sympathizers or active insurgents were 
able to easily report on the activity of the Americans.  With the infiltration of two NVA 
regiments into the area in April 1968, the importance of reports tracking American 
activities naturally increased.  Since both sides were looking to engage in direct combat,  
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the advantage of actionable intelligence favored the Communists.  The ability to collect 
and disseminate this intelligence was easier for the Communists with the hold they had 
over the population, through either their supporters or people coerced by the Viet Cong.   
At the same time, Hue was an international city, with over two hundred 
years of European cultural influence.  Since Hue was the provincial capital of Thua Thien 
and the fourth-largest city in the Republic of Vietnam, the population naturally had strong 
governmental, political, and economic ties to the south.  This was seen during the round-
ups and subsequent murder of approximately 3,000 Vietnamese and foreigners on the 
31st.  Additionally, the fighting that raged from 31 January through 2 March caused 
thousands of Hue residents to flee the city, even as American and ARVN forces did their 
best to safeguard the civilian population.  Given the remote, rural location of many of the 
engagements in the Union operations, protecting civilians did not present the same degree 
of difficulty.  
More than any other factor we discuss for this case, the environment, with 
its physical and human dimensions, led to significant changes in Marine tactics.  Up until 
the battle of Hue, most combat in Vietnam was conducted in rural settings.  Training, 
organization, and equipment were all designed to support operations like those 
undertaken in the Union series.  The Marines found themselves having to make numerous 
adjustments to their tactics, techniques, and procedures in Hue to seize their objectives.  
As the combat-experienced commander of H/2-5 Marines, Captain Ron Christmas put it: 
I could feel a knot developing in my stomach.  Not so much from fear—
though a helluva lot of fear was there –but because we were new to this 
type of situation.  We were accustomed to jungles and open rice fields, 
and now we would be fighting in a city, like it was Europe in World War 
II. (as cited by Willbanks, 2003, p. 25)   
First Lieutenant Lambert, also of H/2-5, further reflected, “urban warfare 
is very different from jungle warfare because you never know where they [the enemy] are 
going to be” (Martin, 2000).  Veterans of C/1-5 Marines further confirmed this when they 
stated in an urban operations compendium published by RAND, Ready for Armageddon 
(Nelson, et al., 2002), that prior to the Tet Offensive, “Marine forces were literally knee-
deep in rice paddies and jungle mud...” (Nelson, et al., p. 98).   
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Given the vast differences between the environments where these different 
operations occurred, each of the additional factors discussed can be linked back to the all-
encompassing factor of environment.  With these major differences taken into account, 
the common thread of how the Marines operated can be drawn back to their relative 
comfort in the rural environment and their inexperience in the unfamiliar and brutal 
environment of a large, old, and congested city. 
2. Time 
Typical of NVA methods, infiltration into an area of operation was followed by 
building defensive positions and resupplying those positions to aid NVA control of a 
region and population.  Operations in Que Son Basin and Hue were the same in that 
regard.  In both cases, the enemy moved in, established defenses, and began to impress, 
indoctrinate, and exploit the local populations.  Since the Communists used such 
techniques to conduct their guerilla war, the onus of removing them fell on the Allies.  To 
use Brigadier General Avidor’s framework of analysis, the Communists understood the 
concept of relative time.  They were able to execute the offensive campaigns because 
their idea of victory was not tied to a timeline with specific time-oriented goals.  They 
were able to force the Allies to react to their timetable of offensive action and then simply 
withdraw at their choosing, particularly once the Allies were able to bring overwhelming 
force to bear on their well-prepared defensive positions.  One NVA author described how 
their enemy did not understand their intent.  “The enemy knew nothing of our strategy; 
by the time our forces approached the city of Hue, the enemy still had not taken any 
specific measures” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 214).   
a. Relative Time 
During both Union operations, the Marines were “force oriented” in the 
sense that they were not constrained by time to destroy the enemy.  Even though the 
Marines would not be able to search indefinitely for the NVA, their timeline for the 
missions was driven by enemy contact rather than seizure of specific terrain as at Hue.  
The Marines knew they were going into an area that had been controlled by the Viet 
Cong for the past 20 years.  They understood that an overnight success would not 
alleviate the hold the Communists had on the region.  To break the Communist hold, the 
Marine company at the Nui Loc Son base began to conduct civic action projects to sway 
117 
popular favor towards the Allies.  This, coupled with the deliberate preparations Colonel 
Radic made to counter any large-scale operations of the 2nd NVA Division, shows the 
Marines were not time dependent in their planning and execution of Operation Union.  In 
the long run, if NVA elements were destroyed and the basin was made secure to reduce 
communist influence, the mission was successful.  In essence, the Marines took an 
approach to operations similar to that of the communists—they were waiting for their 
opponent to react to their move. 
On the other hand, at Hue, the operations were politically charged as soon 
as Communists occupied the city.  Each day the Communists controlled the city 
suggested that the NVA forces were liberating the most venerated city in Vietnam.  
Given such symbolism, it is no wonder that Vice President Ky was willing to “accept 
responsibility” for damage done to the Citadel to remove the Communists (Shulimson et 
al., 1997, p. 205).  The commander of 1-5 Marines, Major Thompson, later commented 
on the issue of time that, “We were 12 days late and Lyndon Johnson was very adamant 
about getting it over with” (Martin, 2000).  With this kind of pressure to produce results 
quickly, the Marines were forced to approach relative time much differently than in the 
typical search and destroy operation, in which the senior tactical commanders could 
decide the tempo of the battle.  At Hue, pressure from above often shoved the Marines 
forward before they were ready.   
Early in the battle, orders from Brigadier General LaHue to Batcheller’s 
company, and later to Gravel’s makeshift battalion, were indicative of the Marine 
leadership being totally unprepared for the Tet Offensive attacks on Hue.  These orders 
show a lack of understanding of how much time was required to fight in a city regardless 
of the anticipated size of the enemy force.  On 31 January, LaHue ordered Lieutenant 
Colonel Gravel on missions that were unachievable.  Both the drive to the MACV 
compound and the movement across the Nguyen Hoang Bridge were assaults made on 
time-driven directives from higher commands.  The extensive functional time required 
for fighting in the urban environment was not realized until casualties were mounting 
without gains made against the defending NVA.  Here the relative time need of a quick 
decision dictated the functional time the higher echelon leadership would allow.   
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b. Functional Time 
On the tactical level, functional time was a critical piece for the Marine 
operations in the Que Son Basin.  In both Operation Union and Union II, relief forces 
were rapidly shuttled into the battles to affect a shift in the fight.  During the action on 30 
May 1967, Colonel Houghton needed to request the release of the 1st Marine Division 
reserve when two of his battalions were pinned down by an enemy strongpoint defense.  
Even with the two battalions pinned down, Colonel Houghton could estimate how much 
time it would take to move the reserve into place.  Although the situation was desperate 
for the battalions in contact, he knew he could wait for the arrival of the reserve.  Had 
Colonel Houghton been ignorant of the time required to commit the division reserve, he 
could have withdrawn his forces prematurely, possibly inflicting more casualties.   
Early in the battle on the unfamiliar terrain of Hue, the Marine leadership 
did not understand the concept of functional time in a city fight.  The Marines recognized 
after the first two days of fighting that achieving their designated objectives would take 
longer than expected.  In fact, Lieutenant Colonel Gravel was initially criticized for his 
slow progress on the southern side of the Song Huong until Lieutenant Colonel 
Cheatham’s 2-5 Marines experienced the same problems.  (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 
180).  To their credit, the Marines learned quickly not to push for success in seizing 
objectives.  Captain Dale Dye (retired), one of the authors of the Ready for Armageddon 
study (Nelson et al., 2002), describes his view of functional time in terms of operational 
tempo: 
Slow the tempo.  Finally one of our most valuable lessons fighting on the 
south and north sides of Hue was to slow down and be deliberate.  Before 
we got the feel for urban ops we had the tendency to just go hey-diddle-
diddle right up the middle and rely on the momentum of our attack to 
shock the enemy.  He was not easily shocked as we learned to our 
detriment.  The solution was to slow down, assess the situation, make a 
deliberate plan, and carry it out with vigor! (Nelson et al., 2002, p. 107) 
This example illustrates how a unit comfortable operating at one speed 
(probably reacting to enemy fire in a rural setting) needed to take into account the city  
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environment prior to attempting to accomplish tasks such as seizing and clearing 
buildings.  Basically, the Marines did not apply Avidor’s idea of functional time to the 
urban environment until the second or third day of heavy fighting and losses.  
Once the Marines established how much time it would take to work 
through the city, they moved more methodically with detailed planning as Dye mentions.  
Key to their success in relation to time was that they did not allow themselves to be 
shaken in their planning and execution.  This was evident in their deliberate approach to 
seize limited objectives day by day, as opposed to their initial unsuccessful forays to push 
the decision by seizing key locations in the city.  Their operations after the 4th of 
February moved much more smoothly, with greater success even though the casualty 
rates were still high.   
c. Objective Time 
The majority of movements and fighting during the Union operations were 
conducted during daytime.  This is logical given the mission of actively seeking out 
enemy positions in order to maneuver on and destroy them.  Additionally, the complexity 
of multiple battalions moving in concert, methodically sweeping through jungle, was 
more easily controlled during the day.  This did not mean that the movement and fighting 
stopped at sundown.  In both Union I and II, the Marines continued to press NVA 
positions in the dark.  Often, the NVA would smartly withdraw under the cover of 
darkness to avoid the fire superiority the Americans had.  This proficiency in operating in 
the jungle at night would not carry over to Marine actions at Hue.   
During the city fight, the Marines did not continue offensive operations 
after sundown.  There are two possible explanations for this.  First, the complexity of the 
environment with the extensive amount of obstacles and ambush positions would only 
favor the static defender more.  Secondly, the risk of coordinating attacks in the dark 
quagmire of rumbled concrete and broken glass would only add to the casualties from 
debris as well as fratricide.  As First Lieutenant Lambert of H/2-5 stated, “We spent the 
night where ever we stopped fighting for the day…we held the ground we conquered that 
day” (Martin, 2000).  A Marine in 1-5 Marines fighting in the Citadel confirmed this with 
an eerie twist: he would awake each morning to the M-48 tanks starting their engines and 
with that he knew he had another day of fighting house to house (Martin, 2000).   
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It seems from these accounts the American were satisfied to hold what 
they could control each night.  The Communists, however, used the darkness to reinforce, 
resupply, and refit as well as displace to a more defendable position, usually two blocks 
away from the Americans in their nightly defensive perimeters.  They also conducted 
limited probes and harassment fire to most likely hide such activities.   
3. Informational Factor 
The main difference in the informational aspect of these two types of operations 
lies in the deliberate planning and execution involved.  Both Union I and II were 
deliberate operations designed to make contact with and destroy Communists forces 
operating in the Que Son Basin.  Intelligence preparation and planning were obviously 
successful, given the ability of the Marines to search, locate, and dislodge NVA 
positions.  As the situation developed, forces in both Union operations maneuvered onto 
the enemy positions as necessary to destroy them.  Fire support and CAS were also a 
standard part of these multiple battalion operations and were included in the planning.   
Since search and destroy operations were based on imperfect information about 
the enemy, the engagements during both Union operations required a combination of 
immediate action fire and maneuver drills, followed by deliberate development of the 
situation, with the commander maneuvering forces to defeat the enemy.  Even with the 
difficulty of seeing friendly units, most Marine leaders from the regimental commander 
down to the fire team leader knew where the enemy and friendly units were located in the 
rugged terrain of the Que Son Basin.  The one exception to this was during the Union 
engagement on 10 May when a Marine air controller mistakenly directed close air 
support onto a friendly company, halting its supporting attack.  During the two Union 
operations, this was the only significant case of fratricide.  Given that friendly forces 
were converging from three sides onto the enemy strongpoint, it is surprising other units 
were not targeted as well during the close quarters fighting.  This success can be credited 
to experienced leaders having the situational awareness to maintain unit locations in the 
heat of battle.   
In contrast, the Marines operated in an information vacuum at Hue.  They entered 
the battle, reacting to the Communist offensive without deliberate planning to support 
their actions.  Captain Batcheller’s Marines in Company A/1-1 were completely 
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unprepared for what awaited them at Hue, not just in terms of the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures needed for urban combat, but about the enemy situation in general.  Had there 
been any understanding of the Communist forces present at Hue on the 31st, one can 
assume more deliberate plans to relieve the MACV garrison would have been made, 
similar to the planning that was later done to storm the Citadel.   
Additionally, both the 1st ARVN headquarters and the MACV compound can be 
blamed for the poor situational picture.  On the one hand, this might be considered 
understandable given that both compounds were under siege and lacked a clear picture of 
the enemy’s activity or overall intent.  Several first-hand quotes attest to the fact the 
Marines were going into the city blind.  On the morning of 31 January, Lieutenant 
Colonel Gravel was unprepared to move from Phu Bai in support of A/1-1.  According to 
his account, the only planning he had time to conduct was to issue the command, “Get on 
the trucks, men” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 172).  Expecting only a two-hour 
engagement, Gravel’s men did not take adequate supplies or personal gear, less “rain 
gear,” for what would be a month of intense combat (Hammel, 1991, p. 69).   
Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham’s entry into the battle was similar, with the broad 
yet curt directions from Colonel Hughes, “I want you to…attack through the city and 
clean the NVA out…if you are looking for any more, you aren’t going to get it.  Move 
out!” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 180).  Even two weeks later, as Major 
Thompson, the battalion commander of 1-5 Marines, was receiving his orders, he was 
under the impression that “no one seemed to know what the actual situation was in the 
Citadel.  I can remember General LaHue commenting it shouldn’t take more than a few 
days to clear up the Citadel affair” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 198).  Given the 
difficulty of fighting in this complex environment, this lack of information did not help 
the Marines in their planning or execution—whether we are analyzing Day One or Day 
Fourteen in the battle.  The most basic information was not coming out of the city.  
Several veterans of C/1-5, commenting on their participation in the battle, questioned 
why the ARVN forces had not sent a report to the Americans on the disposition of the 
enemy in the Citadel since they had been fighting there for two solid weeks (Nelson et 
al., 2002, p. 100).     
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Historically, the Allied inability to foresee the Tet Offensive is considered one of 
the war’s most significant intelligence disasters.19  This failure to forecast the impending 
offensive included oversights in the estimates regarding operations against Hue itself.  
The Allies did not foresee that the Communist plan was to move into a major city in force 
and attempt to hold it and inflict significant casualties on their opponent in the process.  
Brigadier General Graham, the 1st Marine Division Operations Officer, commented on 
the intelligence estimate prior to the 31 January attack, “Hue had no military value to the 
NVA/VC.  Da Nang was the prize—for success in that endeavor could have had serious 
effects on the Allied efforts in the III MAF area” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 
163).  On the morning of 1 February, Brigadier General LaHue made the following 
statement to a group of American reporters at Phu Bai, “Very definitely we control the 
south side of the city…I don’t think [the Communist forces] have any resupply 
capability, and once they use up what they brought in, they’re finished” (as cited by 
Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 175).   This statement was made with the Marines barely in 
control of the MACV compound, less the entire southern side of the city.   
Additionally, unfamiliarity with the time and assets that were required to clear the 
NVA out of the city were apparent.  LaHue was consistently making incorrect estimates 
about the assets and effort needed to fight in Hue.  As discussed earlier, the initial relief 
efforts were expected to be over in a day.  Later that same day, Gravel’s force, expecting 
heavy resistance, still planned to be back by dusk that same day (Hammel, 1991, p. 69).   
At the tactical level, Marine command and control was skewed early on in Hue.  
The physical environment made it difficult to control forces.  Unlike rural environments, 
where commanders could see their forces or conceptually picture the piece of terrain they 
occupied, the numerous unfamiliar buildings forced the Marines to adapt in order to 
maintain control.  Captain Meadows, the commander of G/2-5 Marines noted, “…you  
                                                 
19 Shulimson et al. quoted General Westmorland on his thoughts of the intelligence picture prior to 
Tet.  “Intelligence is an imprecise science: it is not like counting beans; it is more like estimating 
cockroaches…” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 10).  Shulimson et al. further relay that U.S. 
intelligence believed Hue was a major enemy objective, but the 1st ARVN Division could not “credit the 
enemy with ‘the intent’ nor ‘the capability’ to launch a division-size attack against a city” (Shulimson et al., 
1997, p. 17).   
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have to raid the local Texaco station to get your street map.  That’s really what you need” 
(as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 185).  Prior to the use of street maps with 
numbered checkpoints to identify key structure, colors were used to delineate sectors, 
Captain Christmas later related some of the resulting confusion.  He would 
radio Captain Downs and yell, “Hey, I’m in a pink building.”  Downs 
would reply, “Hey that’s fine.  I’m over here in the green building.”  Then 
Captain Meadows would chime in with “Good! I’m in a brown building.”  
At this point Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham would come up on the network 
and ask, “Where the hell are the green, brown, and pink buildings?” 
(Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 185)   
Even with this confusion, the Marines can credit only their tenacity and 
innovation with being able to walk into a completely foreign environment and in a matter 
of days begin to make forward progress in clearing the city.  
As mentioned earlier in the analysis of the environment, the human landscape of 
the city could have been better used.  We found no specific evidence of civilians from 
Hue openly assisting the Marines or ARVN forces with information as they advanced 
through the city.20  It would be simplistic to say the use of civilians would have enhanced 
the intelligence collection capabilities of the Allies.  Yet, getting people to gather the 
information that can be used for military intelligence purposes is a more difficult 
undertaking.  The fighting was not isolated to a specific section or conducted through 
surgical raids.  The fighting was non-stop.  Whereas the offensive efforts tended to be 
conducted during daylight by the Marines, operations did not stop, day or night.  With 
this level of intensity, civilians moving through the city doing anything besides fleeing 
(e.g. attempting to collect information) would appear as out of place as the large-framed 
Caucasians were prior to fighting beginning in the city.  Additionally, the Communists 
had already begun to round up civilians they wanted to detain.  Anyone who learned of 
the fate of the 3,000 detainees would most likely have been reluctant to assist.  The 
intensity of the combat transformed the human landscape of Hue from civilian to 
combatant-dominated.   
 
                                                 
20 There is one case documented by Shulimson et al., of a Vietnamese family hiding a Marine who 
became separated from his element during the fighting (p. 223).   
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4. Use of Technology 
The difference in the settings between the Union operations and the battle for Hue 
affected the uses to which available technology was put.  The equipment and weapons 
common to all Marine infantry battalions were used similarly.  At the same time, 
equipment not organic to the infantry battalions was employed to support operations in 
both environments, but was utilized differently in both instances.   
During the Union operations, the Marines were restricted to what they could carry 
on their backs and what would fit into the CH-43 and CH-46 helicopters that moved the 
forces into the Que Son Basin.  In contrast, Marines moved into Hue in trucks and tanks.  
Consequently, only their own miscalculations and ill preparedness in obtaining 
equipment at their base camps restricted their equipment loads.   
a. Armaments 
Despite the environment, mission, or requirements to ‘move light,’ a 
Marine infantry battalion did not move without its organic 81mm mortars.  These indirect 
weapon systems proved invaluable in providing immediate fire support to Marines in 
contact with the NVA.  During engagements in both Union operations, accurate mortar 
fire was at times the only available fire support to relieve pressure on pinned down 
Marines.   
In both Union operations, artillery and close air support were the 
additional critical tools the commander could call for.  Various types of fire support were 
instrumental in reducing enemy positions, as well as in supporting Marine attacks.  
Marines during the Union operations were able to move artillery by air, within the Que 
Son Basin to support the operations.  Even though they had to reposition the artillery by 
helicopter, fire missions were beneficial in efforts to break enemy defensive positions and 
exploit opportunities to destroy forces withdrawing.   
In contrast, tracked vehicles capable of supporting infantry operations 
were more of a hindrance than help during rural operations.  Normally they were not 
useful in rural areas even where there were road networks that could support their 
movement.  In the typical restrictive terrain in regions such as the Que Son Basin,  
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Tracked vehicles became more of a liability than a tactical asset.  They 
were restricted to the road because the thick brush provided excellent 
cover for NVA soldiers armed with antitank weapons.  Instead of 
providing support to the infantry Marines, the tracked vehicles required 
infantry protection.” (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 127)   
In Hue, the various types of fire support were employed differently.  At 
first, no fire support was made available due to restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) 
placed on the Marines.21  As the battle lingered, with mounting casualties, the Allied 
commanders relaxed these rules.  Even with fire support available, its use in support of 
operations in the city did not have the same effects as in rural areas.  As Lieutenant 
Colonel Gravel commented, “…artillery in an area like that is not terribly effective 
because you can’t observe it well enough.  You lose the rounds in the buildings, in the 
streets…and you have a difficult time with perspective” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 
1997, p. 186).  Colonel Hughes further commented that the heavier rounds, such as the 
155mm and eight-inch howitzers, were accurate enough to walk down streets in a rolling 
barrage to dislodge troops.  Yet, in support of clearing buildings, Lieutenant Colonel 
Cheatham commented that, “…if you put enough 81 rounds on top of a building, pretty 
soon the roof falls in”(as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 188).  Additionally, he said, 
“As wonderful as our artillerymen are, I wasn’t going to have them fire from 11 miles 
away [Phu Bai] and fire into a building across the street from me.  That’s just impossible” 
(Martin, 2000).  So, here, the lighter, more surgical use of the organic mortars appeared 
the best artillery solution for supporting the close quarters combat.   
Even more surgical than the organic mortars, was the use of the 106mm 
recoilless rifles.  This 450-pound (not including ammunition) crew-served anti-tank 
weapon was difficult to move in the city and caused a great deal of destruction if fired 
from within positions with cover.  Yet, the recoilless rifle could accurately create a four 
square meter hole or knock down entire sections of walls in most masonry structures up 
to 300 meters.  This was valuable in attempts to breach the city structures and shock any 
defenders inside.  Additionally, the concussion of a firing recoilless rifle along with its 
back blast, provided enough of a distraction and dust that it served as an impromptu 
                                                 
21 The ROE will be discussed in detail during the Doctrine and Decision-Making portion of the 
analysis.   
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smoke screen to cover the movement of Marines across streets. (Martin, 2000).  
According to Colonel Hughes, “If any single supporting arm is to be considered more 
effective than all the others, it must be the 106mm recoilless rifle, especially the M-50 
Ontos…” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 186).   
The Ontos22 was a light tracked vehicle designed as an Army 
reconnaissance vehicle in the early 1950s.  The Marines adopted the failed Army design 
as a recoilless rifle carrier in their anti-tank battalions.  In Hue, the M-50 was mounted 
with six 106mm recoilless rifles.  Because of the small size of the vehicle, the crew had 
to dismount the vehicle to load the rounds.  Even so, the Ontos was very capable in the 
city given its small size and ability to move quickly, fire, and withdraw before it could be 
engaged.  The firepower was devastating thanks to the crew’s ability to fire the recoilless 
rifles individually, in pairs, or all six at once (Brush, 2002).  Lieutenant Colonel 
Cheatham further points out that the vehicle was “as big a help as any item of gear that 
we had that was not organic to the battalion…” (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 
186).   
In addition to the diminutive Ontos with its powerful punch, the Marines 
eagerly employed other heavy weapons platforms that added firepower and armored 
protection.  Two other platforms used extensively in Hue were the M-48 Patton tank and 
M-42 Duster antiaircraft vehicle.  The M-48 was an aging main battle tank with a 90mm 
main gun and supporting machine guns.  These tanks supported operations in a manner 
similar to that of the recoilless rifles, but were able to withstand more small arms and 
rocket fire.  However, the tanks were “rocket magnets” and drew a high volume of fire 
from the enemy (Nelson et al., 2002, p. 108).  As Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham 
explained, “You couldn’t put a section of tanks down on those streets.  The moment a 
tank stuck its nose around the corner of a building, it looked like the Fourth of July” (as 
cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 186).  “Killer teams,” comprised of one M-48 and one 
M-50, allowed for effective maneuverability and protection for the two platforms while 
still applying surgical firepower.  The pairing at first seems illogical.  But, since the 
Ontos was lightly armored, the best way to bring its devastating firepower to bear was to 
                                                 
22 Ontos is the Greek word for “Thing” (Brush, 2002).   
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pair it with a better-protected M-48 that could suppress enemy fire while the Ontos fired.  
Such ad hoc combinations were common for the Marines and clearly demonstrated their 
ability to construct organizations of convenience in order to accomplish missions.   
In contrast, the Duster had two 40mm cannons capable of firing 60 rounds 
per minute.  Dusters were normally employed in convoy support or in support of static 
defensive positions, such as during the siege of Khe Sanh.  Because of its open turret and 
exposed crew, the use of the vehicle in street fighting was extremely dangerous.  Even in 
the urban environment, these vehicles were limited to support by fire roles at distances 
where they could not be affected by enemy fire, such as during Lieutenant Colonel 
Gravel’s initial assault on the Citadel on the afternoon of January 31.  Nevertheless, and 
despite their vulnerability, the additional firepower these platforms offered was 
appreciated through much of the battle, since the environment was not conducive to 
traditional fire support, or the ROE would not allow it.  In the case of the fighting in Hue, 
the established road networks actually aided the Marines to bring these larger weapons 
systems to bear.   
b. Added Punches 
An addition to the arsenal that Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham brought to 
the fight were the 3.5-inch rockets, the M20.  These rockets were affectionately known in 
WWII as “bazookas,” and were able to do more damage in built-up areas than the current 
66mm disposable rocket, the M72 Light Antitank Assault Weapon (LAAW).  M72s were 
standard issue for infantry units in Vietnam and proved extremely useful in the numerous 
rural “search and destroy” missions as immediate shock-producing flat trajectory rockets.  
Cheatham recognized the M20’s effectiveness and tasked Major Salvati, his battalion 
executive officer, to find as many as possible for the impending fight in Hue (Hammel, 
1991, p. 135).  M20s achieved the desired effects by creating man-sized holes that aided 
in breaching and clearing buildings.   
A key non-lethal weapon that was used to great effect in both rural and 
urban fighting was tear gas.  Even though tear gas was not used during the Union 
operations, it was used defensively in September 1967 in the Que Son Basin during 
Operation Swift.  In one case, an isolated platoon of M/3-5 Marines was attempting to 
disengage.  The platoon commander requested an airdrop of tear gas to allow the Marines 
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to withdraw.  The gas was effective in disrupting the enemy, but its use proved to be a 
double-edged sword.  The Marines were able to withdraw, but were also affected by the 
gas as they had discarded their masks during the action (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 113).   
During the fighting in Hue, the use of tear gas started with 2-5 Marines’ 
assaults on the “Treasury.”  The battle executive officer, Major Salvati, located some tear 
gas canister launchers in the MACV compound and used them to support an impending 
assault.  The gas worked as the NVA was unprepared for the gas.  The veterans of C/1-5 
Marines commented that in about two weeks (13-24 February) of heavy fighting to clear 
the Citadel, their battalion suffered approximately 50% casualties to seize 16 city blocks.  
On the 25th of February, with the use of tear gas, the 1-5 Marines cleared another 12 
blocks without a single casualty (Nelson et al., 2002, p. 109).  In both environments, the 
gas produced the desired effect of disrupting the enemy.  The difference was that in the 
non-urban environment it was used defensively to assist a break in contact while in Hue it 
was instrumental to “smoke out” the enemy from the confined spaces of the city 
buildings. 
5. Human Factors 
a. Limits of the Human System 
As in any environment, combat is physically grueling.  The Union 
operations and the fighting in Hue were no exception.  Both Union operations involved 
more than one engagement.  They were lengthy “search and destroy” operations to 
destroy enemy forces.  Forces were thus in the bush for a few weeks at a time, attempting 
to make contact with the enemy.  Even though forces were seldom in direct contact with 
the enemy, both Union operations had included periods of two to three days of 
continuous contact with the enemy.   
Additionally, the longer, pitched battles between advancing Marines on 
entrenched NVA positions (e.g., the actions on 26 April and 30 May) lasted for hours 
during the day with sporadic fighting continuing into the night.  While there is evidence 
of leaders pushing their men forward, there does not seem to be evidence that the forces 
were suffering combat fatigue by the time they completed the operations.  
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During Hue, the environment seemed to affect the endurance of the 
Marines differently.  The battalion acting as the main effort of the attack shifted three 
times during the battle.  On the 31st, Gravel’s 1-1 Marines were unable to achieve any 
progress beyond securing the MACV compound.  Cheatham’s 2-5 Marines took over the 
role of main effort only three days later, on the February 3rd, and continued to serve in 
that role through the major fighting on the southern side of the city until 10 February.  
Thompson’s 1-5 Marines served as the Marine main effort once the need for American 
reinforcements shifted to the Citadel.  Their fight lasted 12 days, from 13 to 25 February.   
The duration and intensity of the actual fighting also seemed to have an 
effect on the limits the human system could withstand.  Private First Class Purcell recalls 
the differences:  
This probably was some of the most vicious fighting any of us had seen at 
that point in time.  Normally, you would be in a pretty good firefight it 
may last an hour, it may last five minutes, it may last half a day, but then 
you were out of it.  Here it just didn’t stop.  That was the amazing part.  It 
just did not stop. (Martin, 2000)   
Since the fighting was non-stop and the Marines were often intermixed 
with the NVA, the increased stress was bound to cause fatigue.  Hammel gives us a flavor 
of this in his description of Lance Corporal Towe.  Tossing grenades and quickly rushing 
into “the smoke filled rooms to spray the interior was proving to be extremely nerve-
racking even after a day in which no enemy soldiers had been encountered” (Hammel, 
1991, p. 116).  Captain Harrington of D/1-5 remarked:  
The intensity of the fire was incredible.  You can’t believe how loud it 
was.  When you have all these weapons going off and the reverberation of 
the sound off of the concrete buildings and off the wall [Citadel wall], it 
was almost unbearable. (Martin, 2000)   
John Laurence, a CBS correspondent at Hue observed:  
They had just seen too much.  Too many of their friends being killed, too 
much violence, too much noise, too much fear.  Their brains had shut 
down. (Martin, 2000)   
Additionally, the horrors of combat seemed to be magnified in the city.  
Captain Harrington observed, on his entry into the Citadel, “When you looked around, it 
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was utter devastation.  There were buildings down, vehicles burning, and bodies thrown 
about.  The stench of death was all around you.  I mean the smell was just horrendous” 
(Martin, 2000).  Another Marine confirmed this, “…the stink—you had to load up so 
many wounded, the blood would dry on your hands.  In two or three days you would 
smell like death itself” (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 191).  In another example, Colonel 
Hughes, the 1st Marine Regiment commander, ordered the shooting of all dogs and cats in 
the city.  The animals were feeding on the dead that were not yet recovered.  Naturally, 
the killing of the dogs and cats only added to the masses of decaying flesh that were 
piling up in the streets (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 221).   
b. Will and Morale   
Whether the Marines in action during the Union operations were shaken or 
even broken cannot be determined.  Even with first hand accounts this is a difficult factor 
to analyze.  However, what we do know is that Marine companies in most cases moved 
aggressively forward to engage the enemy, often through thick vegetation where the 
enemy could not be pinpointed.  In one case of conspicuous gallantry and exceptional 
small unit combat leadership, Marine Captain James A. Graham posthumously earned the 
Medal of Honor for his actions at the rice paddy during the 2 June engagement of Union 
II.23   
Where there is no clear evidence by which we can measure the strain on 
will and morale during the Union operations and how they affected the outcome of the 
operations, the following illustrates the fighting will and morale of a Marine (or common 
foot soldier).24   
Then-n-n, you run into somebody that you start firing at, and you say, 
“Well I’m going to kick his fucking little fucking Gook ass.”  And all of a 
sudden this motherfucker got you pinned down.  Y’know, I mean he’s 
                                                 
23 In an effort to relieve one of his platoons, Graham hastily organized an assault that successfully 
destroyed an enemy machine gun position.  In the confusion of the action, his assault group was cut off 
from the rest of the company.  Unable to remove one of his wounded Marines, Graham stayed with him and 
defended him with his life.  The rest of the assault group was able to make its way back to friendly lines 
and rejoin its company that had also been able to break contact because of Graham’s efforts (Telfer et al., 
1984, p. 304).   
24 Jonathan Shay, in his book Achilles in Vietnam:  Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character 
(1994), addresses combat trauma of Vietnam Veterans.  The service of the foot soldier in this case is 
unknown.  Since all of Shay’s examples are taken from his combat trauma patients, their identities are 
omitted.  In a later quote, a serviceman states he was in Union II.  Since this was an all-Marine operation, it 
seems safe to assume he is a former Marine.     
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tearing up the fucking trees you’re hiding behind.  And you start saying to 
yourself, “These motherfuckers are serious.  Well, what they’re doing.  
Y’know, “I’m going to break his fucking balls when I get ahold of him.”  
Well I mean, you’re scared at the same time, but your adrenaline and the 
training makes you fucking mad, now.  “I’m going to kick his little 
motherfucking ass when I get my hands on him.” (as cited by Shay, 1994, 
pp. 105-106)    
In contrast, the battle for Hue offers more detailed examples that illustrate 
the challenges of urban combat and demonstrate the need for solid unit will and morale 
under the tremendous strain of fighting there.  For instance, during the first day of 
fighting, on January 31, one of the MACV advisors, Major Frank Breth, who had 
commanded a Marine infantry company prior in combat, commented that he had never 
seen troops [A/1-1] so “jumpy,” and that they needed to pull themselves together in order 
to get back into the fight (Hammel, 1991, pp. 74-75).  Just a few days later, a veteran of 
two weeks of bush fighting was found lying on a bed, “hallucinating, whimpering, and 
talking to himself until members of his squad tied him down and one of the docs dosed 
him with morphine” (Hammel, 1991, p. 128).  Even though the other Marines openly 
cursed him for his cowardice, many wondered who would be next.  The canalization of 
the urban terrain naturally was a concern for the Marines, as First Lieutenant Lambert 
remembered: 
It was hard to motivate the men to run into a storm of fire much like the 
soldiers that came out of those landing craft at Normandy.  But, the morale 
and the aggressiveness if you could keep it built up in your platoon, those 
Marines would do that. (Martin, 2000)   
Another Marine rifleman recounted, “I think the thing that really bothers 
me the most is just seeing Marines laying lifeless in the streets.  It wasn’t a matter of if 
you were going to die daily, it was a matter of when” (Martin, 2000).  Even on the final 
assault to secure the Palace wall, this same Marine commented, “This is it.  This is the 
morning I’ll get it.  Because, you know I’m gonna run out of luck (Martin, 2000).   
This type of hesitation was not restricted to the junior Marines who often 
only needed a strong push to get them started again.  On 20 February, during a battalion 
command conference, Major Thompson had decided, “to continue as before [an attack on 
the Citadel’s west wall] would be sheer folly.”  He, instead, suggested a night attack.  
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Thompson noted that most of his company commanders “were not very 
enthusiastic…they were willing to try, but I could see that their hearts were not in it” 
(Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 207).  With the will of his senior leaders beginning to bend 
seven days into the fight, Thompson was lucky to have kept his Company A in reserve to 
lead the assault.    
Will and morale were tested in a variety of ways in Hue.  There were also 
plenty of heroics by Marines.  Serving as a platoon commander, 21-year-old Sergeant 
Alfred Gonzalez earned the Medal of Honor for his actions on January 31st as a member 
of A/1-1 Marines.  He was later killed on 3 February leading his platoon in seizing the 
school building.  Other actions, such as that of Lance Corporal Lester A. Tully, were 
equally common.  During 1-1 Marines’ advance across the Song Huong on the 31st, Tully 
initiated the assault to cross the Nguyen Hoang Bridge to get beyond the intense enemy 
fire.  His actions allowed two platoons to move forward to the relative safety of the north 
side of the river (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 174).  Most telling though, Lieutenant 
Colonel Cheatham described the overarching spirit of his men:   
I don’t ever remember seeing people with that kind of commitment 
sometimes being wounded once or twice and some three times and still not 
leave.  Or, when they are evacuated, then find them sneaking back because 
they aren’t going to leave their platoon or their squad. (Martin, 2000) 
At Hue, as in other cities, the fighting was continuous and in close 
proximity to the enemy.  Captain Dale Dye even recommended fixing bayonets to aid in 
clearing rooms.  Often Marines were in “eyeball-to-eyeball meeting engagements” 
(Nelson et al., 2002, p. 107).  Fighting in such a complex environment, where the ability 
to disengage at one’s choosing is not available, will eventually wear anyone down.  
While it cannot be proven that the fighting was tougher in Hue compared to the countless 
engagements that occurred in the jungle, the testament of the Marines who fought in both 
environments show that without cohesive units with strong will and morale, this battle 







c. Ethics and Morality 
Marines do not appear to have engaged in any improper conduct during 
the Union operations at the unit level.  However, individuals did stray beyond the control 
of their leaders.  Jonathan Shay quotes one veteran on his loss of control specifically 
during Union II:  
It was a week or two into Union II.  I was walking point.  I had seen this 
NVA soldier at a distance…We spread out to look for him…I couldn’t tell 
who it was, us or him…I saw he had one of those commando weapons… 
and he brought it up and I was looking straight down the bore.  I PULLED 
MY TRIGGER ON MY M-16 AND NOTHING HAPPENED.  He fired 
and I felt this burning on my cheek.  I don’t know what I did with the bolt 
of the 16, but I got it to fire and I emptied everything I had into him…I 
just went crazy…I pulled him out into the paddy and carved him up with 
my knife.  When I was done with him he looked like a rag doll that a dog 
had been playing with.  Even then I wasn’t satisfied…I felt a drastic 
change after that.  I just couldn’t get enough…the hate’d build up, 
ESPECIALLY SEEING WHAT THEY DID TO OUR GUYS IN THE 
OUTFIT THEY GOT A HOLD OF—CUT OF THEIR DICKS, CUT OFF 
THEIR EARS…Got worse as time went by.  I really loved fucking killing 
couldn’t get enough…” (as cited by Shay, 1994, p. 78)   
Even though this loss of moral control is linked to a single incident, for 
this Marine it changed him permanently.  This Marine also alludes to the fact this became 
the norm for him in combat.  Shay refers to this behavior as the “berserker state” and also 
states that this conduct to a degree was acceptable behavior (Shay, 1994, p. 78).  “Don’t 
get sad.  Get even!” was a common mantra of NCOs and officers (Shay, 1994, p. 81).  
Based on this, we can assume behavior of this type was not limited to a specific 
environment.  In fact, with all the first-hand accounts from Hue, there is no evidence of 
losing character to this degree.  Perhaps, since the fighting was non-stop against an 
enemy that would not break contact, such digressions were not permissible by the 
leadership at Hue.   
Even with such events, the loss of professional military ethics cannot be 
considered a factor during the Union operations.  In fact, at the end of Union II, one 
Marine company, still in contact with the enemy after the major engagement of 2 June, 
asked Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner for permission to engage the enemy who were 
collecting their dead.  The 2-5 Marines commander denied the request and used the 
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informal truce to collect his own fallen comrades.  Even though this appears to be 
atypical of Marine and NVA battlefield relations, it also shows that the average Marine 
was disciplined enough to obey his commander and not seek easy retribution after such a 
brutal battle.  
The one type of documented unethical behavior that did occur during the 
battle for Hue was looting.  Throughout the battle for Hue, goods and supplies readily 
available in the shattered city were used without question by both sides.  Captain 
Meadows of G/2-5 explained his company’s actions, “We did take things for our 
use…blankets, food, water.  We must have taken every candle in that side of the city for 
illumination for our own use at night.  These things –you want to call it looting?  O.K., 
we looted (as cited by Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 222).  In other cases, the close proximity 
to items of worth proved to be too much of a temptation.  One Navy corpsman recorded 
in his diary, “Looting is widespread.  The ARVNs wait until the Marines secure an area 
and then move into loot.  The Marines do well for themselves also” (Shulimson et al., 
1997, p. 221).  Lieutenant Colonel Gravel recalled his unit’s actions, “…we took things 
to our use; I wouldn’t kid you about that.  I saw some things and I saw they were 
returned” (Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 221).  Accusations against Marines also included the 
sale of stolen property and “drinking whiskey, cognac, and beer and cooking chickens” 
(Shulimson et al., 1997, p. 221).  Yet, in the end, General Abrams, the deputy 
commander MACV, was satisfied with the measures Marine leaders were taking to deter 
looting.   
The environment itself made looting possible.  Marines operating in the 
jungle, for instance, did not find themselves tempted by much of anything.  Put most 
simply, the material goods were just not there.   
In none of the three sets of human factors we investigated can we find a 
qualitative difference between environments.  Whereas there are more first-hand accounts 
describing the rigors of combat during the fighting in Hue, we do not want to make the 
assertion that the lack of evidence referencing the actions during the Union operations 
means these were any less rigorous or demanding.  One potential explanation for the lop-
sided body of evidence regarding human factors is that the Union operations were typical 
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of the large-scale counterinsurgency operations American forces conducted.  Long-
duration search and destroy operations were more commonplace, and thus not archived.  
Urban fighting, on the other hand, had not been conducted since 1950 during the Marine 
operation to retake Seoul.  Urban fighting was a new horror requiring different tactics 
against an enemy that was not withdrawing as the enemy typically did in the jungle.  
Additionally, because of the initial overwhelming shock of the Tet Offensive, this battle 
received national-level U.S. attention.  With this attention came media interest and the 
ability to better record the event for history.    
Among factors contributing to heightened levels of intensity in Hue were 
the volume of combat noise in the city due to reverberation off the buildings, the large 
number of dead littering the man-made environment, and the immediate availability of 
valuable possessions and foodstuffs.   
6. Decision Making 
During the Union operations, the Marines were operating under combat rules of 
engagement that allowed them to bring the maximum amount of firepower to bear against 
the enemy.  They could avail themselves of artillery close air support, and even tear gas if 
needed (as in Operation Swift).  Also, with a flexible, combat-oriented ROE, Marine 
leaders at all levels were able to make their own decisions.  Two examples demonstrate 
this best.  First, Colonel Radic, commander of the 1st Marine Regiment made the decision 
to place F/2-1 Marines at the Nui Loc Son Base in the Que Son Basin.  He understood 
their presence could lead to an increase in enemy activity in the basin.  In essence, he 
used Company F as bait to draw out the NVA into a fight (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 64).  In 
deciding to do this, he was prepared and authorized to launch Operation Union to halt the 
NVA activity in the basin.  Secondly, during the Union II action on 2 June, Colonel 
Houghton, the 5th Marine Regiment commander, requested the commitment of the 
division reserve at approximately 1430 hours.  Major General Robertson, who had been 
in command of the 1st Marine Division for only one day, authorized the movement of the 
reserve, putting two companies on the ground by 1900 hours (Murphy, 1997, p. 96).  
Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner, commander of 1-5 Marines later commented, “Mal 
Jackson’s entry into the battle saved the day for us” (Telfer et al., 1984, p. 72).  Had the  
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reserve not been committed at the request of the senior commander on the ground, the 
NVA would not have withdrawn and instead would have inflicted greater numbers of 
casualties on the pinned down Marines.   
Given the sketchy information about the Tet Offensive and, specifically, the 
enemy situation in Hue, Marine decision-making did not initially help elements fighting 
in the city.  As discussed earlier, the lack of information affected Brigadier General 
LaHue’s decisions about the forces he would commit to the fight at Hue.25  Within the 
first three days of the battle for Hue, forces were “piecemealed” into the fight.  
Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham said of this, “We thought that was really an incorrect way 
to employ an infantry battalion” (Martin, 2000).  Additionally, LaHue gave broad-brush 
guidance that did not offer his subordinate commanders much to work with.  
Commanders would pass on guidance from LaHue without understanding the true intent 
beyond removing the NVA presence in Hue. 
The decision by both the senior American and Vietnamese leadership to 
hamstring the Allied forces in Hue with a restrictive ROE was one considered to be 
extremely poor by most commentators.26  Initially, restricted uses of artillery and close 
air support did not provide the Marines the necessary firepower to dislodge the NVA 
from their well-fortified urban positions.  The decision to restrict the ROE was a political 
one to help protect the historical city.  Additionally, up until this stage in the war, the 
Communists had not launched an extensive urban campaign.  No one wanted cities 
destroyed as they had been during WWII and the Korean War.   
                                                 
25 Willbanks claims in his piece, that one of the key failures of the Marines was their disjointed 
command and control structure at Hue.  It is first important to note that Marine operations, whether search 
and destroy in rural areas or urban street fighting as in Hue, involved multi-battalion operations that were, 
typically, flexible organizations, adding forces as the situation developed.  One could argue that the task 
organization of the Marines at Hue was convoluted and disorganized because elements were drawn from 
two separate regiments, the 1st Marines and the 5th Marines, as well as three separate battalions, 1-1 
Marines, 1-5 Marines, and 2-5 Marines.  This, however, is not the case, as similar organizations were 
established to execute numerous search and destroy operations, to include both Union operations. The 
typical search and destroy operation was based on more deliberate planning than the operations at Hue 
allowed.   
26 Restrictive ROEs are not traditionally only a characteristic of urban fighting.  A restrictive ROE 
could be imposed anywhere for a variety of reasons.  Restrictive ROEs have been used most recently in the 
Balkans by NATO and the UN.   
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The following from Nicolas Warr’s Phase Line Green: The Battle for Hue, 1968 
(1997) best summarizes the frustrations of the Marines of all ranks in fighting under the 
restrictive ROE: 
If them dumb mutherfuckin’politcian pukeheads would just let us alone 
and let us do our job, we’d be outta here and back to the world in no time 
at all. Shit!  No arty, no fixed wing, no direct support from those 
dumbshit, poor-ass tank crews; just our damned M-16s and grenades and 
they want us to root out a regiment of entrenched NVA in a day or two.  
Well let them dumb asshole politicians come over here and follow me 
around for a minute or two, and see what kind of bullshit happens when 
dumbshit mutherfuckin’ politicians start calling the shots on the ground.  
Jesus H. Christ, why can’t they stick to kissing asses and babies? 
Obscene mumbling from pinned-down Marines overheard amid street 
fighting, Hue, 1968. (Warr, 1997, p. vi)   
Beyond the extensive use of expletives, the basic point about the restrictive ROE 
in the passage above is that decisions made by those far removed from the fighting were 
causing operational problems for the Marines.  Warr himself later adds,  
This insanity, these damnable rules of engagement that American fighting 
men are kept from using the only tactical assets that gave us an advantage 
during firefights- that of our vastly superior firepower represented by 
airstrikes, artillery, and naval gunfire-these orders continued to remain in 
force and hinder, wound, and kill 1/5 Marines …(Warr, 1997, p. 124) 
Thompson later commented that his battalion’s efforts in the Citadel were being 
watched under a microscope.  “It [Operation Hue City] was the only show in town at that 
time.  We were 12 days late and Lyndon Johnson was very adamant about getting it over 
with” (Martin, 2000).   
E. CONCLUSION 
Table 3 highlights the qualitative comparison of how the two different 
environments affected the performance of Marine operations in the areas of the 5 factors 
we have examined.  The Marines performed the worst in managing information.  An 
unclear intelligence picture, coupled with poor battlefield reporting from the city, led to 
uninformed decisions in regard to the maneuver of forces. In contrast, Marine search and 
destroy operations were built on intelligence and the ability of the commander to 
maneuver forces into the fight.  Another significant difference in performance between 
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the environments was how the Marines approached time.  On one hand, they were as 
patient as the Communists in the Que Son Basin, while on the other hand they were 
hastily shoved into action in the city, recklessly causing unnecessary casualties.  
Decision-making can be considered equally poor, with a sharp contrast between clear 
goals during the search and destroy operations and politically generated decisions 
affecting operations in the city.  In both environments, the Marines were adaptive and 
innovative with their available technology and equipment.  Because of the difficulty with 
utilizing fire support in the city, the Marines had to innovate with ad hoc tactics and non-
organic equipment.  Due to a lack of data, it is difficult to analyze human factors during 
the Union operations.  However, the numerous first-hand accounts of bravery, trauma, 
and the horrors of urban fighting are clear indictors that human factors were being tested 
in Hue.  
 
Table 3. Effects of the Factors on Operational Performance of Marine Forces.  
Scale:  Bad Effect (---) to Good Effect (+++). 
 




Urban  (--) (--) (+++) Inconclusive 
data 
(--) 




The Marines were trained to conduct search and destroy operations like those that 
comprised the Union series.  Their organization, tactics, weapons, equipment, and 
planning were all designed to help prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign in this 
fashion.  More to the point still, the combat experience of three hard years of fighting in 
Vietnam confirmed this approach and further shaped the doctrine and training to support 
the counterinsurgency fight.   
Through the Union operations, the basic concepts of conducting sweeps through 
suspected enemy territory to gain and maintain contact with the enemy proved successful.  
Additionally, elements as small as companies and as large as regimental task forces could 
conduct the operations against enemy elements of varying sizes.  The Marines had in 
place supporting arms and could bring additional firepower and logistical support to bear.  
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Artillery, close air support, and helicopter lift assets all proved invaluable during both 
Union operations, as well as in other, similar operations throughout the war.  Making 
adjustments for operations in new areas using different task organizations was not an 
issue since all units, whether combat experienced or not, were familiar with the same 
basic methods of operation.   
Fighting in the streets of Hue was an entirely different story.  Beyond just the 
complexities of ground combat, the Marines fighting in Hue entered that meat grinder 
completely untrained.  The last time the United States Marines had fought in a city was in 
Seoul, South Korea in 1950.  By 1967-1968, “the Marine Corps had virtually cut city-
combat tactics from its war time infantry training program” (Hammel, 1991, p. 97).  In 
hearing about the action at Hue and in preparing his battalion to join the fight, Lieutenant 
Colonel Cheatham spent his last night in his command post at Phu Bai absorbing as much 
information about urban fighting as possible.  As discussed earlier, Cheatham collected as 
much special equipment as he could muster prior to his battalion’s deployment.  Items 
such as plastic explosives and the 3.5-inch rockets would later prove invaluable during 
the fighting.  He also took with him a bed of knowledge from outdated manuals available 
to him that basically said the best way “to fight through a city was to gas the enemy, blow 
things up, and then clear out the ruins” (Hammel, 1991, p. 134).  With his self-
administered crash course in urban warfare, Cheatham became one of the most 
knowledgeable men in his battalion on the subject.   
Despite the total lack of combat experience or training in urban combat, the three 
battalions that fought at Hue all learned very quickly from their mistakes and within two 
to three days of beginning the fight, each battalion was able to make progress in retaking 
the city.  Of the three cases examined, this was the only victory.  This can be attributed, 
in part, to the Marines’ ability to adapt to the urban environment.  This is an amazing 
achievement that speaks volumes about the core training and martial ethic that were 
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V. INSIGHTS FROM THE CASES  
The purpose of this chapter is to perform a cross-case analysis of each factor to 
determine whether our hypotheses stand up to the cases.  This analysis will discover 
trends between the cases as well as recognize any anomalies.  We will also attempt to 
explain our findings using examples from other urban battles throughout history as well 
as other theories or explanations from our review of the contemporary literature.  The 
objective of this analysis is to form a basis for understanding the factors to be used in 
recommending strategies for improving operational capabilities. 
We must acknowledge that the inability to address the 5 factors during an urban 
battle does not constitute the only reason why each of the units we have examined 
experienced difficulties during the conduct of operations.  Clearly, there are other 
circumstances and decisions, which contributed to the outcome of each battle.  These 
reasons are significant and must be understood in context before proceeding with a 
further analysis of the factors. 
At Stalingrad for instance, there were a host of reasons for the German failure.  
Probably the most significant problem for the Germans was that they were unable to 
isolate the city from the outside.  Failure to shut down the Volga River traffic ensured the 
Russians the ability to feed a steady stream of fresh forces and supplies into the city.  The 
Russian encirclement of the 6th Army in November also played a major role in the 
German defeat at Stalingrad.  Cut off from outside support, the army was left to wither 
away.  Urban operations require lots of ammunition, men, medical supplies, and repair 
parts.  Before the encirclement, German supplies and replacements had to travel over a 
thousand miles to reach the front, and following the encirclement the Germans received 
too little to remain operational.  The Germans also committed themselves to a battle for 
which they had little experience or doctrine.  They essentially pitted their weakness at 
close range, positional fighting against the Russian strength of individual infantryman 
tenacity, hardiness, and courage.  Stalingrad, in many aspects, was a failure at all three 
levels of war. 
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Suez City was more of an afterthought for the IDF and consequently the Israelis 
did not plan, prepare, or rehearse for the operation.  Israeli units were not trained or 
accustomed to fighting in cities where their advantages in gunnery and maneuver were 
mitigated.  The IDF was also overconfident going into its first urban battle, and failed to 
integrate infantry and heavy forces.  After a series of resounding successes, including the 
remarkable operation to cross the Suez Canal, the IDF was sure it could grab one more 
prize before negotiations could begin.  The Israelis incorrectly presumed the Egyptians to 
be a completely defeated army.   
Unlike the two previous cases, U.S. and ARVN forces won the battle for Hue.  
However, they did experience difficulties caused by circumstances beyond the 5 factors.  
There was, for instance, the Marine failure to isolate the NVA from outside support, 
which allowed the NVA to move assets as it required (like the Russians at Stalingrad).  
Additionally, the Marines were not accustomed to the NVA holding its positions for so 
long under such intense pressure, and due to ROE restrictions the Marines were not 
allowed to indiscriminately use their firepower advantages, as they did in rural areas.  
Finally, as in the first two cases, the Marines were also untrained and unfamiliar with the 
nature of urban fighting.   
In all of these cases, there were also some plain tactical failures.  It may appear 
easy to associate these setbacks with urban warfare.  However, it certainly appears that in 
many engagements the Germans, Israelis, and Marines were simply outfought by their 
opponents.  The underlying message here is that we acknowledge and agree with the 
commonly regarded reasons for the failures, challenges, and frustrations experienced by 
all three armies.  Our 5 factors in and of themselves do little to explain or account for 
failure.  The value of analyzing these factors is that it may provide insight into how to 
mitigate their interaction with the environment, thus possibly helping to increase the 
likelihood of, or speed up, success in future urban operations.  
A. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. Stalingrad 
The vast differences in terrain between the steppes and streets of Stalingrad had a 
tremendous impact on German operations.  The open steppe and farming communities 
allowed the Germans the space they required to execute their doctrine of mobile warfare.  
143 
Their advantages in tank tactics, close air and artillery integration, maneuverability, and 
optics were fully maximized in the non-urban terrain.  Conversely, the density of terrain 
features in a “rubbled” city negated every one of these advantages, and actually played 
into Russian strengths.  The urban terrain compressed the German formations, creating 
problems in coordination and situational awareness for which the Germans were 
untrained.  This impression is captured in the records of the 24th PD, “Terrain difficulties 
such as house ruins, bomb craters, narrow streets and obstacles largely limit the 
maneuverability and observation possibilities so that, in principle, operations of panzers 
in city combat must be avoided” (Mark, 2002, p. 327).   
2. Suez 
The streets of Suez city produced a stark contrast in terrain from the deserts of the 
Sinai and green belt fighting near the canal.  In the desert, the IDF armor brigades were 
some of the best in the world.  The green belt and canal did create some difficulties for 
the IDF in coordinating fires, and allowed the Egyptians better concealment and cover.  
However, the IDF still had enough battle space to maneuver its infantry dismounted to 
support the canal crossing operations.  In contrast, Suez City took away the IDF’s ability 
to maneuver.  Israeli tanks and infantry alike quickly became pinned down in Egyptian 
engagement areas and remained there until they could withdraw under cover of darkness.   
3. Hue 
The physical differences between the Que Son Basin and Hue were not very 
dramatic but still had important effects.  The cultivated fields with their ditches, dikes, 
and canals, coupled with the heavily vegetated hills offered advantages in concealment. 
However, the Marines were trained and accustomed to conducting operations in such 
environments and were relatively effective in that terrain.  Marine advantages in 
firepower and air movement were able to generate significant casualties on the NVA in 
the rural areas.  In the city of Hue, the Marines were less comfortable with the terrain.  
Major Thompson, commander of 1-5 IN commented, “This was not the kind of battle you 
could high diddle diddle up the middle.  Everybody outside [not engaged in Hue] still had 
the straw hut mentality.  They had not adjusted to this kind of warfare” (Martin, 2000).  
Marine advantages in artillery and CAS were also mitigated more by the close proximity  
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nature of urban fighting and forced them to invent new methods of bringing superior fires 
to bear.  Captain Christmas said, “It was a 35 meter fight, you were looking directly at 
who you were going to kill” (Martin, 2000). 
In all three cases the three-dimensional, close proximity nature of the urban 
combat, in conjunction with the increased density of obstacles and events, acted to 
mitigate previously held advantages in firepower (Hue), maneuver (Stalingrad), or both 
(Suez City).  The urban terrain in all three cases compressed previously well-dispersed 
formations while simultaneously decentralizing control of them.  This dual effect of 
compression and decentralization generated by the environment created coordination and 
control problems in all three cases, as well as the inability to exploit advantages in 
maneuver or effectively mass fires.  The Marines, experienced in fighting in jungle 
terrain, may have been better prepared to deal with the change in environments.  A 
Marine Corps manual on jungle operations written in 1989, characterizes the similarities 
between jungle and urban environments: loss of control, limited observation, canalized 
movement, excellent concealment opportunities, and limited range of fields of fire 
(U.S.M.C. FM-FRP 12-9, 1989, pp. 41-42).  Even so, without the ability to effectively 
maneuver or coordinate, all three urban fights became exercises in firepower and 
determination. 
Russell Glenn noted a similar reaction by the Serb Army as it entered Vukovar, 
Croatia in 1991.  The density of the urban environment compressed Serb formations and 
they experienced problems getting in each other’s way.  In contrast, the Croat defenders 
were able to shrink the size of their perimeter which allowed them to free up additional 
forces for counter-attacks, raids, or other missions.  As the Croat perimeter shrank, the 
Serbs had less space with which to occupy with the same number of units, creating 
additional coordination requirements, masking the effects of units, and providing a 
healthy number of targets for the defense (Glenn, 2002, p. 64).   
It is probably safe to assume the Russians, Egyptians, and North Vietnamese were 
not entirely comfortable operating in urban terrain, and experienced their own 
uncertainties and degraded capabilities.  However, these forces enjoyed more advantages  
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relative to the attacker, such as familiarity with the ground, smaller areas to defend, less 
control requirements in the defense, and less need to place themselves outside the 
protection of buildings and fortified positions.   
B. HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 
1. Stalingrad 
During the advance to Stalingrad, the impact of civilian activity was limited, due 
to the sparse population of the steppes.  In contrast, the nearly 600,000 civilians in 
Stalingrad played a key role in the defense of that city.  The NKVD went to great lengths 
to keep civilians in the city, and the indiscriminate German fire bombings, which killed 
40,000 civilians in the first day, inspired many of the civilians to assist the Red Army in 
the preparation and defense of the city, as illustrated by the efforts of the civilian factory 
workers to produce tanks while under direct fire. 
2. Suez City 
The fighting in the Sinai and around the green belt was not affected by the 
presence of civilians, due to sparse populations or previously conducted evacuations.  
However, within Suez City proper, the Egyptians had the foresight to mobilize and train 
civilian militias to defend their homes.  At the same time, the Egyptians evacuated the 
women and children to permit these militias to focus solely on performing military tasks.   
3. Hue 
During the Union operations the rural civilian populations provided the North 
Vietnamese and Vietcong forces a great deal of logistical support and intelligence.  
However, in Hue, the population was more loyal to the South Vietnamese government.  
The execution of approximately 3,000 Hue civilians by the NVA and Vietcong created a 
host of refugee problems for the Marines, but for the most part, the civilian population 
tried to remain out of the fighting and did not play much of a role in the outcome other 
than as a minor hindrance to operations.  The key point to note is that the NVA 
essentially alienated the civilian population. 
In both Stalingrad and Suez City, civilian elements contributed to the defense of 
the city making it more difficult on the attacking forces.  At Stalingrad, the intensity, 
stakes, and duration of the battle likely contributed to the fanatical resistance displayed 
by Soviet civilians, whereas the Egyptians prepared their civilians to fight ahead of time 
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by conducting training, equipping and evacuation of non-combatants.  Hue represents a 
different kind of civilian interaction.  The NVA and Vietcong by their mass executions 
alienated themselves even further from a population that leaned towards the South 
Vietnamese government.  This alienation ensured that the civilian sector would provide 
little to no support for the defenders unless impressed to do so. 
Alienation of the population appears to be a significant factor in predicting the 
outcome of an urban battle.  In a study on urban warfare conducted in 1987, Roger 
Mclarin et al analyzed nine urban battles in which the defender was alienated from the 
civilian population (Mclarin et al, 1987).  In eight out of nine battles the attackers won.  
The only exception was Arnhem, where the Germans were able to beat off the British 
attack.  Conversely, in 13 battles analyzed in the study, where defending forces were 
familiar or supported by the civilian population, the attacking force was only successful 
eight times (McClarin et al., 1987, p. 94).  The evidence from the recent capture of 
Baghdad suggests that the Hussein regime alienated itself from the population, thus 
providing one explanation as to how a city of five million people fell in a matter of days.  
C. TIME   
Hypothesis:  In cities, time required to complete basic tasks will increase, 
synchronizing combat power will become more difficult, and interpretations of 
objective time will change. 
Brigadier General Avidor’s framework of analysis for time was instrumental in 
the examination of each of our cases in both the urban and non-urban environments.  His 
categories of the three types of time were useful in understanding each military’s 
approach to time as an element of planning and execution.  In using his framework, three 
key findings were uncovered across all three cases.  Time in relation to a military’s 
objectives changed from the non-urban to the urban environments.  Second, functional 
time required to accomplish tasks increased in the urban environment and, consequently, 
time required to synchronize these tasks in operations also increased.  Third, each 
military abandoned its practice of taking advantage of all the time available to it in a 24 
hour period to move, refit, and fight.  In all three cases, the forces discontinued nighttime 
operations in the urban environment.    
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1. Relative Time   
In all three cases, missions were more or less enemy or terrain-dependent.  During 
the city fighting, the objectives became closely connected to time.  The Germans were 
terrain-oriented during their offensive operations across the Ukrainian steppes.  This did 
not stop them from effectively destroying the light resistance that stood in their path.  
Time was a concern only in that the Germans hoped to meet the overall campaign 
objectives of seizing the Caucasian oil field southeast of the Volga before winter.  Yet, at 
Stalingrad, the Germans appeared to become overly concerned with seizing the city in a 
timely manner.  With Soviet forces continuing to reinforce the defensive efforts in the 
city, and the looming onset of winter, victory in a timely manner became critical to the 
Germans in a way it had not been before.  In the end, the Germans became victims of 
time requirements they could not meet. 
In the Sinai, the Israelis were always concerned about time with regard to their 
objectives.  During the counteroffensive, the entire operation was conducted under the 
threat of a possible ceasefire.  This subsequently forced the Israeli leadership to make 
hasty decisions in an attempt to grab Suez City as a bargaining chip before the ceasefire 
was enforced.  Hasty attacks in complex terrain contradicted previous operations, as 
evidenced by the methodical crossing and breakthrough operations where time and the 
potential ceasefire were secondary to the primary mission of crossing the Suez Canal and 
destroying as much of the Egyptian army as possible.   
The Marines in both Union operations were not concerned with time as a key 
element of their victory conditions; they were almost entirely enemy-oriented.  Marine 
leaders understood the long-term nature of counter-insurgency and the role that search- 
and-destroy tactics played.  However, this changed much as in the other two cases when 
the Marines began to fight in Hue.  With the initial decision to have the Marines help 
retake the city, time became a key factor.  Anticipated high civilian and military 
casualties prompted leaders to press for a quick decision in this highly visible battle.     
Concern for excessive casualties is one explanation for why leaders in all three 
cases dictated perceptions of relative time by demanding speedy.  With this in mind, 
ground commanders cut corners in sound planning and execution to save time, but in the 
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end it actually ended up costing them more time. This is evident in all three cases as 
removed leaders provided specific guidance to the ground commander to execute 
operations quickly. 
2. Functional Time      
The physical density of the obstacles and the lack of operational battle space, 
coupled with insufficient or nonexistent urban warfare training in each case, added to the 
increased time required to accomplish tasks in the urban setting.  One explanation for this 
could be that standards and procedures designed for one environment were 
misappropriately applied in another.  If a unit was not prepared for the nuances of a 
strange environment, such as an urban setting, the lack of familiarity in the environment 
would increase the time necessary to negotiate the task.  At Stalingrad, buildings were 
cleared with tanks and panzer grenadiers; these were the same tactics that had been used 
earlier on the steppe for other types of operation.  Given the drastic change in terrain, 
these tactics took longer to complete while maneuvering through the restrictive, obstacle-
filled terrain of the city.  However, if different skill sets were adapted for fighting in the 
new environment, such as at Hue, functional time to perform tasks could be better 
controlled.  We see this at Hue in the use of various non-organic weapons and tear gas to 
aid clearing operations.  Data is inconclusive as to whether the Israelis adjusted their 
tactics for the urban environment.  Their losses were so heavy on the first day of fighting 
in Suez that Adan refused to attempt any more attacks of that size and opted to only 
probe the defenses in the coming days to see if the Egyptians had withdrawn.  After their 
experience at Suez, the Israelis did not develop a doctrine specifically for urban 
operations for several years.   
Functional timelines and the dense compression of units generated coordination 
problems, which led to longer duration operations.  In turn, synchronization of multiple 
tasks required additional time.  This was seen both in Stalingrad and Hue, where progress 
in seizing objectives requiring coordination was consistently delayed or postponed.  At 
Suez City, synchronization of tasks did not survive first contact.  After the devastating 
engagement on the Sarag Road, the Israelis were concerned with only withdrawal and 
evacuation.  Yet, in their most desperate hour, members of Adan’s division were  
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nevertheless able to synchronize closely the evacuation of numerous wounded, scattered 
throughout the city.  Perhaps some of these rescues were done so quickly and boldly that 
luck and courage were the reason for their success rather than synchronized efforts.      
3. Objective Time   
Why did all three fast-paced militaries, known to fight by day and move and refit 
by night, all stop when the sun went down during city fighting?  Potentially, it was the 
inability of these forces to secure themselves on the move and coordinate combat 
operations at night.  Additionally, whereas the city was already a defender’s paradise by 
day, darkness only increased these advantages for the defender.  The already handicapped 
ability to observe in urban terrain decreased to nil at nightfall and provided the defender 
with unlimited locations to establish ambush positions.  Additionally, each of the 
militaries examined had problems securing its own forces in the complex terrain.  
Perimeters were often riddled with obstacles that further isolated elements.  In each case 
there are specific reasons why forces did not operate at night, but the bottom line is 
simply that combination of urban environment and darkness increased force 
vulnerability.  In order to mitigate this increased vulnerability and to avoid further control 
problems, to include fratricide and an inability to effectively mount an attack, all three 
militaries opted to hold and defend the ground they had conquered during daylight.  In 
the greatly uncertain urban environment, this seemed the best way to maintain control of 
their forces and prepare them to fight the next day.   
Today, this aspect of objective time could be considered unimportant as a factor 
of analysis, because of the rise of night vision technology that allows for increased 
observation, targeting, and the coordination of forces regardless of limited visibility.  
However, not all night vision systems are created equal, and counter measures to this 
technology may be in the works.  Fire and smoke are very effective in mitigating passive 
night vision capabilities.  Although the U.S. is the leader in fielding this technology, its 
allies may not have access to the same technology or be trained to the same level of 
proficiency in using night vision tactically.  Additionally, the U.S. possesses a high 
number of these systems disseminated to as many end users as possible.  The U.S.’s allies 
may not have these luxuries, which begs the question…Why not?   
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Avidor’s view of time greatly differs from the accepted definition of time and 
how it is applied by our current doctrine.  In U.S. Army doctrine, the acronym METT-T27 
is used to conduct an estimate of the situation to aid in planning.  One “T” stands for 
“time available” to plan for and execute the mission.  Inherent but not explicit in this 
definition, are all three elements of Avidor’s framework of analysis.  However, U.S. 
military doctrine does not analyze the effects of time on the mission specific to the 
environment.  It only uses it as a tool to assist in enabling a commander to plan for what 
time he has available.  As we have seen across the three cases, Avidor’s framework easily 
subdivides the precious commodity of time so that it can be better considered in future 
planning and execution.  Not only is Avidor’s framework a useful tool for planning, but it 
also helps highlight how the militaries in each of the three cases related to time 
differently in the urban and non-urban environments. 
D. INFORMATION 
Hypothesis:  In the urban environment, a military will be severely constrained in 
its ability to collect, process, and disseminate information. 
In the comparison of the three cases we determined that the urban environment 
did effectively constrain the German, Israeli, and American abilities to collect, process, 
and disseminate information. 
Collection and intelligence-gathering was made particularly more difficult by the 
urban environment.  German ability to sense and locate Russian forces was made easier 
by the open terrain on the steppe; the occasional hill or balka made predictable locations 
for Soviet defensive positions.  In the city, German forces could not use their aerial assets 
to pinpoint defensive positions, and Russian strengths could never be completely 
discerned due to the abundance of concealment.  In essence, the enemy was seen only in 
snapshots, and poor HUMINT contributed to making the city an intelligence enigma for 
the German 6th Army.   
On the steppe, the Germans did not complain about FM communications, ability 
to see the battlefield, or the ability to process all the information coming into the 
command and staff nodes.  At Stalingrad things were much different.  FM 
                                                 
27 The Department of the Army’s Field Manual 100-5: Operations (1993) defines METT-T as 
Mission, Enemy, Terrain (& Weather), Troops, and Time Available.   
151 
communications were “unreliable”, and commanders became fixed to their command 
posts.  Major attacks involving large formations in the city became bogged down for 
many reasons, one of the more important being a general failure to coordinate and 
communicate with adjacent units and fire support assets. 
IDF intelligence collection and reconnaissance during the fight in the Sinai and 
the green belt were excellent.  Adan’s forces proved their intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield competency during the canal crossing.  However, at Suez City, IDF 
reconnaissance assets were not trained in urban collection methods, the IDF did not 
possess detailed maps or imagery of the city, and it also lacked the time to collect 
intelligence because of political reasons.  This led to intelligence problems, but does not 
necessarily constitute an intelligence failure.  When compared to the previous Israeli 
intelligence successes in non-urban terrain, a reasonable conclusion is that the Israelis 
went into the city not knowing all the key information required to be successful and they 
paid for it.   
The short duration of the Suez operation failed to reveal any trends in ability to 
process and share information, although the degraded ability to visualize the battlefield is 
captured in the experiences of Lieutenant Dudu’s trapped paratroopers.  Lieutenant Dudu 
was painfully aware of his predicament, and was convinced that an escape attempt would 
be futile.  Adan’s headquarters kept pressing for Dudu’s withdrawal because it could not 
comprehend the situation exactly as Dudu did; this disconnect in perceptions contributed 
to hesitation and inaction on the Israelis’ part. 
The Marines during the Union operations were accustomed to planning deliberate 
search and destroy missions.  Finding the enemy and then having the assets available to 
pounce on them was how the Marines operated in the non-urban setting.  Within Hue, 
U.S. commanders from MACV down to the company level had little to no idea about the 
composition or disposition of the communists in the city.  The city masked the 
information from the Marines, who drove into battle without any idea of what to expect.  
What is so amazing about this fact is that ARVN units had been engaged in Hue for 
nearly two weeks before the Marines arrived, yet failed to disseminate any of their 
intelligence to the Marines.   
152 
The inability to visualize the urban battlefield also hampered Marine operations.  
Over time the Marines began to learn from their mistakes, but commanders were 
untrained in controlling what they could not see or conceptually position in their minds.  
LaHue’s inability to estimate the enemy situation or how the battle developed is the best 
example of Marine information challenges. 
Inability to visualize the urban battlespace is the biggest trend across all three 
cases.  History reveals that this is not a new phenomenon.  British forces at Buenos Aires 
in 1807 were trapped by a civilian militia uprising in the city.  Two British battalions, 
unable to communicate with their commanding general and completely unaware of the 
situation, surrendered en masse, despite the fact that the battalions were less than a block 
away from each other; each battalion surrendered because it thought the other battalion 
had done so already (Andrade, 1997).  The other trend appears to be that hasty attacks 
into cities without proper IPB can lead to disaster.  The Russian foray into Grozny on 
New Year’s Eve 1995 is another example of a hasty operation conducted with little 
understanding of the enemy situation.  That intelligence failure resulted in an urban 
disaster and destruction of a motorized rifle regiment (Oliker, 2001). 
Stalingrad and Hue illustrate how the urban environment can affect the ability to 
process and disseminate information; Suez City did to a lesser extent but not enough to 
convince us that the urban environment negatively affects communication and 
information processing.  U.S. Marine and German 6th Army accounts do mention 
frustrations with communication in cities, but do not give specific causes for these 
frustrations.  Dr. Lester Grau’s study on communication problems experienced by the 
Russians in 1995-1996 supports the idea that FM communications are severely degraded 
by the urban setting: 
Tall buildings and other towering structures in a modern city absorb, 
interfere with and reflect radio transmissions on the FM and UHF bands.  
Further, industrial sites and tall buildings can degrade transmission quality 
and range.  Prior to entering a city, signal planners must consider the 
nature of radio wave diffusion, carefully select the primary and alternate 
radio frequencies and determine what will interfere with street-level 
communications (both while moving and stationary).  Large cities have 
powerlines, electric train and trolley lines, and industrial power lines that 
can also interfere with communications.  However, there are instances 
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where such transmission lines retransmit an intensified signal along the 
same path as the transmission line.  Conversely, these lines can generate 
from 100 to 300 times interference over normal atmospheric interference 
on the UHF band  
A limited number of frequencies, normally on the lower part of the band, 
work in cities.  Consequently, the bulk of enemy and friendly radios use 
the same bands.  With the inevitable concentration of forces in city 
fighting, this can create a complicated electromagnetic situation in a small 
area.  Further, as happened in Grozny, the enemy may try to enter a 
friendly net to misdirect forces and transmit false reports or monitor 
tactical communications.  Therefore, the combined arms commander and 
his commo chief must take into consideration the terrain characteristics 
when selecting the command post location in order to insure maximum 
transmission range. (Grau, 1996, p. 2)28 
Sean Edwards, an analyst at RAND now at the National Ground Intelligence 
Center, performed a study for improving tactical communications in cities.  His research 
found that the most intractable information requirements for urban warfare were position 
location inside buildings, detection of snipers, through-wall sensors, and combat 
identification of friendly forces, enemies, and noncombatants.  Edwards also 
acknowledges that the urban environment creates challenges to the EMS and renders 
portions of bandwidth useless (Edwards, 2001, pp. 1-4). 
E. USE OF TECHNOLOGY  
Hypothesis:  Technology, which includes technical systems and organization, 
must be tailored to urban settings in order to be effective. 
The militaries in each case were very proficient in wielding the available 
technology and organizational constructs in their respective non-urban environment.  The 
German panzer divisions were highly mobile and well synchronized forces that seized 
large tracts of land almost effortlessly by coordinating armor, mechanized infantry, 
artillery, and close air support.  The Israelis in their own right were masters of the same 
style of warfare in the 1960s and 1970s.  They were accomplished in all aspects of 
maneuver warfare as displayed in the Six Day War and later in their counteroffensive 
during the Yom Kippur War.  Launching the counterattack, the canal crossing, and 
breakthrough operations all exemplify the high level of Israeli equipment proficiency, 
                                                 
28 Retrieved from [http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/urbanwar/urbanwar.htm] on 22 
April 2003. 
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professionalism, and training.  The Union operations as well show that the Marines in 
1967 were prepared to execute the long and grueling search and destroy operations 
through their expert employment of small unit tactics, vertical envelopment, artillery 
fires, and CAS.   
For both the Germans and the Israelis improper employment of technology 
contributed to the setbacks each side experienced in the urban environment.  It took a 
month of hard fighting for the Germans to correctly place their panzers in support behind 
the infantry.  This occurred in mid-October during the bloody fights for the factory 
district.  The armored dashes through Suez City were effective for seizing the initiative, 
but were not properly supported by lagging infantry.  The Germans were unable to apply 
their available technology and equipment to affect victory.  In the case of the Israelis, 
they were unable to make any gains with their humbling foray into the city.  The Marines, 
on the other hand, were not only tactically successful in the city, but made a point of 
adapting to the new environment and developed innovative tactics, techniques, 
procedures to enhance their capabilities.  The urban environment, with its existing road 
network, actually allowed the Marines to bring to bear more options on the enemy.  The 
106mm recoilless rifles (mounted both on the four-wheel “mule” and the six-barreled 
Ontos), M-48 tanks, bazookas, and tear gas launchers were all extremely effective and 
normally would not have been available in the isolated environments where search and 
destroy operations traditionally took place.  
German panzer-infantry coordination was poor for a host of reasons and offers 
one potential explanation for failure to adjust employment and technology.  After the 
major losses suffered in the fight for the factories, the Germans began to note the need to 
change their organization and employment of weapons, but by then it was too late to 
affect the outcome of the battle.  This differed both for the Marines and the Israelis.  The 
Marines had their noses bloodied badly in the first three days of fighting.  When 2-5 
Marines became the main effort, it happened to them as well, they too required another 
three days to become accustomed to the city fighting.  As Captain Christmas, commander 
of H/2-5 put it, “we would learn a lot of hard lessons there…” (Martin, 2000).  This 
pattern continued in the Citadel with 1-5 learning the same hard lessons by experiencing 
heavy casualties in their first days of fighting.  The Israelis, on the other hand, had only 
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one major engagement on October 24 that resulted in heavy casualties and numerous 
units requiring rescue or escape.  They suffered quickly enough that they relegated 
themselves to only probes for the two remaining attempts to take the city.  Brigadier 
General Avidor relayed that the failures surrounding Suez were so significant that the 
IDF failed to address or develop an effective urban operations doctrine for several 
years.29  The flawed logic behind this decision was that if a doctrine was developed it 
would be employed.  Based on their experiences in Suez City, this would only result in 
more worthless slaughter and failure.   
Conceptually, innovation through failure is supported by Barry Posen in The 
Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars 
(1984).  He asserts that a military will innovate in the areas of technology and 
organization after it has met with failure (p. 47).  Posen was referring to an all-
encompassing doctrine of how to wage war, with the innovation coming in the aftermath 
of a major conflict, such as WWI in his study.  Yet responses to failure, both by the 
Marines and later the Israelis also support his hypothesis.  The Marines, as mentioned 
before, innovated and adapted to meet their failures immediately in the city.  Their 
lessons would resurface over 25 years later with the end of the Cold War and the 
emergence of smaller conflicts.  As America’s “911 Force” and those most likely to 
conduct operations in remote third world urban areas, the Marine Corps was tasked as the 
Department of Defense’s proponent for authoring the latest joint urban operations 
doctrine, Joint Publication 03-6:  Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (2002) and the 
Handbook for Joint Urban Operations (2000).  As also mentioned previously, the Israelis 
did not want to face the failures of Suez City initially, but they later identified a need to 
develop an effective urban warfare doctrine that has seen successes in Lebanon in the 
1980s and in more recent operations in the occupied territories.  Today, thanks to their 
experience, the Israelis considered leading experts in the field of improving urban 
operations capabilities.   
 
 
                                                 
29 This information was disclosed to the authors in a personal meeting with Brigadier General Avidor 
on 12 March 2003.   
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F. HUMAN FACTORS   
Hypothesis:  Human limits will be reached more quickly in an urban 
environment. 
Comparing across our three cases did not convincingly prove that human limits 
are reached faster in urban environments.  The ability to prove this hypothesis is 
particularly challenging given the limited availability of empirical data to accurately 
measure human reactions to the stress of urban combat.  Our method of comparing 
anecdotes from soldier accounts allowed for some insights into human factors, but was 
insufficient for proving our hypothesis convincingly.  However, the evidence did seem to 
indicate that something regarding human factors is at play.  Even though we cannot see it, 
nor prove it completely, we discovered some correlations that may provide more insight 
into the human dimension of urban warfare, and warrant future research and 
consideration. 
The duration and intensity of the urban battle do appear to have effects on 
individuals and units, and the pre-existing levels of combat experience, cohesion, 
confidence, and initial will and morale appear to have tremendous effects on establishing 
the limits of human systems to tolerate urban warfare.  It must be remembered that each 
German, Israeli, and Marine unit examined had a high degree of combat experience, 
cohesion, and confidence going into the urban fight. 
1. Limits to Human System 
The Stalingrad case comes closest to showing how the urban environment affects 
the human limits for enduring the chaos of combat.  Combat on the Ukrainian steppes 
was difficult and exhausting for the forces involved, yet on the steppes the contacts were 
intermittent, the lines clearly designated, and the range at which battles were fought was 
extended.  Within the city of Stalingrad, sensory overload became the norm.  German 
troops rarely slept, the enemy was continuously close by yet unseen, danger could come 
from anywhere at anytime, and the physical rigors and stresses of this particular fight 
wore down the forces rapidly.   
The evidence does not suggest that the Marines fighting in the Union Operations 
suffered too much from combat fatigue.  While the fighting was fierce during those 
operations, it, too, was intermittent.  The accounts of Marines in Hue indicate that they 
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were initially unprepared to deal with the crescendo of violence and shock of continuous 
close combat.  Marines experiencing shell shock after three days of fighting around the 
Citadel created the effects described by John Laurence, “They had just seen too much.  
Too many of their friends being killed, too much violence, too much noise, and too much 
fear.  Their brains had shut down” (Martin, 2000).   
The battle for Suez City was too short in duration to reveal any measurable effects 
of human limits being reached faster in the urban environment.  In the green belt many 
Israelis fought for seventeen consecutive days and units began to wear down, but in Suez 
City the fight lasted less than two days and there simply is not enough evidence to 
support an assertion that the city wore them out.   
The constant theme throughout all three cases is that the urban combat 
experienced was extremely violent, and that the intensity of the fighting in the city was 
such that in the case of Stalingrad and Hue some men broke down, or in Suez City were 
withdrawn from the combat before they broke down.  While our cases do not prove that 
human limits are reached more quickly in an urban environment, there are several 
explanations as to why humans may experience greater difficulty while fighting in cities.  
Soldiers do not naturally think of combat in three dimensions.  BG Gideon Avidor 
of the Israeli Defense Force observed particular human limitations for fighting in an 
urban environment: 
· We are connected to the ground and we look parallel to it. 
· We grasp what we see---at the ends of the horizon. 
· We think in two dimensions 
· Left/right, forward/backward 
· We use linear terminology (directions and ranges) 
· Line of sight 
· Field of view 
· Line of communication 







The combination of physical fatigue and human disposition to think linearly, 
places soldiers at a significant disadvantage while attempting to perform complex tasks in 
a dangerous and uncertain environment.  This notion implies that a soldier’s shelf life 
may be limited in the urban arena.    
Michael J. Driver, a professor of organization and management at the University 
of Southern California, presents the idea that a human’s ability to process information is 
directly related to the environmental load and type of information experienced.  He 
suggests that a high load environment is made up of the following components: high time 
pressures, highly complex tasks, high uncertainty and unpredictable events, important 
consequences, and a highly charged emotional environment.  As an individual moves 
from a low environmental load towards a high one, his ability to process information 
actually increases because the individual is engaged and all senses are focused on the 
heightened input.  As the environment becomes more high load, the ability to process 
information drops rapidly and, in an extreme environment like that in which urban 
combat occurs, people may completely lose the ability to process information (Driver, 
1998, pp. 40-41).30  This concept may also partially explain the cause of decentralization 
of operations as well as the increased time requirements to perform basic tasks in a city.  
Another explanation supporting our hypothesis about human limits in the urban 
environment comes from David Grossman, a retired lieutenant colonel and former 
psychology instructor at the United States Military Academy.  Grossman conducted an 
insightful study into the psychological and physiological aspects of close combat.  One of 
his conclusions suggests that fear alone is not enough to debilitate soldiers, rather it is 
fear generated by the proximity of human aggression and hatred: 
Fear in and of itself is seldom a cause of trauma in everyday existence, but 
facing close-range interpersonal aggression and hatred from fellow 
citizens is an experience of an entirely different magnitude. (Grossman, 
2000, p. 11)31 
                                                 
30 Michael J. Driver, Kenneth R. Brousseau, Phillip L. Hunsaker.  The Dynamic Decision Maker.  
ToExcel: New York, 1998, pp. 40-41. 
31 David Grossman, “Human Factors in War”, in The Human Face of Warfare.  Ed. By Michael 
Evans, and Alan Ryan Allen and Unwin Australia: 2000, p. 11. 
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We reiterate that our analysis of the cases provides only mild support for 
understanding the relationship between human limits and the urban environment.  
However, we feel that it may be premature to conclude that human limits are not 
environmentally dependent.  Thus, this area warrants further exploration.  Israeli in 
exactly this area, for instance, has led them to permanently assign medics trained to 
identify psychological casualties.32   
2. Will and Morale 
Our analysis indicates that the importance of will and morale to mission success is 
critical regardless of the environment.  In both Union Operations, Marine esprit de corps 
and morale were high and undoubtedly contributed to their success.  High casualty rates, 
long duration operations, and a determined enemy were all overcome by something more 
than firepower.  The Marines knew how to fight in that environment and were 
comfortable.  In contrast, at Hue, the Marines faced a challenge about which they had 
little experience to draw from.  There were ROE constraints, old tactics and methods did 
not work as well, there was less certainty about the picture of the battlefield, and constant 
fighting; consequently, they suffered a series of defeats.  In the urban environment, the 
glue that kept the Marines intact and able to innovate and adapt to the environment 
appears to have been their high degree of cohesion and morale built up through months of 
experience and teamwork. 
At Suez City, there simply was not enough time to measure the environmental 
effects on will and morale.33  Similar to the Marines, the Israelis experienced several 
operations in non-urban terrain, where good will and morale played an important part in 
the outcome.  A canal crossing under pressure, or decentralized fighting in the green belt, 
all call for high levels of will and morale.  In the city, this same high level of confidence 
and will and morale were evident in that, despite major setbacks and losses in leadership, 
the Israelis were able to break contact in relatively good order.34  LT Dudu’s ability to 
hold the remnants of his battalion together, despite tremendous fear and uncertainty, 
                                                 
32 Avidoer.  Brief at Fort Leavenworth. 
33 The Suez City case was an excellent case for testing the factors, but due to its less than 48 hour long 
duration, it is perhaps not the best case to use to test human factors. 
34 Breaking contact under pressure is universally recognized as one of the hardest tasks for small units 
to accomplish. 
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indicate that the morale of the paratroopers was fine, and probably saved them from 
destruction.  The fact that Israeli officers led from the front, and Israelis went through 
great lengths to rescue wounded soldiers, probably contributed to this high morale in the 
city.35  How well this morale would have been sustained over time will never be known. 
The duration of combat in Stalingrad, as well as the complete difference in 
outcome between fighting on the steppe and in the city, was sufficient for revealing some 
qualitative trends in the loss of will and morale, but we still do not know what the 
proximate cause of that erosion was.36  On the steppes, confidence in systems and tactics 
was reinforced through battlefield success.  In Stalingrad, the same victorious army met 
nearly continuous frustration and defeat.  Add this frustration to the continuous fear of 
fighting in the city over a long period of time and it becomes easier to see how German 
will and morale declined.  Conversely, Russian morale seemed to improve in the urban 
environment.  The Russians did not surrender or retreat with nearly the same frequency 
or scale as previous fighting on the steppes had demonstrated.   
The constant theme across all three cases seems to be that a high level of will and 
morale is necessary for intense urban operations.  What we cannot prove is how time and 
the environment affect levels of will and morale.  Yet ironically, the urban environment 
in some way brings the importance of will and morale to the forefront because of the 
isolation and uncertainty that both individuals and units can experience, as well as the 
continuous close range combat that over time must take its toll.  For example, the 
importance of will and morale to soldiers in a WW I trench line undergoing a chemical 
attack was certainly high.  However, in the trench line, soldiers could look left and right 
and see and even touch their comrades and leaders.  The enemy was to their front and at 
extended ranges.  In contrast, in the urban environment, soldiers often cannot see their 
leaders, have little idea where the enemy is even though he may be nearby, and can often 
become isolated in rooms or buildings.  These differences in environments create 
different strains on individual morale.   
                                                 
35 Israeli units fighting in the Golan Heights during the same time frame reveal the significance of 
officer example and care of casualties to overall morale of a unit (Kellet, 1982, p. 37). 
36 After all, the Germans fought inside Stalingrad continuously for months. 
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Will and morale take on greater importance in the urban arena because units 
fighting battles at the small unit level often have little else to fall back to.  Clausewitz 
hints at this notion when he suggests: 
A regular army fighting another regular army can get along without 
military virtues more easily than when it is opposed by a people in arms.  
For in the latter case, the forces have to be split up, and the separate units 
will more frequently have to fend for themselves.  Where troops can 
remain concentrated, however, the talents of the commander are given 
greater scope, and can make up for any lack of spirit among the troops.  
Generally speaking, the need for military virtues becomes greater the 
more the theater of operations and other factors tend to complicate 
the war and disperse the forces. (Paret, 1976, p. 188) 
SLA Marshall also hints at the greater importance of individual will and morale in 
the city.  In his study on urban warfare, Marshall makes the following suggestion: 
As imagination takes over, the danger at one’s back seems greater than the 
danger that probably lies forward.  Maintaining friendly contact comes as 
hard as locating enemy points of resistance.  So stress-laden is the task that 
the forward tactical elements must be frequently shifted with the frontal 
fire teams rotating hourly or so.  Such duty is more wearing on the 
individual foot fighter than being under heavy sustained fire as one of a 
company. (Marshall, 1973, p. 16) 
3. Morality and Ethics 
The cases by themselves do not suggest that urban environments cause morality 
and ethics to erode faster than do other environments.  We based our initial hypothesis on 
the notion that higher intensity, greater visibility of death and its effects, closer proximity 
to and the mere nature of the killing, and the inability to escape the circumstances over 
time would cause degradation in morality and ethics at a faster rate than in non-urban 
environments.  
No case convincingly shows a loss of morality and ethics, but there are some 
indicators that these can change over time.  For example, at Stalingrad Russian POW 
rates dropped significantly between the non-urban and urban environments, and records 
from the 24th PD which indicate humane treatment of civilians during the advance to 
Stalingrad, report problems and issues with looting and other “degrading” acts against 
Russian civilians in Stalingrad. 
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At Hue, the number of POWs captured by the Marines declined despite an 
increase in the intensity and duration of the fighting.  This decrease can be attributed to 
any number of things, one of which may be the fact that Marines were given guidance to 
shoot if there were any doubts, and the fact that they would throw grenades into rooms 
first and then see what was in there after. 
There was no evidence to suggest that Israeli ethics changed in Suez.  The short 
duration of the operation most likely had something to do with this.  
In general terms, morality is the sense or awareness of right or wrong, and ethics 
are how a person acts in relation to that sense or awareness.  While we could not prove it 
in our case analyses, it still appears that the tremendous stress and emotion experienced 
by units fighting in close quarters in the streets, coupled with isolated and decentralized 
operations and loss of authority figures negatively impacts the ethical behavior of 
soldiers, causing them to act in ways contrary to their awareness of right or wrong.  Over 
an extended period of time, the urban combat environment may even erode their sense of 
right or wrong.  From the sack of Jerusalem to Grozny, mass executions, torture, and rape 
characterize many of history’s most violent and prolonged urban battles.   
The ethics and morality factor of the human dimension demonstrates the darker 
side of urban warfare, and that given the right conditions and length of time nearly all 
elements of the human system can degrade to an instinctual and primordial level.  Again, 
this could happen in any environment, but may be more likely in the urban environment. 
  Psychiatrist Dr. Jonathan Shay specializes in the treatment of combat veterans 
suffering from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder.  His study, Achilles in Vietnam, 
examines the nature of going berserk.  According to Shay, soldiers that are trapped, 
surrounded, isolated from friendly elements or leaders, facing certain death, or lusting for 
revenge are vulnerable to going berserk (Shay, 1994).  One of the characteristics of 
berserk behavior is cruelty without restraint or discrimination (Shay, 1994, p. 82).  Shay’s 
preconditions for going berserk—specifically being isolated, surrounded, and 
leaderless—seem to be more prevalent in urban fighting.  If this is the case, than the  
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consequences of indiscriminate and merciless rage can be expected in the city where the 
consequences of breakdowns in discipline, motivation, and ethical behavior are more 
severe and visible.   
The ability to understand human behaviors is as important as understanding the 
enemy and the environment; control depends on the ability to predict, manipulate, and 
harness human energy and limitations.  While the results are inconclusive in this area, the 
importance of this factor is clearly not and calls for further study.  As Roger Spiller 
noted, “war is the most human at the very place where humanity is in the greatest danger 
of extinction:  in the killing grounds and zones of combat, where men devote every 
impulse of their mental and physical energy to destroying one another” (Spiller, 1991, p. 
47).37 
Despite the fact that our findings were inconclusive in this area, based upon a 
shortage of empirical data, we feel that morality and ethics are an important consideration 
in urban warfare, even if only because there is greater visibility of these immoral and 
unethical acts, and the stakes in terms of costs to civilians, cultural icons, and economic 
infrastructure are higher.  We feel that the importance of morality and ethics in warfare 
warrants further study. 
G. DECISION-MAKING  
Hypothesis:  Decisions to prosecute operations in urban areas will be made at a 
higher level than a traditional non-urban battlefield where the same size forces 
would operate.  Decisions made at higher levels will convolute the decision-
making process and chain of command. 
Would Hitler have continued to attack Stalingrad if he knew he would have lose a 
250,000-man army?  Would General Gonen have even considered authorizing the attack 
on Suez City if he knew Adan’s forces did not have a chance?  Would Lieutenant General 
Cushman, the III MAF commander have allowed his Marines to be piecemealed into Hue 
and then tie their hands with an overly restrictive ROE if he could foresee the aftermath?  
The answer to all these questions is a rhetorical no.  Yet, all these decisions were made 
with other than military necessity in mind.  Poor decision-making beyond the everyday 
tactical mistakes in each of these cases contributed to failure in two (Stalingrad and Suez) 
                                                 
37 Roger J. Spiller, “My Guns: A Memoir of the Second World War”, American Heritage, December 
1991, p. 47. 
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and a prolonged battle with heavy casualties in the third (Hue).  The three examples 
above show a distinct disconnect between military necessity and political aims.  In the 
non-urban fights, these disconnects did not exist, or not to the degree that they required 
far-removed leaders to reach down and direct elements over which they did not have 
visibility.   
In comparing the decision-making in each case between the two environments, 
units were subjected to decision-making at a higher level in the urban than the non-urban 
environment.  Hitler personally made the decision to seize Stalingrad at all costs, when 
just a few months prior, taking the city was not even a consideration.  At Suez, political 
pressure to seize terrain for bargaining chips led to an ill-prepared and poorly executed 
attack by an otherwise combat-proven and highly successful division.  The battle for Hue 
drew the attention of leaders at every echelon, from the 1st Marine Division commander 
to President Johnson.  The messy fighting and slow progress under the watchful eye of 
the American media made the political decision-makers impatient to end this type of 
fighting.   
In comparison, prior to the city fighting, decisions affecting the same size unit 
(e.g. a battalion or division) were held at a tactically more suitable level.  Battalions were 
being direct by regiments, divisions by corps etc.  The non-urban operations were still 
important and difficult, but emphasis beyond military necessity to accomplish the mission 
was not apparent in any of the cases.  Reasons for this could include: the complexity of 
the operations in the urban environment, the symbolic prize of capturing a city, or the 
fear of public opinion turning against efforts to fight in a city.  It is fitting that decision-
making is the last factor we analyze because the effects of the other factors examined can 
play a role in why decisions were made at a higher level in the city.   
First, if the notion that the urban environment presents different challenges is 
accepted, then logic would suggest that these challenges would concern higher-level 
commanders.  They may feel the need to take control and direct action rather than watch 
the situation develop.  At Suez, Dudu appealed directly to Gonen to send tanks in to get  
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him out.  Gonen countermanded Adan’s orders and directed that a force be sent back into 
the city to retrieve the trapped paratroopers.  Only personal intervention on Adan’s part 
prevented that rescue operation from happening.   
Second, the urban environment’s effects on Avidor’s categories of time also affect 
decision-making to a degree.  The fact that tasks and operations simply take longer may 
have concern decision-makers and drive them to want to see more progress faster.  Third, 
the sheer lack of information about the actions available in a city may drive decision-
makers to reach down and find the ever-elusive commander’s operational picture.  A far 
removed decision-maker no longer receives accurate information about the situation, he 
could take measures to ensure he receives it.   
Finally, the potential magnification of human factors, such as the embarrassing 
loss of will and morale and the potential ethical failures like looting that a military could 
commit in the condensed human environment of cities, may lead decision-makers to 
closely supervise the city fight.  Immoral and unethical acts could cause severe damage to 
the political aim and negate the efforts and success of military action.  Overly restrictive 
ROE, of the sort seen at Hue, are an indicator of political pressure to control the 
possibility of bad behavior.  Essentially, we discovered that potential pitfalls, 
complications, lack of visibility, and costs associated with fighting in the urban 
environment tempt removed leaders in micro-managing urban operations. 
H. FRICTION 
As we suggested in the first chapter, friction is inherent to each of the 5 factors.  
Clausewitz says that, “Friction is the combined effect of differences between our 
constructs of unfolding military operations and their actuality” (as cited by Watts, 1996, 
p. 7).38 
However, it must be noted that friction affects both sides in proportion to their 
ability to interact with the environment.  Clausewitz originated the concept of friction in 
war.  He presented the notion that friction is an inherent construct in war.  He cites two 
axioms of war, which lead to the presence of friction: 
 
                                                 
38 Bob Watts Article Retrieved from [http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wab03/wab03.pdf], March 2003. 
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· Numerous chance events, which touch everything. 
· Numerous difficulties that inhibit accurate execution of the precise plans 
that theory tends to formulate (as cited by Watts, 1996, p. 9). 
From this foundation, Clausewitz developed eight factors which contribute to friction and 
its effects (Watts, 1996, p. 9).  These too, may be magnified in the urban environment.   
1. Insufficient Knowledge of the Enemy 
The enemy is rarely seen in an urban environment, and when he is seen it is for 
brief moments.  The enemy may be impossible to distinguish from among the masses of 
civilians.  Enemy intentions are harder to discern, as is his organization, because he is 
seen in snap shots only.  In all three cases we determined that insufficient knowledge of 
the enemy played a role in poor decision-making and execution. 
2. Rumors 
Rumors typically plague armies and generate uncertainties within the minds of 
soldiers.  In a city so little is known, communication and control are so difficult, and 
operations are so decentralized that rumors can run rampant.  We saw no clear reference 
to the effect of rumors in the three cases we examined, but there doubtless were rumors 
because there always are. 
3. Uncertainty About One’s Own Strength and Position 
The urban environment makes it more difficult to not only see the enemy, but to 
see oneself, and to see oneself relative to the enemy’s position.  In all three cases, we saw 
how the environment led to a decentralization of operations.   
4. The Uncertainties that Cause Friendly Troops to Tend to Exaggerate 
Their Own Difficulties 
For an exhausted, uninformed soldier engaged in close quarters battle, nothing 
else but his own difficulties matter to him.  CPT Christmas, LT Dudu, and LT Stempel all 
repeatedly noted their extreme difficulties.  In Dudu’s case, General Gonen was prepared 
to commit tanks to relieve his soldiers until convinced otherwise by Adan.  In the end, 
Dudu did not need the tanks and was able to successfully withdraw.  His fear and 




5. Differences Between Expectations and Reality 
The complex urban environment hampers soldiers’ and leaders’ ability to equate 
expectations and reality.  In all three cases, there were clear differences between 
expectations and reality, and these differences caused delays, uncertainty, hesitation, or 
complete mission failure. 
6. The Fact That One’s Own Army Is Never as Strong as it Appears on 
Paper 
The urban environment can easily make symbols on a map appear more coherent, 
intact, and organized than they are.  This, in turn, can lead to disconnects between the 
reality on the ground and the mental images of the battle in the minds of decision makers.  
In all three cases, the pull to control the situation—from Hitler to LaHue to Gonen 
generated friction because these decision-makers never fully understood the actual 
capabilities or shortcomings of the units involved. 
7. The Difficulties in Keeping an Army Supplied 
This could apply to any situation, but getting supplies to forces inside a city 
presents a series of challenges.  In all three cases, ammunition supply and casualty 
evacuation presented problems that impacted operational effectiveness. 
8. The Tendency to Change or Abandon Well Thought Out Plans When 
Confronted with the Vivid Physical Images and Perceptions of the 
Battlefield 
When fear, chaos, sensory overload, and uncertainty kick in on the high end of 
urban fighting, plans quickly change, privates become generals, primordial combat 
ensues, and survival becomes the priority.  Again, in all three cases, there were examples 
of operations abruptly changing because of the intensity of violence and ferocity of the 
defender’s resistance.   
In each of the cases we examined, militaries had problems accounting for the 
friction generated by the interaction of the 5 factors and the environment.  Friction 
magnified by entering urban combat affects individuals to an extent, but its greatest 
impact is on units and operations.  The effects on units are exemplified by difficulties in 
non-combatant management, navigation, integrity of formation, synchronization of 
systems, higher incidents of fratricide, greater decentralization, and continuous flux  
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between military objectives and achieving the end state.  To mitigate as much of this 




A. RECOMMENDATIONS   
Our recommendations are derived from the analysis of the cases.  
Recommendations include conceptual, organizational, and technological changes that 
will help mitigate the effects of the factors that influence combat in the urban 
environment, and which we believe will improve our capabilities for conducting urban 
operations.    
1. Time    
Examination of the cases shows that each military approached Brigadier General 
(retired) Avidor’s categories of time differently in the non-urban and the urban 
environments.  Since trends show time was approached differently in the two 
environments, developing an understanding and application of Avidor’s framework for 
analysis may prove beneficial.  His framework of analysis would be valuable to U.S. 
military doctrine to aid in conducting mission analysis, planning, and execution.  His 
easy-to-apply categories of time (relative, functional, and objective) can provide insight 
to commanders, planners, and operators at all levels from tactical to strategic.  His 
framework can also expand the limited approach to time that currently consists of 
backwards planning and time available analysis.   
Operations in urban environments should avoid time-based constraints or 
synchronization.  Across all three cases there was a failure to properly calculate 
functional time.  As a consequence, each force experienced an unraveling of operational 
synchronization and, in some cases, a loss of tempo and initiative.  In general terms, 
event-based planning may be a more effective way to plan urban operations.  Event-based 
planning needs to account for tactical, operational, and strategic level views of time 
estimates.  Time disconnects between these three levels can become a cause for poor 
decision-making.  The first step in avoiding these disconnects is to give the small unit 




In the same light, urban operations planners should attempt to make time an ally, 
not an adversary.  Avoid constraining forces with time.  Rather, allow perceptions of time 
to adjust to the situation.  In cases where perceptions of time cannot be altered, such as 
during a NEO, the existence of small tailor-made forces such as SOF or Marine units is 
one way to mitigate the effects of relative time.  Another method for avoiding the ill 
effects of time constraints on urban operations may be to adapt a long-term or 
unconventional approach.  This would require preparation and deliberate planning to help 
develop the operational area for large scale-operations.  Here, time for deliberate and not 
impromptu planning would be essential.   
2. Information 
Our analysis leads to three specific sets of recommendations.  These are: 
improving situational awareness, dealing with the loss of tactical leaders, and designing 
information systems that are reliable and can endure the hardships of the urban 
environment.  
a. Improving Situational Awareness 
In all three cases, the ability to sense the battlefield and communicate was 
restricted to varying degrees by the urban environment.  In the complex, three-
dimensional urban environment, commanders will continue to have difficulty visualizing 
their forces scattered across the battlefield.  To improve this may not require the 
technological ability to see the urban battlefield through remote sensors.  This may 
actually overload leaders and make the information (and the technology to transmit it) a 
burden, as well as create the risk of luring commanders into the fight when their efforts 
could best be utilized assessing outside events.   
Nevertheless, it is essential to improve urban sensing capabilities. Nor 
does this end with the commander.  These capabilities are crucial, especially for the 
lowest level leaders who need to be able to manage the sensing assets as they see fit, 
while also having the time to fight, control, and coordinate their elements.  Increased 
urban awareness is critical.  However, with increased information flow, various nodes 
within the chain of command can become overwhelmed with information.  This was seen  
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in each case with chaotic radio nets and massive amounts of information being 
transmitted, but often not properly received or analyzed, let alone disseminated to the 
elements that needed it.  
Controlling the flow and volume of information is a product of 
organizational design and practice.  Reporting channels and information relationships that 
work well in non-urban environments may not be suited for the city.39  That notion at 
least deserves some experimentation.  Information networks might be an answer.  Sharing 
common imagery, video, and other information simultaneously could empower the 
leaders of decentralized operations, while freeing higher commanders of the 
responsibility to report back down the chain.   
Initial intelligence preparation prior to going into an urban area is vital.  In 
all three cases, the attacking units went into the urban battle with poor visibility and 
analysis of the enemy, and in all three cases they suffered serious initial surprise and 
subsequent setbacks.  For hasty attacks to succeed in the urban setting, quality IPB is 
necessary.  In the U.S. context, expeditionary forces may have a disadvantage in quality 
IPB.  Unlike the Israelis in the West Bank, or Russians in Chechnya, U.S. forces are 
prone to be unfamiliar with the environments that they are heading into, and very 
unlikely (given current trends) to have established HUMINT networks.  The use of SOF 
or other agency assets to conduct operational preparation of the battlespace (OPB) could 
close this gap for U.S. expeditionary forces.   
Additionally, information sharing between U.S. information collectors, 
analyzers, and allies will be key to developing the intelligence picture.  Had the ARVN 
shared its intelligence with the U.S. prior to committing the Marines inside Hue, the 
Marines would not have been surprised on 31 January with Gravel’s initial assaults and 
later Thompson would been better prepared for the Citadel fight. 
 
                                                  
39 Sean Edwards of RAND proposes using ideas from organizational theory to reexamine information 
flows in order to increase efficiencies of reporting in urban environments.  He also proposes that 
commanders learn to recognize “zones of situational awareness” or areas where the urban environment will 
have the greatest impact on information flow such as sewers, EMS deadspace etc…(Edwards, 2001, p. 
xiii). 
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b. Dealing with the Loss of Tactical Leaders 
The urban environment obstructs command and control of units, forcing 
them to operate in decentralized manner.  The loss of leaders coupled with these 
environmental effects reduces the control of forces.  Yet, even with loss of a leader, 
information must still flow.  Just as Lieutenant Dudu, the battalion S2, took charge in the 
police station in Suez, so will countless unprepared junior leaders and soon-to-be leaders 
take charge in future situations.  U.S. military culture always assigns a chain of 
command.  In the urban environment, where elements will be pulled apart by the terrain 
and enemy, we need to ensure forces are trained to handle uncertainty and take charge 
when warranted.  This will require higher standards for our junior enlisted enabling them 
to take charge and lead by example immediately following the loss of their first-line 
supervisors.  Some of the active measures we can take to improve unit ability to deal with 
loss of leaders, and truly enable “privates to become generals”, include the following: 
simple operation schemes, reliable and redundant communication systems, mental 
preparation for taking charge, greater redundancy and division of labor in leadership 
roles40, and training which thoroughly tests junior leaders’ ability to step up and assume 
roles of greater responsibility.   
c. Design Information Systems that are Reliable and Can Endure 
the Urban Environment 
Even though the cases did not fully demonstrate the effects of EMS 
disruption or other communications failures, we know from recent studies the limitations 
of the EMS in the urban environment.  Information systems designed for urban 
operations must be able to overcome these limitations.  Soldiers burdened by the weight 
of these systems must be able to depend on them.  Information shortages caused by 
battery failures, enemy jamming, operational security violations, network failures, or too 
much traffic on the same bandwidth, will create distrust in the information, and only 
serve to add to operational friction.   
 
 
                                                 
40 The Israelis sometimes use two company commanders in their units.  One is up front in the fight, 
while the other is further back orchestrating the battle.  This insight came from a discussion with Brigadier 
General (retired) Gideon Avidor of the IDF in March 2003. 
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Similar to operational reliability, is the ability for the system to endure the 
hardships of the environment.  Hardening of communications systems will be important.  
This is particularly important where communications platforms are vulnerable to high 
volumes of close-range small arms fire, as in a city.  Improvements may be made in the 
form of a wireless network, redundant radio sets, or the ability of all crewmembers to 
communicate externally from the vehicle  
3. Use of Technology 
a. Urban-Specific Vehicles and Weapons   
All three cases demonstrate the use of and need for armored fighting 
vehicles in the city.  The tanks in these conflicts were infantry-friendly, e.g., capable of 
supporting infantry-heavy operations.  If urban operations of all levels of intensity, from 
peacekeeping to open warfare, are expected in the future, vehicles specially designed for 
the challenges of the urban environment may be warranted.  An urban-specific vehicle 
would need to be light enough to be rapidly deployable, but armored well enough to 
defeat direct hits from two of the world’s most widely proliferated small arms, the rocket 
propelled grenade (RPG) and the 12.7mm machinegun.  These vehicles would not require 
advanced technology.  The environment and the nature of urban fighting could degrade 
many of the technologically advanced systems that could be emplaced, such as 
sophisticated onboard gunnery computers and communications.  However, 
communication systems that are compatible with infantry portable systems will continue 
to be vital.  The Achzarit41 infantry armored vehicle used by the Israelis is a variant of 
the T-55 Soviet tank with the turret removed and a troop compartment built in the rear to 
support urban operations (Foss, 2002, p. 300).  It can withstand the RPG at close range 
and still support infantry operations with logistical and medical support as well provide 
automatic small arms fire.  This is a vehicle designed with one purpose in mind: urban 
warfare.42   
 
 
                                                 
41 Brigadier General (retired) Avidor relayed that achzarit is Hebrew for “cruel.”  Achzarit is the 
female form of the adjective achzar used for a form of a body, like a vehicle.   
42 Brigadier General (retired) Avidor relayed the Achzarit’s protection capability during a presentation 
at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS on 12 March 2003.   
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A future infantry-friendly tank should likewise be considered.  Such a tank 
would need to support infantry directly with a main gun that provides shock effect, like 
the M-48’s 90mm, without destroying everything in its path.  Lightweight tanks that can 
maneuver in tight streets without clumsily “rubbling” buildings and carving up road 
surfaces would be especially beneficial.  
b. Additional Technologies 
In Stalingrad, German after action reports made mention of the need to 
conserve manpower.  Technology can provide assistance in this area.  If infantry strength 
is critical in the urban environment, then machines should conduct tasks that typically 
place infantry at the greatest risk.  Locating the enemy and then getting to him often 
results in some of the highest casualty-producing operations.  Therefore, reconnaissance 
and breaching machines should be developed to complement human assets assigned to 
those perilous missions.   
At both Stalingrad and Hue, the defenders attempted to remain in close 
proximity to the attacker to nullify attacking advantages in CAS and artillery.  These 
hugging tactics are still in use today, and there is a high probability that U.S. forces will 
experience them in any future urban fight.43  Therefore, weapons that can be used to take 
advantage of close enemy proximity, such as thermo-baric weapons, overpressure and 
concussion munitions, and possibly even sonic weapons that can terrify, stun, or disorient 
an enemy should be developed and then incorporated into training and organization.  In 
essence, forces should have psychological and physiological weapons that terrorize, stun, 
or kill the enemy at close ranges without exposing friendly troops to needless risk.44 
c. Non-Lethals 
The use of effective non-lethal weapons will help defeat an enemy without 
destroying the urban infrastructure.  Rubbling the city makes it difficult to maneuver in, 
use later, and leads to costly postwar rebuilding efforts.  Additionally, in Hue many of the 
casualties were caused by falling debris and not enemy fire (Martin, 2000).  In Stalingrad, 
                                                 
43 The Chechens were notorious for hugging tactics in Grozny (Oliker, 2001; Grau & Thomas, 2000) 
from an article published in the Marine Corps Gazette, April 2000 Retrieved from 
[http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/Rusn_leslrn.htm]. 
44 Tim Thomas, in the RAND publication Denying the Widow Maker, suggests that sonic weapons 
could be developed to penetrate concrete walls and induce nausea, “an endless smoke detector” (as cited in 
Glenn, 1998, p. 58). 
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extensive destruction only slowed the heavy panzer forces.  By reducing rubbling, 
maneuver can be increased.  Numerous non-lethals are an alternative to overbearing 
firepower that could work against a military force.  Non-lethals that are currently being 
used by law enforcement need to be considered for combat roles, much like the Marines 
innovated and began using tear gas during the battle for Hue.   
Non-lethal weapons can be used to reduce the total damage and suffering, 
but also should be viewed as a means of generating confusion and overload within an 
enemy organization.  The urban environment, as we have seen, degrades information.  
Remote demonstrations, such as clusters of pyrotechnics or other devices, can be used to 
introduce further confusion into the enemy’s decision cycle. 
d. Training 
The biggest failure across all three cases was lack of training for urban 
operations.  There is an expansive literature on this subject, so details are not critical 
here.45  What is important, however, is to identify the need to adapt organizations and 
weapons systems.  This may seem like common sense, yet three competent militaries all 
entered the urban environment fighting just as they did in non-urban environments.  Of 
those three, only one successfully adapted to the environment to win its battle.   
Training for urban operations will require realistic sites to conduct 
expansive operations that allow commanders to implement new technologies and tactics, 
and recognize how some of the frictions we have discussed here unfold in a long-
duration urban operation.  Given the differences and challenges we have described in the 
urban arena, training needs to reflect these challenges realistically and test combined 
arms application and higher command and control systems.  With this level of realism, 
the trends in friction we have identified will manifest themselves and commanders will 
be able to prepare for them in combat.  
All three cases demonstrated the intensity of urban fighting.  Given the 
increased importance of the individual in urban combat, training programs should focus 
more intensively on preparing individuals to endure the decimation of their units in the 
                                                 
45 Two of the more notable works available beyond U.S. doctrine include Denying the Widow-Maker: 
Summary of Proceedings of the RAND-DBBL Conference on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain by 
Glenn R. et al, (2000) and Capital Preservation by Glenn, R. (2001).  Both are comprehensive 
compendiums of urban operations lessons learned and techniques.   
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urban environment.  The 75th Ranger Regiment’s individual training philosophy, for 
instance, focuses on four basic components of individual training that could be adopted.  
Since these four areas are: physical fitness, marksmanship, small unit drills, and 
individual medical training.  Many aspects of the Ranger Regiment’s philosophy are 
urban-related, from climbing obstacles during physical fitness training to close-range and 
off-hand firing techniques, and from room clearing to individual medical skills.  With 
these essential “blocking and tackling” skills, the Rangers possess the flexibility to 
respond rapidly to chaos, loss of leaders, and isolation.   
e. Organization 
The Germans and Marines both learned to adapt their organizations during 
the conduct of the fighting.  Both utilized combined arms efforts to fight in the city.  The 
Israelis almost exclusively now deploy for urban operations in combined capabilities 
battle groups.  Media footage from recent actions in the occupied territories shows Israeli 
infantry, armor, bulldozers, and dog teams all working within a couple buildings of each 
other.  The Russians also rediscovered the value of task organizing combined arms battle 
groups during the later operations in Grozny (Grau & Thomas, 2000).  The power of 
battle groups in urban warfare is that they allow for different capabilities to be used at the 
smallest levels, and since decentralization of operations most inevitably occur, it makes 
sense to push these capabilities down to the lowest level, be they Ontos recoilless rifle 
systems, combat engineers, or direct fire support artillery.   
One of the requirements for battle groups to be effective is that there be 
strong unit cohesion.  Cohesion takes time to develop; therefore, it may be necessary for 
these company and battalion level battle groups to become permanent organizations.  
Task organizing these forces “on the fly” is a haphazard way to go about forming these 
groups because urban combat tests cohesion and is not at all the situation in which to 
build it.  For expeditionary force concepts to work in the urban context, the prerequisite 
forces must be cohesive before deployment.  The U.S. should consider building these 
habitual combined capabilities units in peacetime, not just prior or even during 
operations.   
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The experiences in Stalingrad, Suez City, and Hue also demonstrate the 
added value of combat engineers and snipers.  Both engineers and snipers should be 
incorporated into units designated to fight in cities, and special schools and equipment 
should be developed to further test the potential of these two very important urban 
combat multipliers.   
4. Human Factors 
Even with inconclusive results across all three cases, our preliminary research 
reveals how important it is to pay attention to human factors and understand that limits 
may be reached differently in the urban environment.  The IDF, for instance, goes out of 
its way to mitigate human factors in urban fighting via tow procedures worth 
consideration here.   
a. Force Rotations 
First, the IDF uses a shift rotation of forces to keep constant pressure on 
the enemy with fresh troops.  Entire units are assigned a shift and rotated daily, as might 
be done in factories.  Usually operating on a 12-hour cycle, an element will conduct 
operations during a block of time that is equally divided between hours of daylight and 
darkness.  As revealed in our analysis of time, darkness decreases the tempo of operations 
and potentially increases stress through the added uncertainty of the environment.   
b. Treatment of Psychological Casualties 
Another procedure the Israelis have integrated into their operations is the 
identification, treatment, and return to duty of psychological casualties.  Front-line 
medics and surgeons are tasked to identify and evacuate potential psychological 
casualties.  The soldiers are kept in close proximity to their parent unit, usually at the 
brigade-level aid station.  Here, confidence is instilled and they are encouraged to return 
to help their comrades.  By insulating these casualties, the Israelis have had great success 
in returning soldiers quickly to their units.46    
 
                                                  
46 Brigadier General (retired) Avidor relayed this procedure during a presentation at the Foreign 
Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS on 12 March 2003.  Tim Thomas observed that of the 1,312 
Russian paratroopers surveyed after the first battle of Grozny in 1994-1995, 72% of them suffered from 
some form of psychological disorder ranging from weakness to pathological disorders (as cited in Glenn, 
1998, p. 57). 
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c. Heading Off Unethical Behavior 
If future operations can be anticipated in urban areas, then plans need to be 
put in place to deal with the possibility of looting and other unethical behavior around 
civilian populations.  The fact that urban areas are large concentrations of civilians only 
increases the opportunities to loot and engage in other forms of misconduct.  Of the cases 
examined, the Marines came the closest to having these problems at Hue, but checked 
them quickly once leaders were made aware.  New methods may have to be developed to 
ensure that combatants obey standards, particularly since leaders may easily lose direct 
control over units scattered in different buildings, etc.   
c. Building Teams to be Ready for Urban Combat 
In all three cases, high levels of will and morale, experience, and cohesion 
were essential to maintaining unit integrity and sustain soldiers’ ability to conduct 
operations under duress.  U.S. units may find themselves thrust into urban combat 
without the “luxury” of being able to develop combat experience in a non-urban 
environment.  Here simulations may prove useful, though any such simulations should 
test more than operational concepts and constructs.  They should also test and challenge 
individual senses.  Simulate sensory overload, and test cohesion and commitment in 
leaders at all levels by forcing them to deal with isolation, panic, uncertainty, and set-
backs.  Without question, teaching units through training and simulations cannot replace 
real combat experience, but it can build a base of confidence for dealing with severe 
psychological and physiological stress, while simultaneously teaching the usefulness of 
self-reliance. 
Another consideration is the amount of equipment carried by soldiers. In 
all three cases, soldiers carried their weapons, some ammunition, and water.  They had 
little body armor, packs, or equipment to bog them down.  Weight is an important 
consideration, especially with modernization efforts, which may force soldiers to carry 
heavier loads.  SLA Marshall observed in Notes of Urban Warfare (1973),  
To be emphasized above all else is that infantry in the attack must travel 
light.  To overload is to invite defeat.  Nimbleness of foot is the 




Of all the recommendations we have made, the one regarding decision-making is 
the easiest to make yet, the hardest to implement.  As we saw in each of the cases, when 
high-ranking leaders became more actively involved they usually convoluted the 
decision-making processes of operational units.  To prevent this convoluted command 
behavior, commanders on the ground as well as advisors to higher-ranking decision-
makers will need to recognize the hazards they can cause forces engaged in combat.  To 
avoid detrimental interference, the high-ranking decision-maker will need to be 
introspective about the potential consequences of his actions.  Second, subordinate 
commanders and advisors will need to demonstrate moral courage and remind leaders of 
these potential pitfalls.  As with most of our recommendations, this is a matter of problem 
identification and prevention.  Two indicators of an improper balance in decision-making 
are lack of harmony between the political will and military necessity regarding particular 
objectives, and the willingness of leaders to skip the chain of command to affect action.  
How to avoid this imbalance should be addressed in initial campaign strategy formulation 
and then updated occasionally to ensure a proper fit with changing circumstances.  This 
especially applies to ROE. 
6. Operational Concepts 
In each case examined, none of the militaries went into the battle with an 
operational concept developed specifically for urban combat.  Our research indicates that 
the Germans and U.S. Marines modified previously used tactics and techniques to fit the 
urban environment.  In all three cases, the attackers met with initial failure, and only in 
the case of the Marines was the attacker able to adjust tactics in time to manage a victory.  
Therefore, we feel that urban-specific constructs should be examined and tested to see if 
there is a way to win urban battles without having to go through an “adjustment” period, 
with all its associated risks and costs.   
At the heart of all our suggested operational concepts is the idea of “constant 
pressure.”  Brigadier General (retired) Avidor mentioned the concept of constant pressure 
as a means to defeat an urban opponent.47  As the term implies, constant pressure is the 
                                                 
47 Brigadier General (retired) Avidor presented this idea during a presentation at the Foreign Military 
Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS on 12 March 2003.   
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result of continuous effects placed on the enemy throughout his organization.  Over time, 
the effects of this pressure will be enough to break the organization, and the continuous 
nature of the pressure will ensure that he does not have the opportunity to efficiently 
maneuver forces and assets or regain/seize the initiative.  Constant pressure can take on 
many forms, and its real benefit lies in how its effects are compounded by the urban 
terrain.  The enemy is subject to the same environment and must account for the same 
five factors in some way, shape, or form.  If possible, we should make the urban 
environment as unfriendly as possible for our foes, while simultaneously trying to use to 
advantage ourselves.  Listed below are a few concepts that seek to take advantage of the 
power of exerting constant pressure on a foe in an urban environment.      
In all three cases we saw the attacker attempt to defeat the enemy by first 
destroying his physical capability to resist.  As the defender lost assets, his organization 
began to erode, followed shortly by his will to fight.  Except for Hue, we never saw the 
attacker fully destroy the physical ability of the defender to fight.  Major General (retired) 
David L. Grange, in a briefing on urban warfare, made the following recommendation for 
fighting an urban opponent that is in line with the application of urban pressure.  He 
suggested that instead of the “traditional” manner of destroying an enemy physically, 
followed by destroying his organization and then his will, U.S. forces should attack 
enemy will and organization with the same power, speed, and vigor that we go after him 
physically.  Grange suggests that by doing so, actual costs in terms of violence and time 
will substantially decrease (as cited in Glenn, 2001, p. 306).   
A means to accomplish this end may entail the necessity of integrating SOF and 
conventional forces to achieve the necessary volume and diversity of combat power to 
overload enemy organizations and break down the enemy’s will through physical and 
moral isolation and denial of sanctuary.  Conventional attacks in conjunction with SOF 
efforts to conduct unconventional warfare would help isolate the urban environment 
conducting raids on peripheral targets could help discombobulate the enemy.   
Another way to increase the constant pressure felt by the enemy is to take active 
measures to increase his levels of friction associated with the urban environment.48  As 
                                                 
48 Spiller presents the idea of turning friction into a weapon in his study, Sharp Corners, (2001, p. 
107). 
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previously mentioned, friction affects both sides but to different degrees, depending on 
each side’s ability to adjust to the enemy and environment.  Mitigating the effects of 
friction has been the traditional technique used to increase unit performance.  This 
technique is still valid, but also begs the question, “How much more effective could a 
unit be if it dropped its own levels of friction while raising those of its opponent?”  
Disruption of enemy communication capabilities, supply methods, disguising friendly 
strengths and weaknesses, psychological operations, deception, and continuous pressure 
are ways to possibly use the negative effects of friction against the enemy, instead of 
simply relying on the traditional passive measures taken to mitigate the enemy’s effects 
on friendly elements.  
Tipping urban friction in favor of friendly forces while applying constant pressure 
can only happen if units cease fighting urban operations in traditional linear-modes.  The 
Germans and Israelis were stymied using these methods.  The Marines were set back 
initially, but eventually adapted their tactics just enough to beat the NVA.  Perhaps a 
better way to go about achieving the same results would be for a partial abandonment of 
linear (terrain oriented) tactics.  A combination of internal and external pressures, formed 
by a conventional hammer and unconventional or SOF swarming operations, could take 
advantage of the benefits of shock, speed, and simultaneity.   
Also, isolation needs to be recognized as powerful force, and should be achieved 
whenever possible in the urban setting.  True physical isolation is very costly in terms of 
manpower, and can take time to achieve.  Isolation is an effect that can also be applied to 
a variety of targets of organizational and moral worth with equal or greater effects and 
less cost.  Isolating the enemy from the population and using diplomacy or the media, to 
isolate the enemy from other sources of support have a role to play in lowering the costs 
of urban warfare.  
B. CONCLUSION 
By examining three different militaries and qualitatively comparing their 
performance in urban and non-urban environments, we were able to identify differences 
in performance in 4 of the 5 factors we identified as most likely to be changed by the 
urban environment.  While we could not prove conclusively the effects that the urban 
environment had on human factors, participants in the battles we studied did note the 
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importance for keeping units together under the strain of urban combat.  Finally, clear 
commonalities in how militaries approached time, used their technology, and made 
decisions during urban operations offer lessons for future consideration.  Our factor of 
information is a popular topic in urban operations literature, and results of our study 
reinforce the difficulty that can be expected in sensing, processing, and communicating 
various forms of information in the urban environment.   
After comparing performances in urban and non-urban environments, we cannot 
say the urban environment is more difficult than a non-urban environment.  Every 
environment presents challenges, and mitigating these challenges relative to an enemy’s 
ability to do the same is the key for improving the probability of success.  Future urban 
opponents are likely to hold several environmental advantages over our forces, given 
their expeditionary nature and their initial unfamiliarity when deployed to a new setting.  
Consequently, we need to train, educate, and tailor our forces to look forward and not 
dread fighting in cities. 
Because urban fighting is about more than sound doctrine, room-clearing 
techniques, or technological quick fixes, more attention needs to be paid to the factors we 
have defined and examined.  Understanding these will help military leaders with the 
ability to reduce the friction these factors invariably give rise to.   
We hope this study has generated thought about urban operations beyond what is 
published and accepted in our doctrine.  Where we might have once thought urban 
combat is a tougher type of combat, we now realized it is just different.  Differences in 
warfare, call for innovation.  More importantly, attention paid to them now will enable us 
to adjust to meet the threat before the fight begins rather then have to where the cost will 
be in treasure, blood, and more.    
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